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PKEFACE
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The thesis is based chiefly 011 material obtained from
Parliamentary Papers and Colonial Office correspondence with
the West Indies Colonial Governments.
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1865 - 1900, has been carried up to the date of the abolition
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THE BRITISH WEST INDIES
SUGAR INDUSTRY
(1800 - 1865.)
The purpose of this general survey is to provide,
as clearly as is possible, a picture of the sugar in¬
dustry of the British West Indies during the period
1800 - 1865. It is intended to be preparatory to a
thesis covering the ensuing period, 1865 - 1900.
If there is one evident fact that emerges from an examination
into British West Indian history, during the early nineteenth
century, it is that distress existed in the sugar industry long
before the Emancipation of Slaves in 1834, and the passing of the
Sugar Duties Act of 1846.
There appears to have been a progressive decline extending
back into the eighteenth century, and cries of distress were
heard, almost in conjunction with the establishment of the sugar
industry in the islands, in the seventeenth century. ^In en¬
deavouring to establish the cause of this distress it is dif¬
ficult to escape the conclusion that much of it arose from in¬
debtedness acquired as a result of the slave system. Long says
"the purchase of new negroes is the most chargeable article
attending these estates and the true source of the distresses
under which their owners suffer, for they involve themselves
deeply in debt to make these inconsiderable purchases, and lose
so many by disease, or other means in the seasoning that they
become unable to make good their engagements and are plunged in
law-suits and anxiety" There is evidence that this opinion
was held by other persons, not only in the British West Indies
but in foreign sugar colonies as wells.
The expense involved in acquiring the requisite slave stock
for a sugar plantation was very great, - rated at one-third to
one /
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one-half the total value of the sugar property, - and constant
replenishment was necessary. Toward the end of the eighteenth
century the slave system "became more and more expensive to main¬
tain. The cost of food imports rose to double after the War
of American Independence,1 the provision grounds provided on
the estates for the slaves were becoming exhausted through years
of cultivation.2 Thus the expense of feeding the slaves rose
increasingly. Wastage of life was enormous and continued right
up until the abolition of slavery.3 The rise in the price of
sugar during the period 1808 - 18184, added incentive to the
planters to work their slaves more strenuously, and excessively
long hours of work were reported5.
Thus, initial cost of slaves, their maintenance and loss
by wastage, imposed a heavy burden upon the British West Indian
planter who had also to meet charges imposed on his estate by
marriage portions, annuities and interest on legacies and mor¬
tgages. The distress felt by the planter had reached such a
stage by the end of the eighteenth century that petitions and
complaints are manifested very frequently during the first three
decades of the next century.6 Space permits of reference to
only a small number of these. A parliamentary commission in
1792 reported that in the course of twenty years 177 estates
in Jamaica had been sold for payment of debts and92 more were
in /
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in the hands of creditors and that executions had "been lodged
* ,
in the provost-marshal's office for 22, 563,786 1. In a report
for 1804 it is stated that "every British merchant who holds
securities in Jamaican estates is filing "bills to foreclose"
and that "all kinds of credit is at an end". A West Indian
Committee reported in 1807, that since the year 1792 there had
taken place "a progressive deterioration in the situation of
the planters". A report of the House of Assembly in the same
year declared that within the five or six previous years 65
estates had been abandoned in Jamaica and 32 estates sold under
s
decrees of Chancery and that there were some 115 more "which suite
were pending and many other bills preparing. Moreover that "the
sugar estates lately brought to sale and now in Chancery in this
island and in England amount1about one-fourth of the whole number
in the colony"2. In 1832 Mr. Huskisson was remarking in Par¬
liament on "the deplorable distressed state of the West Indian
planters". 5
The above cries of distress were voiced at a time when
great numbers of slaves were being introduced into the isL ands
(up to 1807) and it was during these years that the British West
Indian sugar industry received a number of boons. In 1791 a
slave rebellion in St. Domingo had wiped out the sugar industry
there. Prior to this annihilation of her sugar producing
power /
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power, St. Domingo had exported annually a volume of sugar
equivalent to that of all the British West Indies combined.1
The withdrawal of this great amount from the sugar market created
such a demand for sugar, clayed or otherwise, that the British
West Indies found it more beneficial to ship sugar in its raw
form rather than clay it as they hitherto done. The destruc¬
tion of the St. Domingo sugar supply raised sugar to a famine
price.2 In Jamaica estates were planted in places and on
soils which could only pay under a system of protection or
during a period of very high prices. These estates were the
first to collapse on the break-up of the slave trade and during
the later difficulties met with in the nineteenth century.3
The introduction of the Bourbon or Otoheite cane at the end
of the eighteenth century4 also proved a blessing to the sugar
industry. The advantages of this cane from the Pacific were
soon apparent. Introduced into Jamaica in 1799 the Otoheite
cane had raised production to 150,352 hogsheads in 1805, the
highest it had ever been and indicated the zenith of Jamaica's
sugar industry.3
Another boon occurred in 1807 when the prohibition of
spirits in England made from corn or grain created an increased
-*
demand for rum. In 1825 there were adjustments favourable to
commercial prosperity. British West Indies ports were thrown
open /
* Such, a prohibition was not unprecedented - See Pares, R. "wf^d^Le
op. cut. pp. 484-5.
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open to foreign ships and duties on West Indian produce in a
few instances were decreased.
Sugar prices averaged the highest on record between the
years 1808 - 181& but from 181-& on a progressive drop was re¬
corded. 1 The acquisition of British Guiana and Trinidad, the
enhanced production of Mauritius2 caused expansion that con¬
tributed to a severe fall in the price of sugar in England -
from 91s. lOd. in 1815 to 47s. 8d. in 1851.5 The price fall
plus the forecast of abolition of slavery, a hurricane which
devastated the Leewards and Barbados in 1831, and a destructive
slave uprising in Jamaica in 1831 - 2, brought matters to the
stage where a Select Committee was q?pointed to inquire into
and devise remedies for the plight of the Sugar Colonies.
The Report of the Commission was to the effect that over¬
production was the cause of depression. The British West
Indies with this greatly enhanced production, resulting from
the acquisition of British Guiana and Trinidad, produced more
than the United Kingdom consumed. The resulting overflow went
to Europe, where, meeting the competition of foreign sugar, a
price decline set in.4 The Report also stated that difficulties
arose from monopolies, to which the British West Indian planter
was subjected to - especially in respect to the prohibition im-
*
posed on their refining their own sugar. The result of this
prohibition /
A prohibition-,in t&§ form of heavy duties on refined sugar
entering the United Kingdom.
6
prohibition was an amazing waste in bringing over muscovado
sugar which was of benefit neither to the United Kingdom nor to
the West Indies.1
, The British West Indies derived little benefit from the
Report of 1831 - 2. Its few recommendations were not im¬
plemented by the British Government and its chief value was in
the information obtained respecting the financial relationship
that existed between the planter and the consignee merchant in
England.
Sugar planters in the West Indies almost always appeared
to be short of capital, although their chief desire was to ac¬
cumulate sufficient capital to enable them to retire and live
at home on a competency.2 To obtain this capital it was essen¬
tial that the planter keep his estate working and, if possible,
increase cultivation. This he was able to do only by con¬
tinually obtaining advances from a lender, in his case, a mer¬
cantile correspondent at home. Briefly, it may be said that
most of the inconvenience and frustration that the.planter was
subjected to arose naturally from his trading on borrowed
capital.
The Sugar planter would usually establish a connection
with a merchant in London, Bristol, Liverpool or Glasgow, who
undertook the entire charge of receiving and realizing the con¬
signments /
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signments of sugar and furnishing supplies. The consignee
would grant the planter an advance of money securing that ad¬
vance "by a mortgage on the sugar estate. In addition to the
interest at six per cent on the mortgage the merchant also
received a commission of 2i% on the amount of sugar sold (duty
advanced included) ana on plantation stores sent out, along with
on all insurance effected.
The interests of the planter and merchant did seem to he
mutually identified. If the planter became embarrassed, the
merchant did not escape embarrassment. If prices fell and the
planter's advance was not covered by a sufficient consignment,
the merchant would equally be in difficulty in that usually his
business consisted of multiple transactions and theplight of one
planter was usually the plight of other planters. The capital
of the merchant, unless it were very large, might be absorbed
and placed beyond his control. The mortgages were of value to
the merchant only in an ultimate sense; they served as an instru¬
ment to bring the planter's sugar into the hands of the merchant
and they returned a good interest as long as the estate was in
active cultivation. But to foreclose and to take possession
of an estate was often a hazardous course.-1-
The Report of 1831 - 22 failed to produce evidence whereby
the merchant could be accused of dishonest practice. The
planterfe/
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planter's freedom of choice was restricted and higher charges
were paid for different facilities, as a result of his connec¬
tion with the merchant, hut it is difficult to "believe that
these could have heen avoided by a planter working on borrowed
capital no matter from what source that capital were obtained.
The evidence of the Report showed that there were advan¬
tages accruing to the planter as a result of his connection with
the merchant. Planters who were not tied to a consignee merchant
stated that shipping facilities provided by the consignee were
far superior to those of a "seeking vessel". The consignee's
ships were especially constructed for the sugar trade, and ran
on a schedule that suited the planter's time-table. Plantation
stores were needed at the end of December or early January when
crop time commenced. Sugar, if not shipped, quickly lost weight
once it was stored in hogsheads. The consignee merchant ,if he
did not have his own ships usually chartered them and was respons¬
ible for payment of demurrage if loading was not completed within
the specified time1. Incomplete loading and a short cargo meant
that the charterer had to pay on "dead freight"2. At the home
port the charterer had to ensure quick unloading. True, freight
charges levied by the consignee on the planter's sugar was higher'
than those charged by the "seeking vessel" but the planter had
his coals and freight brought out free of freight charge. Ship¬
owners /
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owners of seeking vessels stated that they could afford to carry
sugar at a cheaper rate than the consignee's vessel only if they
had the advantage of freight on cargo outwards.^
The consignee merchant did not look to ship-owning as the
profitable part of his business, although it was an essential
part if he were to have the planter's sugar channelled to hira
when he wanted it. For the profit the merchant hoped to make,
and did, he depended on his commission for selling and buying
and on the interest he received for his mortgages.
Although the recommendations of the Commission of 1831 - 2
were not acted upon and distress was still evidenced, the
Abolition of Slavery in 1834 did not result in the complete col¬
lapse of the sugar industry as had been predicted.2 A gradual
decline had already existed and by 1834 the sugar exports of
Jamaica had fallen to 84,756 hogsheads from the high figure of
150,352 hogsheads in 1805.3 The production of the other colo¬
nies had also declined but not so much and they were gradually
to recover their position in the future, but Jamaica never did,
not even in the twentieth century.^ For all the British West
Indies, the period immediately following Emancipation was one
of confused re-adjustment. The first problem was that of
financing the wage bill. There had always been a shortage of
cash in the West Indies5 and now it was very much accentuated.
Prior /
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Prior to the period of apprenticeship, there had been no banking
system, banking business being transacted through the medium of
the large mercantile houses. This was now inadequate to meet
the problem of finding specie for payment of wages. So great
was the scarcity of silver in the first few years of Apprentice¬
ship that planters paid premiums of 6 to 6^% for it, where-re¬
quired to pay wages.1 This deficiency of specie in small units
and the lack of capital on the part of the planter resulted in
tardiness in paying wages and caused ill-feeling between planters
and negroes.
The first attempts to establish a banking system were made
during this period of Apprenticeship. The growth of Joint Stock
banks in England led to the formation of the Colonial Bank in
Kingston, Jamaica in 1836, and branches were established through¬
out the other islands.2 The success of the Colonial Bank led
to the founding of two local banks in Jamaica, the Jamaica Bank
and the Planter's Bank. The absence of coinage continued, the
newly found banks putting out a disproportionate paper circulation,
until in 1839, the Jamaica Legislature passed laws restricting
banking operations in the Colony, and gradually the change of
having all notes redeemable in silver was effected.® In 1836
Mr. Burge, Agent for Jamaica, applied to the British Government
for a supply of small coin. The result was that 200,0001. of
the /
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the 500,000 1. granted to Jamaica at this time, was actually-
made up in small coinage and sent out on hoard a man of war.1
In this manner, the shortage of cash for wages was gradually
eased.
In many ways the planters misused their opportunity during
Apprenticeship of establishing a sound basis for future relations
with the labourers. There were many cases of undue and exces¬
sive valuations of apprentices to retard their purchasing their
freedom,2 and there were also excessive demands of work. It
was reported that "Negroes now do 160 cane holes in the same time
they used to dig 90 during slavery3". Many planters still gave
those benefits to the negroes as was the custom during slavery -
such as providing provision grounds, rations of rum, grinding the
labourer's cane, and giving him medical care. Other planters,
however, discontinued these benefits.4 The inability of the
majority of resident planters to pay wages to the negro^; the
irritation of overseers whose power was gradually transferred to
the new magistracy, and also opposition of the negro and reluc¬
tance to labour without assurance of prompt payment of wages,
and a disposition to withold his own time3 - all these factors
operated to bring about a state of affairs where, as it was
stated, all classes were at cross-purposes with each other.6
The end of Apprenticeship in 1838 saw practically a complete
exodus /
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exodus of negroes from the sugar estates in all the British
West Indies, except Barbados. In some of the islands it was
a gradual process as in Antigua, where, in 1846, Governor
Higginson reported "the number of labourers withdrawing from
estates continued to increase and up to 1846, 9,300 of them had
withdrawn forming 70 settlements".-1- In Jamaica, the exodus
was complete and rapid and brought industry to an impasse.
Governor Barkly reporting for the parish of St. Thomas in Vale
said that the canes rotted to the ground and, in the first year
of freedom, scarce 1,000 hogsheads of sugar were realized.1 The
labourers took to the hills or squatted on abandoned estates
where they depended for a livelihood on their provision grounds.
By May, 1839, it was reported of Jamaica, that "all the best and
most valuable and only efficient part of the population of the
estates are gone or going - becoming a yeomanry."2 In Trinidad,
the disposition of the Creoles to settle away from the sugar
estates was at length checked by a territorial ordinance under
which people could obtain legal possession of Crown land only
on paying moderate rates.3 In British Guiana, the movement
took the form of an exodus into the interior and along the
shores of the great rivers. This "internal haemorrhage" as it
was termed was remarked on by Governor Barkly in his journey up
the Demerara river; he reported that he saw the banks lined 50
or /
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or 60 miles with huts and clearings.1
An interesting feature of this withdrawal from the estates
was the purchase of estates by groups of negroes, for substantial
sums. In British Guiana estates were purchased by negroes who
paid sums ranging from £11,000 to £16,000 and showed that the
negro, in some cases, had not been lacking in thrift during
Apprenticeship.2
The termination of Apprenticeship (1838), took the sugar
proprietors by surprise. In Trinidad, planters claimed they
had only four days notice that on August 1st, 1838, their ap¬
prentices would be absolutely free.3 The first reaction of the
sugar planter was, in many cases, a muddled attempt to economize.
In Jamaica, lack of labour resulted in the practice of hiring
hands only in crop time - thus cleaning and cultivating were ne¬
glected.4 In British Guiana, stipendiary magistrates were in¬
structed to attempt to induce labourers to consent to a reduction
in wages.5 In St. Lucia, "canes were cut before they were ripe
and the sugar shipped half-cured" as a result of lack of labour
and improved processes.5 In many cases, planters attempted to
seduce labour from each other and Lord Grey spoke of the effect
this had in making the negroe a disinterested labourer.17
The lack of labour and difficulty in adjustment at the end
of Apprenticeship had a telling effect on sugar production. In
comparing /
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comparing the years 1839 - 42 with the years 1835 - 38, sagar
production of Jamaica and-Grenada declined "by one half: British
Guiana hy three fifths: St. Vincent by two fifths and Trinidad
by one fifth. Barbados alone maintained her production and, as
well, in the latter period showed a sharp increase in production.1
According to the argument advanced in the Report of 1831 - 2, this
reduction in sugar production of the British West Indies &ould
have given the planters a full monopoly of the British market and
have maintained a high price by equating production to consump¬
tion, but such did not happen. Foreign sugar imports were in¬
creased despite the higher duty they were subject to. Mauritian
sugar production more than trebled and East Indian sugar had been
admitted on equal terms with West Indian sugar into Great Britain.
By 1842, the average price of British West Indian sugar was 49s.
cwt. compared to that of Brazil and Cuba which was 21 s. cwt.2
The protection given to the British West Indian sugar industry
was stated as a tax of £2,000,000 on Britain for the benefit of
the sugar proprietor.3 Despite this protection, the sugar in¬
dustry in the British West Indies was not in a healthy condition.
The greater portion of estates in Jamaica were mortgaged at the
time of Emancipation and in most of these cases, compensation
V
money was awarded to the mortgage;®.4 Except in British Guiana
h
very little of the compensation money received for the slaves
was /
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was used to buy labour-saving improvements and to improve the
technique of sugar manufacture. Immediately after the payment
of compensation money in Jamaica many of the encumbered estates
ceased to be cultivated. A return presented by the Jamaican
House of Assembly in 1843 showed that of 600 sugar plantations
during the time of slavery, 300 were immediately dismantled and
said that these 300 estates less in cultivation was an extinc¬
tion of 300,000 1. annually in work and wages.1 In the first
four years after Emancipation, British Guiana reported a diminu¬
tion of 57 estates from a total number of 308 at the 1st January,
1838. 2
A Select Committee was appointed in 1842 to inquire into
the commercial state of the British West Indies.3 The resolu-
tionsof this committee were to the effect that Emancipation had
been productive of most gratifying results, but unhappily, with
this betterment in the negroes' condition there had been a great
diminution in the staple production of the West Indies, the prin¬
cipal cause of which was the difficulty in obtaining steady and
continuous labour.'1 The Committee urged immigration to compensate
for this deficiency. The principle result of this Select Com¬
mittee was the institution of immigration schemes to bring la¬
bourers into the various colonies.
Attempts to supplement the labour force took various forms
in /
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in the first half of the nineteenth century. Early efforts to
"bring in Europeans availed of little use. The climatic effect
and the habits of living into which they quickly degenerated,
destroyed any potential value that these Europeans might have
had, as the nucleus of a dependable labour supply.1 The Por¬
tuguese proved to be the most capable of these European immig¬
rants, however, as soon as they acquired enough savings they in¬
variably left the estates and took up shopkeeping and huckstering.2
Attempts were also made to recruit free African labour from West
Africa andAfrieani freed from captured slave ships.3 These
immigrants never amounted to any substantial number and v/ere
soon enticed away from the estates by the Creoles.4
Attention was early turned to the Coolie of India and.it
was from here that by far the greatest number of immigrants were
introduced into the British West Indies. More Coolies were
introduced into British Guiana and Trinidad than into any of
the other Colonies of the West Indies,5 and, generalizing, Coolie
immigration was successful in these two Colonies, but with the
exception of perhaps Antigua it was of negligible importance
in resuscitating the sugar industry in the rest of the British
West Indies, up to 1865. British Guiana aid Trinidad had some
difficulty at first in organizing their immigration system and
much misery and ill-feeling prevailed but by 1848 difficulties in
organization /
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organization and medical care had been straightened out.1
Coolies applying for renewed periods of indenture were very
many in number, and the value of savings taken home by those who
returned to India indicated that the system was working to the
advantage of the Coolie at least in British Guiana and Trinidad8.
In Jamaica, immigration never obtained to the extent that
it did on British Guiana and Trinidad, although at the time of
Emancipation it was evident that there would be a scarcity of
labour since Jamaica had so much available land on which the
Creole negro might squat and grow provisions and, as Carlyle
said "where a black man by working about half an hour the day
(such is the calculation) can supply himself by aid of sun and
mxfcK
soil with asApumpkin as will suffice, he is likely to be a little
stiff to raise into hard work."s
Apart from the ease with which his wants could be satisfied
by little effort, there were other reasons for the lack of inclin¬
ation to work on the part of the Creole negro. Emancipation and
Apprenticeship were followed by periods of confusement. No real
basis of wages and hire had been determined and a confused mix¬
ture of tenancy and wages prevailed in most of the colonies ex¬
cept Barbados. It was the consensus of a number of informed
persons that the unsatisfactory tenure of land and the absence
of clear-cut agreements respecting wages was the cause of
abandonment /
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abandonment of estates by the Creoles.1 In Barbados wheif labour
was abundant, it was long maintained by planters in other colonies
that the command of labour resulted from the pressure put on this
labour by scarcity of land in Barbados. This was an incorrect
opinion according to officials in Barbados. Satisfactory re¬
lations in Barbados arose from other causes - such as the just
treatment accorded the labourers - tenancies were not at will
as in most of the other Colonies, but were guaranteed, wages were
paid weekly, not monthly or even at longer intervals as in some
of the other islands, and the Barbadian planter also granted
certain perquisites to the labourer - such as grinding his cane
and boiling the juice, and, finally, there did exist a definite
patriotism in Barbados which made the labourer loath to emigrate.2
In Barbados, unlike the other colonies, negroes continued to
occupy the same houses as they had during Slavery and Apprentice¬
ship and provision grounds were conveniently situated to these -
not as, for example, in Jamaica, where the negro complained of
having to travel good distances from his place of labour to his
provision grounds.3 Task work was largely resorted to in Bar¬
bados and the labourer could thus earn his 1 s. per task in much
less time than by day wages as obtained largely in the other
colonies.4
Coolies were first introduced into Jamaica during the period
1845 /
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1845 - 47, by private recruiting agencies. Mismanagement fol¬
lowed and by 1851 out of 4,556 Coolies introduced, more than
5,000 were dead and the survivors unfitted for labour.1 The
x charge incurred had been secured on the revenues of the sugar
estates and, finally, was thrown on the island treasury. Jamaica
managed without Indian immigration until 185S, and then recom¬
menced in a small way. Apart from the fiasco of the early at¬
tempt at immigration, there were other causes of this small in¬
flux of immigrants into Jamaica. Opposition of coloured members
in the Legislative Assembly and that of missionaries who were
much vocal had much to do with the meagre supply of labour re¬
ceived from India.2
Inter-island immigration never tended to establish an equi¬
librium between supply and demand for labour as existed in the
of May 1st 1858, said "it is a remarkable fact that considerable
emigration is constantly taking place from Colonies, which are
importing immigrants, at a great expense to the public, to other
colonies in their neighbourhood. The obvious cause is the dif¬
ference in the rates of wages. There is a great demand for
labourers in Grenada as in St. Vincent and,yet a stream of emig¬
ration is constantly flowing from the former island to Trinidad."3





Grenadiaiii tended towards Trinidad because that island was
Roman Catholic in religion as was Grenada, and also because the
wind blew from Grenada to Trinidad, making sea-navigation easier
in that direction.^ Creoles did emigrate in small numbers from
the crowded island of Barbados and they were familiar as house-
servants throughout the rest of the West Indies, but on the whole
they were loath to leave their home island. Jamaican Creoles,
with difficulty were induced to leave their native parishes to
obtain work when it was more plentiful in other parishes, and were
more so reluctant to leave the island. These factors which
operated against a transference of labour within the colonies
to where work was available was not taken into consideration by
those who reiterated that there was no need for immigration and
that the expense incurred thereby was solely for the benefit of
the planter at a cost to the whole community.2
The cost of immigration was large3 and despite their having
this immigration, the sugar planters still evinced distress which
was received with a degree of distrust by opinion both in the
Colonies and Great Britain. It was stated by planters (who
appeared to think that indentured Coolie labour was the nearest
return to slavery) that they would rather pay for Coolie im¬
migration than use the money to purchase improved machinery4
and and statements as these did not win them support at a time
when /
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when they were "being criticised for their "backward technique.
Obsoleteness of technique in sugar manufacture was one of
the most common charges directed against the British T/est Indian
sugar proprietor in the nineteenth century. Compared with a
number of foreign sugar colonies, the technique was admittedly
crude, especially when these other sugar regions were rapidly
modernizing their methods towards the mid-century.1 It is not
true that the West Indian proprietor was unaware of, nor indif¬
ferent to the possibility of improved technique. Besides the
very important factor of lack of necessary capital to institute
technical improvements, there were other reasons for the sugar
proprietor not wanting to install better appliances. The total
sugar production of the British West Indies during the period
1800 - 1865, consisted almost entirely of muscovado2 - that is
raw sugar obtained by evaporating the sugar cane juice and drain¬
ing off the molasses, no further refining process being involved.
It did not pay the sugar proprietor of the British West Indies to
refine his sugar because refined sugar was subject to a dis¬
criminating duty in Great Britain. Under the mercantile system
refining in the Colonies was forbidden and improvements thereby
discouraged.3 In 1850, Governor Barkly of British Guiana stated,
"improvements in sugar boiling apparatus, therecan be no doubt,
are retarded as pointed out in several of these returns, by the
discriminating duty at present levied in Great Britain upon sugar
considered /
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considered to be the equal to white lslayed" which really con¬
stitutes as stated a "poialty upon improved processes of manu¬
facture.
The"claying" of sugar, (that is - partially refining sugar)
had been largely carried on in the British West Indies up to the
end of the eighteenth century. The annihilation of the St.
Domingo sugar industry in 1791 had left such a demand for sugar
in any form that it no longer paid to clay it.^ The gradual
depletion of the labour supply in the sugar industry made it suf¬
ficiently difficult to obtain labour for cutting, grinding and
boiling,apart from carrying on the skilled process of claying.
Evidence given in the Report of 1831 - 2 showed that at this date,
already, the art of claying was lost and would not be easy to
revive. 3
The concentration on muscovado sugar was not a blind one.
Crude though the muscovado process was, it had reached in its
^ A
own right a high level of native skill based on emperical methods.
Each sugar colony in the British West Indies had its own type of
sugar, "strong" sugar from Jamaica, "oscillated" sugar from Bar¬
bados and Demerara "best grain".3 In addition to the induce¬
ment offered by the prevailing tariff policy of Great Britain, the
importance of by-products tended to maintain the popularity of the
muscovado process. Rum had always bulked large in the West
Indian /
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Indian sugar industry, "being about the most profitable item
the planter sold.1 During the nineteenth century, the produc¬
tion of rum became of increasing importance to the planter.^
Other sugar colonies were concentrating on improving and refining
sugar and did not produce rum equal in quality to that obtained
from the molasses from drained muscovado sugar. Jamaica rum
maintained its high reputation long after sugar had dropped to
third or fourth place in the island's list of exports. Rum from
Jamaica was imported into Germany and used as a base to improve
the quality of the poorer grade of rum made from sugar beet
molasses.3 The importance of rum as a profitable export ex¬
plains much of the obsolete methods of manufacturing and shipping.
Delay in shipping sugar from the estate and difficulty of ships
e
in obtaining full carg^s was frequently due to time required for
drainage of molasses.4 The huge cumbersome hogshead of the
British West Indies was considered an ideal conveyer of sugar
and yet permitted the drainage of molasses and obviated the dan¬
ger of bursting that might result from fermentation. The hogs¬
head was packed with raw sugar from the estates sugar mill and
then bundled on to trestles where the bulk of the molasses
drained off, however the drainage continued on board ship and
again at the port of landing. 5
Cuba and Brazil were packing their drier sugar in chests,
sometimes /
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sometimes, in barrels and bags. Mauritius and the East Indies
packed theirs in Jute bags.-*- These chests and bags stacked
more compactly and allowed of greater cargo and were more re-
rauneration- to the ship-owner than the cargo made up of hogs¬
heads.2 Ship-owners objected to the hogshead because of the
greater weight carried for nothing, the freight charged being
that on the sugar alone, while the tare amounted to upwards of
ten per cent. The hogshead did provide a convenient container
for coals on the outward journey, but its disadvantages seemed
to outweigh the reasons offered for its being used. At the
beginning of the nineteenth century, the average weight of a
hogshead was q? proximately 14 to 15 cwt. but by 1862 this weight
had increased to about 18 - 22 cwt. so to escape paying a higher
tare duty.4 Inconsistency in computing the weight of hogs¬
heads arose from the fact that this weight was computed according
to the measurement of the truU-, regardless of the quality of the
sugar (which determined weight) and the possibility that hogsheads
might be incompletely filled.5 The adherence to the use of the
hogshead as a container for sugar, meant that the consignee mer¬
chant who provided his own ships would have them specially con¬
structed for the sugar trade. They had to be stout ships of
teak or oak to bear the weight of the heavy cargo,® their beams
must be placed just wide enough for two hogsheads between each
pair /
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pair; and a depth of hold was required of at least 19 feet. -1
No provision was usually made on ships carrying British West
Indies sugar to catch the leakage of molasses; this drainage
was mixed with bilge water and had to be pumped out on docking.
The mixture of bilge water and molasses, if redeemable, was
usually sold at a reduced price.2 The loss by drainage from
muscovado sugar was enormous and was generally estimated at any¬
where between 5 to 12$. In cases where sugar was weighed
accurately on scales in the West Indies, and again at port of
landing the loss was known accurately and proved to be rarely
rz
less than 10 - 12$. Cuban ships were fitted with iron tanks
to catch what leakage did arise, and this drainage was brought
home without waste.4 By 1862, it was reported that ships car¬
rying British West Indian sugar were also being fitted with tanks
but objections to these were raised on the grounds that they were
conducive to fermentation.5
In addition to inefficiency in shippiigmethods, the crude-
ness of Briti sh West Indian sugar manufacture was a by-word.
Admittedly for best results, the sugar manufacturing process does
become highly complicated but in comparison to the level attained
elsewhere the sugar planters were still carrying on the manu¬
facture of sugar in 1842 in the same state"as a 100 years ago".6
Evidence given in the Reports of 1851 - 2, 1842 and 1847 - 8
and /
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and annual returns given in Blue-books shows that machinery was
but slowly being adopted in the British West Indies.1 British
Guiana alone could be said to have shown any spirit of enterprise.
The steam engine had already been introduced thereby 1815, and
the vacuum-pan process was in use. i;n 1832 on Vreed-en-Hoop es¬
tate.2 Mechanization continued in British Guiana throughout
the century and figures of machine imports indicate that they
were practically confined to this colony, that is as far as im¬
proved refining machinery was concerned. By 1861, the sugar
production of British Guiana was about 55,000 tons yearly, of
which 15,000 tons was vacuum-pan sugar, and it was claimed that
but for the 16 s. duty on such sugar, the figure would have been
much greater.5 Governor Barkly, in a despatch to Newcastle,
Nov. 10th, 1852, stated " apparatus for carrying manufacture of
sugar to a higher stage was adopted earlier here than in any
tropical country. The.vacuum-pan having been put up on seve¬
ral estates 20 years ago" ... "if there was one rate of duty
charged on sugar without reference to its fineness;" Barkly
believed that "the vacuum-pan would become universal on all
estates making 500 hogsheads up".4 Estates in British Guiana
were of a large size and could support the large expense invol¬
ved in installing vacuum-pan equipment, and production of cane




process to its proper capacity. British. Guiana was considered
the one colony where it was advantageous to import machinery and
imports of this description during the period 1850 - 60 were
double the amount of the preceding ten years.1 However, the
rest of the colonies imported a very small amount of sugar equip¬
ment. One estate in Cuba imported machinery greater in value
than that imported by all the British West Indies in one year,
British Guiana excepted. 2
Throughout the British West Indies the plough was the one
instrument that could have economized labour,5 although the Re¬
port of 1842 stated that on the whole that it was a rarity on
the sugar plantations.'1 Planters offered various objections to
the use of the plough, many of which objections appear unsound
and naive. Some planters claimed that the plough pulverized the
soil too much, affording no hold to the roots of the cane.5 On
hill soil it was said to be conducive to soil erosion; it was
claimed by other planters that the plough exposed the soil to
the injurious rays of the sun.5 The only authentic objection
to its use came from British Guiana, where an elaborate drainage
system was maintained and the drains prevented traversing with a
plough, but in British Guiana an ingenious device was brought
into use in lieu of the ordinary plough.7 The introduction of
the spade was a slow process on the sugar estates and, like the
plough /
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plough, was not in use until the planters were absolutely forced
by the want of labour to adopt it. Criticism that the negro
could not use the spade did not take into account the fact that
he wore no shoes and that to sink a spade into the clay soil re¬
quired a driving thrust which could be given only by a man well-
shod. As late as 1870, it was observed that labourers were
driving the spades into the ground by the movement of their arms
and shoulders and the muscle tension involved was remarked on.1
The fork also was practically unknown in the first half of the
nineteenth century and negroes were observed loading dung with
their hands. 8
The indifference towards improvement in implements extended
in all activities and was expressed in lack of fencing; the use
of proper carts with depressed axles which would have made loading
and unloading easier, the use of wheelbarrows and efficient
cutting tools.3 Bigelow in 1851 speaks of their not having even
the ordinary axe in use.4 In North America the axe had been de¬
veloped into a finely balanced, effective instrument for use in
the lumbering industry. The axe would have much eased the task
of cutting fuel on the sugar plantations, and cutting fuel was
one of the most arduous forms of labour as carried out on the
estates and this difficulty was one of the reasons offered in
explaining the lack of steam power.3
The /
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The steam engine was early introduced into the British West
Indies but never became widely used.1 Difficulty in providing
fuel was perhaps the chief obstacle to the use of the steam engine
on the sugar estate apart from the initial expense of installing
it. Wood was scarce in some of the islands and in Barbados
was unobtainable. In Barbados, there was a scarcity of water
for human consumption let alone for steam engines and salt water
could not be used.2 The windmills on which Barbados depended
were fairly satisfactory. The Trade Winds blew steadily and if
need be could be supplemented by animal power, but there were
disadvantages, the windmills provided an irregular motion and a
resulting incomplete extraction of cane juice, and were only
satisfactory on high ground and on the windward side of the
island.3
Steam engines were condemned by some proprietors on the
grounds that their use would lessen the amount of manure avail¬
able for fertilizer4 - this did not apply to British Guiana and
Trinidad where rationing could be carried on for a number of
years without renewing fertility. However, as in Barbados, the
lack of fresh water in Trinidad operated against the use of the
steam engine. Lack of mechanical skill and early experience
with defective machinery did make planters chary of investing in
steam power. Barbadian proprietors combined to hire one engineer
to /
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to service the steam engines on a number of estates. Creole
negroes could be trained as mechanics and it was a peculiarity,
remarked on, that the Creole negro was much superior in this
£ O
way than the Coolie. Fuel difficulties were rarely solved.
Coals, even when carried freight free were expensive in the West
Indies and it was stated that three or four times as much coal
was required to raise steam on the sugar estates as was needed
in Great Britain.3 Assurance of having fuel shipped when wanted
was not always to be had and "A planter is sometimes disappointed
with great expense in the labour of cutting wood. It costs
treble the money to cut fuel even upon the planter's estate,
it is so much labour".4
Investment in a steam engine usually involved further capi¬
tal outlay because the whole sugar mill had to be speeded up, and
field operation^ carrying of cane, and taking away bagasse all
must be increased in tempo. Steam power was most economical if
a 24 hour day was in operation as in Cuba, otherwise it meant
getting steam up rarely before 9 &.na. and letting fires die out
by 5 p.m. Cuban mills were highly mechanized, steam power was
raised by fuel cut by slaves and with their up-to-date equipment,
Cuban mills were obtaining 7b% extraction of cane juice compared
to 35% in the British West Indies.5
Colonial legislatures were not indifferent to agricultural
imp rovement s /
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improvements. The Jamaica Legislature had early attempted to
encourage improvements and had granted financial assistance,1
and British Guiana, "by 1847, had hired an agricultural chemist,
Doctor Shier, formerly of Aberdeen University.^ Doctor Shier
carried on research work in the sugar industry in the colony and
then returned to England to supervise the construction of utensils
suitable for the industry in British Guiana. A number of model
ploughs were sent out and on a number of estates improved drainage
was instituted. Covered drainage, which would have permitted
the use of the plough, was adopted in a number of cases, but the
necessary capital was great and deterred proprietors generally
from putting it into effect. Planters in British Guiana were
impatient of Doctor Shier's work and looked to quick results
that he could not promise. 3 In addition to impatience on the
part of the proprietors, their present open drainage system had
an advantage which made them reluctant to change. By open drains
their estates had periodical floodings that provided a form of
flood fallowing which renewed the fertility of the soil.4 By
1851, sugar proprietors in British Guiana were also utilising the
great shell banks on the coast and forking the lime into the
stiff clay soil5 - a procedure that Bryan Edwards had advocated
some sixty years previous.6
During the period of Apprenticeship and the first few years
of /
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of adjustment afterwards - approximately from 1834 to 1847 - 8,
»
a great withdrawal of capital took place from the British West
Indies. This withdrawal was the result of old families selling
out, abandoning, or being forced to relinquish their West Indian
assets because of overwhelming debts. A good number of merchant
houses also liquidated their West Indian assets during this
period. The process of withdrawal of capital was gradual and
the movement of the old families had begun early. In 1812, a
memorial from Jamaica planters stated that "the ruin of the origi¬
nal possessors had been completed.^ By 1831 - 2, there were in
St. Kitts "but three hereditary proprietors remaining"^because
of doubt cast upon the security of West India property. Jamaica
lost a large number of the original possessors and in British
Guiana, by 1866, of the original Dutch planters only one hereditary
proprietor remained.5
A new type of planter took the place of the old who withdrew
from the estates. In many cases, this new planter was the former
overseer, manager or attorney who had scraped together enough
savings to place a down-payment on an estate, which had deterior¬
ated in value - in some instances, by two-thirds.4 During the
years of Apprenticeship it had been to the interest of these
agents to depreciate these estates of which they were in charge





planters did well, others, chiefly from lack of capital, were in
no position to withstand the competition and trials that awaited
in the coming years of the nineteenth century.
A Mr. Borthwick, representing the Chamber of Commerce,
Kingston, Jamaica, (a "body of resident planters and merchants)
reported in 1847, "We are resident proprietors and all of us
I
have, with one exception, purchased or leased our properties
since Emancipation and parties who were victims of the 1846
Bill, were many who lately became proprietors".-1- Sir Henry
Light in giving evidence in the Report of 1849, stated that when
he arrived in British Guiana in 1838 men were buying up estates
and paying very little down on them and he gave a list of such
cases.2 Governor Higginson of St. Kitts spoke of the disap¬
pearance of the old families and the increased influence of the.
class of attornies.3
Prices were sufficiently high in the period of the early
forties to enable these newly established planters to make a
profit and the labour situation had begun to improve with the
prospect of immigration. The blow came in 1846 when the Sugar
Duties Act of 1846 removed prohibitory duties on refined sugar
and abolished discriminatory duties against slave grown sugar.
Reduction of duties, providing a preference to colonial sugar,
was to take place until, in 1851, duties on foreign and colonial
sugar /
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sugar were to be equalized. The effect of the Sugar Duties Act
on the West Indies was one of depression for the British sugar
planter. The last report of stipendiary magistrates in Jamaica,
for 1846 gave a prosperous picture,1 "but by 1848 a Select Committee
was appointed to investigate the commercial distress prevailing
in the Sugar and Coffee industry.
The Select Committee of 1847 - 82 was timely, in that it
showed the effect of a severe commercial crisis that was occurring
in England,on the West Indies and also in that its Report, about
a year after the Sugar Duties Act of 1846, produced evidence as
to its effect on the sugar industry. Distress was definitely
acute according to the evidence of witnesses and had worsened in
the current year. One third of Jamaican planters were bank¬
rupt, and purchasers could not be found at any price.3 Estates
put up for auction in London brought only three or four persons
in attendance.4 In Trinidad, a great many houses advertised
their unwillingness to make advances to planters on their crops,
being consigned to their correspondents in England.3
The difficulties of the sugar planter were greatly increased
by the state of the money-market and the credit of their cor¬
respondents in England. The crisis within the Bank of England
resulting from a railway boom and other causes in England, led to
a contraction of credit3 and at the same time the collapse of the
West /
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West Indies Bank, which had its headquarters in Barbados, and
the collapse of the Planters Bank in Jamaica in 1847, caused the
collapse of a number of big merchant houses. Between August,
1847, and August, 1848 thirteen West India Houses went into
liquidation.1 "In two years nearly all the Scotch and English
houses were struck down."2 The failure of these mercantile
houses with their large interests in the West Indies had a
ruinous effect on many sugar proprietors.3 In Barbados, the
failure of the mercantile house of Barton, Irlam and Higginson
which had extensive claims on planters caused great inconvenience
in that these were now called for, and similar cases occurred in
other sugar colonies.4
The over-all effect of the commercial crisis of 1847 was a
tightening of capital advances to planters, and, remarking on
this want of money and credit, Lt. Governor Darling of St. Vincent
attributed it to the "extreme difficulty with which advances are
obtained from those sources that were so long bounteous fountains
of pecuniary supplies" and Darling urges that "estates must pass
from the hands of merely nominal owners whose profits go to
mortgagees and other creditors to those who possess capital" - in
stating this, Darling was anticipating the West Indies Incumbered
Estate Act. 5
The passing of the Sugar Duties Act and the resulting de¬
pression /
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pression in the British West Indies sugar industry appeared to
justify the charge that the British sugar proprietor was "ener¬
vated "by protection. " Despite the depression that did obtain
in the British West Indies at this period, importation of sugar
from there into Great Britain increased from 2,842,555 cwt. in
1846 to 3,566,394 cwt. in 1852. The price of sugar in London
in 1846 was - Havana, 24/8d.; West Indies, 35/3d. ; and at the
end of 1852 it was - Havana, 22/-; West Indies, 23/8d., showing
that a gradual equalization had taken place, and if the tendency
continued, British West Indian sugar might soon be cheaper than
Cuban slave grown sugar.1 The British ?/est Indies cry that they
could not compete with slave grown sugar was a frequent one in
the first half of the nineteenth century but does not appear to
be an authentic grievance. Earl Grey in 1852 drew attention to
the fact that Cuban planters were so satisfied that free labour
was cheaper that they were taking measures to introduce 8,000
Chinese free labourers.2 It was distinctly stated by the British
Commissary Judge at Havana Mr. Crawford in 1860 that the cost of
a slave to his owner in Cuba was 8/lOd. a day, whereas the
sugar planter of the British West Indies paid a wage of from Is.
to l/6d. per day and ,had no interest in providing food, clothing




Cuba's advantage resulted from other factors than that of
having slave labour. Mr. Crawford in a despatch of February
21st 1848 stated that ratooning was carried on in Cuba for many
years, not less than 15 or 20, and the land was then abandoned
for a time. ^ The great Cuban estates were maintained by a
system of prairie agriculture and Cuban productiveness resulted
from the rich virgin soil on which sugar could be ratooned up
to 50 years and with a very modest application of labour. The
greater fertility of Cuba was expressed, in an average production
of four hogsheads per acre to one per acre in Jamaica.2 The
advantage of ratooning on virgin land was brought home to the
sugar .planters of the older British sugar colonies at the begin¬
ning of the century when they expressed concern over bringing the
virgin land of the newly acquired colonies of British Guiana and
Trinidad into competition with the old.3
Besides This advantage of virgin land Cuba had other advan¬
tages. On Cuban estates ample wood for fuel was present and a
command of slave labour with adequate American cutting tools.
In the Report of 1831 - 2, it was stated that Cuba and Brazil
either furnished their own lumber or, if they did import it, re¬
quired much less than the British West Indies because of the less
bulky containers required for their dry sugar.4 Cuban estates
were of a comparatively recent origin and had not accumulated
debts /
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debts such, as the British West Indian proprietor had been pushing
ahead from year to year - Cuba had up-to-date machinery, much
of it imported from Germany as early as 1831.1 Sugar was carried
to Europe at cheaper rates (3/6d. to 3/9d. cwt. in 1831), com¬
pared to that charged on sugar from the British West Indies to
Great Britain (Consignee Merchants charged the sugar proprietor
5/- cwt. but in reality only paid 3/- cwt. to shipowner).2 These
advantages, as enumerated, were the determining factors in en¬
abling Cuba to produce sugar more cheaply than the British West
Indies, not solely the result of having slave labour. As has
been shown, the British West Indies had practically overtaken
Cuba in the matter of producing sugar at low prices and the
threat from this quarter had been lessened chiefly as a result of
economical management in Barbados and by improved methods in
British Guiana and Trinidad. These three colonies largely ac¬
counted for the increased production of sugar from the British
West Indies after the Sugar Duties Act of 1846.
The British West Indies purportedly enjoyed an advantage
over East India sugar in the market of the United Kingdom up to
1835 as a result of the lower duty on West Indian sugar. The
advantage enjoyed was not so great as appeared. Exports from
Great Britain to the West Indian sugar colonies had fallen off
considerably after the first decade of the nineteenth century3
as /
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as a result of greater imports from North America by the West
Indies; depression in the sugar trade and abolition of the
slave trade. Outward bound ships to the West Indies were thus
carrying imcomplete cargos and carrying ballast as a result of
the decreased imports from Great Britain.1 Carried as ballast,
lime, bricks and even soot (used as manure) were being carried
freight free - as evidenced in the Report of 1831 - 2.2 Evidence
of this feature of West Indian trade at this period is that stone
mills were built largely of stone carried as ballast from Great
Britain. 3
In the case of the East Indies matters =marked in reverse.
The volume of export trade from Great Britain to the East Indies
was very large and steadily increasing^ while the tonnage of
sugar carried on the homeward journey was proportionately small
in relation to the tonnage of shipping involved. Thus, we find
sugar frequently carried as ballast from the East Indies to Great
Britain.5 In the British West Indies the carrying trade to
Great Britain depended largely for its income on the freight paid
on sugar carried to England. So much was it necessary to obtain
a freight paying cargo home, that ship-owners frequently paid a
premium to get sugar as a cargo.6
This feature of the flour trade to and from Great Britain
which had tended to balance the advantages of the East and West
Indies /
40
Indies in the United Kingdom sugar market prior to 1835, worked
to the disadvantage of the West Indies after this date and added
to their other difficulties.
The question of absenteeism of planters from their sugar
estates in the West Indies was raised frequently in the evidence
given in Select Committees and was quoted as one of the evils
that lay "behind the depression in the sugar industry in the period
under review.
There had "been absentee planters in the West Indies since
the seventeenth century, the number had greatly increased in the
eighteenth until, by the early nineteenth century, it could be
said that a rough approximation would be about two-thirds of the
sugar proprietors were absentees.
It is impossible to indict absentees as a body. Each case
of absenteeism depended on the merit of the man himself, not
whether he resided in the West Indies or in England. Governor
Barkly in a despatch to Newcastle, May 26th, 1854, remarked, "It
%
will he perceived from the examples I have cited that the fortunes
of the sugar planters of Trelawny are of a very chequered character
and very little, if at all, dependent on their presence or absence
from their estates, though no doubt where a resident proprietor
possesses capital and understands the management of his agricul¬
tural and manufacturing operations likewise, he must be more
likely /
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likely, caeteris paribus, to succeed. 1,1 In the Report of 1847 - 8
it was stated a number of times that the mere presence of the pro¬
prietor made no difference in the estate bearing a profit or a
loss.2 Evidence given in this Report tended to show that ab¬
sentees spent more money on improvements and imported more ma¬
chinery than resident proprietors.3 The important factor was
whether the proprietor, resident or absent, had capital or not,
and evidence given in 1842, showed that during the depression
prevailing immediately after Apprenticeship, resident proprietors
suffered most, being those who recently acquired property and
who were short of capital.4
The belief that the sugar proprietor by being present in
the colony saved paying a hierarchy of agents was not wholly true.
The sugar proprietor though resident did not necessarily live on
his estate, and if he did usually had his overseer and "book¬
keepers". ^ In Barbados it was stated "absentees have appointed
men of experience and some of the best-managed estates in the
island are those of non-resident estates."As to whether it
may be easier for a person to introduce improvements if acting
for himself and not as agent - it may be easier in one respect
but in another it may be more difficult, for as agent he may be
agent for a rich person and of limited means as a proprietor".17
Planters who admitted that residence was beneficial stated
that /
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that on many estates it was perfectly impossible for a proprietor
to live with his family because good houses were lacking and
white men were quickly attacked by ague, unless accustomed to
the island and the quick turnover of estates prevented this.1
A number of planters giving evidence in 1847 - 8 expressed
the opinion that they felt themselves to be of little use on an
estate. 2 Absentees generally had more capital as were more in
touch with it than resident planters. Agents were more likely
to try experiments not being at their own cost. In 1851 it
was stated "there are a considerable proportion of resident pro¬
prietors in Demerara and their estates were encumbered, to the
same extent as absentee proprietors" and "absentee estates in
Demerara, were very well run, the persons appointed managers
have been capable men".3 Bigelow writing in 1850, says that
the proportion of absentees was not diminished appreciably, the
depression of 1846 - 8 had caused foreclosures of mortgages and
estates were taken over by absent money-lenders.4 The number
of absentees was continually being altered by this method. But
the necessity of handing over an estate, hastily acquired through
foreclosure of a mortgage, to the charge of an attorney, who in
some instances had a dozen or so estates under his charge, was
not the best way in which to run it efficiently. Numerous cases
were mentioned of the absentee coming out to the sugar colonies
to /
to,find conditions on his estate much worse than he had "been
led to believe from the attorney's report.1
The select committee's report of 1847 - 8 on the commercial
distress in the British West Indies, expressed the view that the
legal machinery of the sugar colonies was inadequate to the
p
problem of dealing with encumbered estates.
A similar problem had been faced in the Danish West Indies
and had been dealt with by the Danish Government.
In the British West Indies this problem of estates with
"blistered" titles, as termed in the colonies, was to be handled
by the setting up of an Encumbered Estates Court. This subject
is treated in a later section.
The depression of 1846 - 8, was followed by a very severe
cholera epidemic in a number of the sugar colonies which further
prolonged their difficulties. The labour population was
decimated in a number of the islands and increased the demand
for immigrants and raised the wages paid to labour.^" But by
1853, reports from all colonies, with the exception of Jamaica,
indicate that their difficulties had been almost completely sur¬




measures such as using women and children in "piccaninny" gangs,
the exports of sugar were not only maintained at their former
amount hut in some cases very considerably increased.1 Prices
which had risen in the mid 1850's (a rise which the Crimean Ytfar
had helped to bring about), yielded a fair, though moderate profit
to the planter. The rise in prices and increased consumption in
Great Britain stimulated production and in all the Sugar Colonies,
and as well in Jamaica where depression still existed, a number
of abandoned or partially abandoned estates were brought back
into cultivation indicating that optimism was not dead.
Those sugar proprietors who had purchased their estates at
reduced prices during the period of Apprenticeship and immediately
after, and who had managed to weather the crisis of 1847 - 8 were
now raising themselves up to the position of the successful pro¬
prietor. Shrewd, possessed of practical skill and local know¬
ledge, but devoid of available capital, their position could
only be sustained by high prices. The fall in sugar price and
depression of 1847 - 8 had caused the ruin of many of these new
planters but those who got through the crisis were now fairly
assured of their future.
In all the sugar colonies there were a number of proprietors
who had somehow managed to hang on over the shock of 1847 - 8




the retention of their estates was impossible. Completely
dilapidated and semi or non-cultivated there was no scheme that
could save them except sale to persons with capital and initiative.
This was the type of estate which was to be catered for by the
West Indies Incumbered Estates Court and the work of this Court
was largely concerned with bringing these estates to sale and
distributing the purchase money. In British Guiana between
1851 and 1870 the decrease in number of estates from 171 to 153
was a result of the abandonment or assimilation of these near-
derelect estates.1 Their loss did not materially affect pro¬
duction figures and their liquidation was beneficial in making
more labour available to estates in cultivation.
Jamaica never regained her position as the chief sugar pro¬
ducing colony in the British West Indies during the remaining
half of the nineteenth century. Jamaica differed from Barbados
and the old sugar islands, in having a greater quantity of fer¬
tile land accessible to the negroes, on which they could sub¬
sist without labouring in the plantations - and on the other
hand from the newer sugar colonies of British Guiana and Trinidad
in having refused to avail itself of the offer made by Her Ma¬
jesty's Government in 1848 of a guaranteed loan for immigration
and having imported a very small number of immigrants in proportion
to the field of cultivation.2 Both British Guiana and Trinidad
had /
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had obtained a very large number and compensated themselves for
the reduction in price by increase of quantities.1 Thus the
exports of Jamaica which were in 1840, 517,217 cwt. remained at
nearly the same point in 1852 being then 511,247 cwt. whilst the
exports of sugar from British Guiana, which were in 1840, 579,644
cwt., had increased in 1852 to 838,298 cwt. Looking to the re¬
turn of immigration in the respective colonies we find that be¬
tween 1840 - 1852, 49,544 immigrants had been imported into
British Guiana and only 14,132 into Jamaica. In like manner
the exports of sugar from Trinidad increased between 1840 - 52
from 245,778 cwt. to 483,853 cwt. with an immigration of 24,899
Coolies.2 ^
Thus it would not seem incorrect to presume that Jamaica's
distress was due to lack of money being paid out for immigrants.
There thus appears to have been in the case of Jamaica a connec¬
tion between the fortunes of the sugar industry in that island
and the management of financial and political matters.3
By 1865 more than one-half of Jamaica was still owned in es¬
tates averaging 1,000 acres, many of which were non-cultivated or
only partially so, and of a total acreage of 2,848,160 acres,
approximately 1,000,000 acres were abandoned.4 The tradition
of "bigness" was maintained and opposition of proprietors to




original patents being unbroken.1 Except on large estates near
the sea or in specially favoured locations inland, such as was
enjoyed by Worthy Park estate of the Price family, producing
sugar did not pay in Jamaica in the year 1865.^
Of the smaller colonies Barbados remained the most prosperous
during the years 1855 - 1865. The highest crop in her history
g
was gathered in 1857 and this was surpassed in the year 1866.
Speculation during these years as in the other colonies, resulted
in a rise of the value of estates. The report of 1859 stated
that as long as an estate capable of producing 100 hogsheads of
sugar was worth in the market about 10,000 1., it may be safely
inferred that there was an average profit on the cultivation of
sugar cane.4 Economical use of labour, skill in cultivation -
in 1858, 80,000 tons of Peruvian manure were imported^ - main¬
tained high productivity. Considerate treatment of labourers
appeared to pay dividends. Labour, although abundant in Barbados,
commanded an equivalent price to that received in the other sugar
colonies, excepting British O-uiana, and little desire to emigrate
from Barbados was evinced.
Considering the other small colonies - St. Vincent during
the depression of 1848 - had turned to the production of arrow¬
root. The soil of the island was suitable to the growth of this




captured this limited market. The West Indian Incumbered Estates
Court, first introduced into St. Vincent, evidently was beneficial
to that colony. Estates dealt with by the Court were revived and
again producing.-'- St. Vincent, by 1865, was free from public
debt and had a high productivity of both sugar cane and arrow¬
root.
St. Kitts and Nevis also increased production in the period
1855 - 1865 and a number of partially abandoned estates were re¬
vived as had been done in the other sugar colonies during the
same period.2 The problem of fuel shortage in all the sugar
colonies, where steam power was being used, was alleviated at this
time by the introduction of multitubular boilers. In 1866, St.
Kitts reaped the largest crop ever yielded and the Report for the
year, 1865 expresses a feeling of confidence in the progress made.
Antigua, Grenada, St. Lucia and Dominica evidenced similar
satisfactory conditions and high productivity.® Machinery im¬
ports into these smaller sugar colonies had increased in the few
years prior to 1865, manure was increasingly imported,4 and it is
of interest to note that the French Government, interested in the
evident prosperity of St. Kitts, obtained information as to the
causes of that prosperity.5
A brief summing up of the sugar industry's position in 1865




kind in the sugar colonies, British Guiana, Trinidad and Bar¬
bados being the most prosperous; British Guiana especially, had
modernized and increased her productivity. The lesser islands
all displayed more vigour and were complaining less of distress
than formerly. Excepting Jamaica, the British West Indies were
in a position where it would not be too optimistic to say that
they had a good chance of meeting sugar beet competition, which
was to be their chief threat for the remaining years of the nine¬
teenth century.
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The West Indian Encumbered Estates Court.
(1854 - 1892).
The Parliamentary Commission which reported on
Commercial distress in the British West Indies in 1847-8,
revealed that the majority of estates were heavily en¬
cumbered by charges placed on them in the heyday of the
sugar industry. The extreme intricacy of these charges
and the delay and expense of legal proceedings in the
various colonies rendered it impossible to make out an
indisputable title to any would-be-purchaser.1
A cheap and prompt mode of transfer had to be de¬
vised if a sale was to be effected to persons who could
retrieve these estates from their neglected condition.
The Danish West Indies had partially met this problem
of encumbered estates by means of loans from the National
Debt Commissioners of Denmark in the 1820*s.2
In the British West Indies St. Lucia was the first
colony to attempt a solution of the problem of transfer¬
ence of ei cumbered estates to solvent persons. An
office for the registration of deeds and mortgages was
first established in St. Lucia in 1829 under a law
originating with Sir John Jeremie, president of the Court
of Appeal. A term of eighteen months was allowed for
the registration of all then existing mortgages which,
if enrolled during the period specified, retained the
original /
original priority. Before the expiration of the
eighteen months no less than 1,918 mortgages were
placed upon the rolls, representing the sum of £1,199,000
sterling, as debt and liabilities of the proprietory body.
The consequence of this disclosure was the enactment of
a law to authorize the seizure and sale of immoveable
property, and known in the colony as the "saisie re£lle"
- being very similar in effect to the Encumbered Estates
Law of Ireland.3 This enactment did not come into force
until January, 1853, when the immediate consequence was
the levy and forced sale of estates which continued year
after year, until, by the end of 1843, 69 sugar estates
out of the island's total of 81 had passed by judicial
sale under new titles. By 1851 there were only twelve
proprietors in St. Lucia whose title deeds were of a
date antecedent to the abolition of slavery.4
Although precedents in the way of these measures of
St. Lucia, the Danish West Indies - and Ireland, existed
as a method of meeting the problem of encumbered estates,
there was no attempt made by the British West Indies as
a whole to have an Encumbered Estates Act passed. Sir
Charles Metcalfe, Governor of Jamaica, had recorameaded
such /
such a measure in 1841, and the question was raised in
Parliament in 1848 by the Duke of Newcastle who stated
that Governor Barkly of Jamaica urged such a measure and
that the West Indian Association advocated it.5
In 1852, the affairs of an infant proprietor of an
estate in St. Vincent being brought under the cognizance
of the Court of Chancery, Lord St. Leonards pronounced an
opinion that, as the expenditure on the estate had for
some years exceeded the income and the continuance of its
working only tended to accumulate debt it would be for
the benefit of the infant if the estate were sold, and
that other West Indian sufferers would be benefited by a
similar remedy to that of the Encumbered Estates Law of
Ireland.6 The Governor of St. Vincent shortly after this
incident drew the attention of the Home Government to
evils arising from the great number of encumbered estates
in St. Vincent and -urged an Encumbered Estates Act.17
The question of an Encumbered Estates Act for the
British West Indies evoked little comment when introduced
in Parliament. Lord Brougham, who said he had opposed
the Irish Encumbered Estates Act had to admit that it
proved productive of much good and therefore he had great
hopes /
hopes of a similar result in West Indies. The Lord
Chancellor criticised the Bill in that he considered
it "ruinous" that each colonial legislature could pass
an act to effect the objects of the Bill when the pro¬
prietors and mortgagees were in England. The Duke of
Newcastle, who introduced the Bill, spoke of the dif¬
ficulty in implementing such an act in that the laws in
the West Indian Colonies frequently were at variance
with one another. In British Guiana, Trinidad, Mar¬
tinique, and St„ Lucia, for example, laws more resembled
those of Holland, France and Spain respectively and thus
flexibility would be needed.8
The West Indies Encumbered Estates Act was passed
in 1854 and was based on the Irish Encumbered Estates
Act, but, unlike Ireland, the introduction of the Act
into the West Indian Colonies was dependent on the will
of each colony.^
The object of the Act was to facilitate the sale
and transfer of land held by insolvent proprietors.
This object was effected by means of a central court in
London and local courts in the several West Indian
colonies established under local statutes. The local
encumbered /
encumbered, estates courts were offshoots of the central court
in London, and the local commissioners were usually the judges
of the local supreme courts in each colony. The local en¬
cumbered estates courts had the same right of appeal to the
Privy Council as the local supreme courts. The local com¬
missioner when required, was provided with a secretary, and
both were remunerated by means of a percentage of the money
received from sale of estates. The local commissioner was
to receive one-half per cent and the secretary, one-quarter
per cent of the sales money.
The central court in London was to ensure uniformity of
decisions and proceedings, and to provide protection for West
Indian merchants and proprietors resident in England. The
central Court in London was composed of a chief commissioner
at a salary of £500 per annum, and an assistant commissioner
at £400 per annum. The assistant commissioner also partook
of the duties of secretary to the Commission.^(a) por the
greater portion of the Court's existence, Mr. J. Fleming (Her
Majesty's Counoil) as Chief Commissioner, and Mr. R. J. Cust
(Barrister /
(Barrister at Law) as Assistant Commissioner administered the
duties of the Court. The central court in London also had
the assistance of two clerks at £150 and £100 each per annum.
The London Court in the first three years of its existence was
located in an obscure office at 8 Park St., Westminster,
however in 1862, solicitors practising in London sent a
memorial to the Treasury, applying for the removal of the offices
of the commissioners to the vicinity of Lincoln's Inn. The
central court was thus removed to St. Martin's Place, Trafalgar
Square.^(*0
It was the duty of the commissioners who administered the
West Indies Encumbered Estates Act, to enquire into the owner¬
ship and titles of estates and to distribute the purchase money,
deciding all questions of fact and law, among the encumbrancers
according to priority.1®
Proceedings in the court, local or central, could be
originated by the owner or any encumbrancer and, if within a
limited time no sufficiently valid reason presented itself the
estate was to be sold. The proprietor and the applicant for
sale need never to come into contact.11
Although the West Indies Encumbered Estates Act was passed in
12
1854, no action followed immediately. The Act was found de¬
fective in a number of material points. There was inadequate
provision for preventing the sale of an estate where the yearly
income from that estate gave /
1
gave some possibility of meeting the interest on en¬
cumbrances. Thus the original Act was amended and
the commissioners were prohibited, upon the application
of any encumbrance#, from selling an estate unless the
yearly interest on the encumbrances exceeded one-half
of the yearly/*income of the property, such income to
be calculated on the average of the preceding seven
years.13 Provisions regarding stamp duty had to be
corrected; the definition of the word 'owner' was also
defective and confused with tenant-for-life, and the
section providing for the duration of the offices of
commissioners, for six years, was also ambiguously framed
and had to be righted.14 These corrections were no
sooner made than the operation of the Act was further
delayed by the death of the Chief Commissioner, Mr.
Phipps in 1857, and a few months elapsed before a suc¬
cessor was appointed. Thus it was not until 1858 that
the Court was ready to begin work.13
St. Vincent was the first colony to adopt the Act,
the Legislature of this colony addressing the Crown in
1856, but due to the delays forementioned no business
was done until the amendment act received royal assent
in /
in August 1858. Tobago also addressed the Crown early
in 1858.
The first estate dealt with was that of Arnos Vale
in St. Vincent, sold by the Court on November 1st, 1858,
in London.1^ The sale of this estate posed knotty prob¬
lems in the way of tracing out titles and various claims,
that were typical of those estates sold later by the
Court.
Arnos Vale which in the heyday of the sugar industry
had produced an income of £10,000 a year, was brought to
sale in the Encumbered Estates Court, charged with join-
tures legacies and annuities ato the extent of £30,000.
At the time of sale it was entirely unproductive and had
been from 1854, when it was abandoned by its owner and
placed in Chancery. Arnos Vale had comparatively good
equipment. It had a good cast-iron water wheel (the
majority of estates in St. Vincent depended on water
power), a complete mill and a good shipping bay 1,000
yards from the works. This property was rated poten¬
tially as one of the best estates in the colony but could
no longer make headway in the face of disproportionate
demands on it. The estate was sold for the sum of
£10,050 /
£10,050, the highest sum ever paid for an estate sold
through the Court. It was in connection with this sale
that the Commissioners enunciated the principle of the
"consignee's lien" which was to he a source of much con¬
tention in the future, and which is treated later in
this section. There was no opposition in this case to
the consignee's lien, the owner having abandoned the es¬
tate four years previously.
Apart from St. Vincent and Tobago no other colonies
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in the first two
years of its active existence. Prosperity was of suf¬
ficient degree throughout the colonies in the years
1858-60 to lessen the need for the Court. In a cir¬
cular despatch to the British West Indies on December
6th 1860, Sir George Cornwall Lewis recommended the
adoption of the Act by the various colonies. He stated
that the Act had proved its worth in the few cases where
it had been adopted to date. He also added that the
expense of the Court was borne by the Home Government,
but it was questioned how long this expense would be
borne unless the West Indies colonies took advantage
more generally of the Act.19
The injunction of Sir George Cornwall Lewis appears
to /
to have had a stimulating effect. In 1860 the Virgin
Islands and St. Kitts adopted the Act, followed by
Jamaica in 1861. Jamaica presented a field where much
work could he done by the Court. In an abstract of
August 1852, it had been shown that there were in Jamaica
168 estates that had been at one time under sugar cul¬
tivation but were now abandoned. In addition to these
there were 63 sugar estates partially abandoned.20 Mr.
Hossack, Finance-''feln-ister of Jamaica, in 1861, stated
that he advocated the Act from his complete knowledge
of the number and value of abandoned properties in Jamaica,
and added, - "I am sure a vast amount of property must
pass through the Court pretty quickly under the stimulus
of the deep cry for cotton which has set in since the
Americans have quarrelled"21
In the year following the adoption of the Act in
Jamaica, thirty-two estates were sold in that colony
through the Court. The price of these estates varied
from £100 for 100 acres to £4,500 for 2,388 acres.
A number of the purchasers of the estates sold by
the Court in Jamaica did turn to cotton hoping for a
keen demand as a result of the American Givil War, In
addition /
/I i
addition to attempts made to cultivate cotton a number
of the estates were reeultivated in sugar as a result
of improved prices in the early sixties. The scale
of duties in the United Kingdom still favoured the
muscovado type of sugar made by Jamaican estates without
exception.22 The invention of the centrifugal, which
made possible the separation of molasses from the sugar
in much less time than the old system of natural drainage,
also induced a continuation of the muscovado process and
the profitable rum industry which was of increasing im¬
portance in Jamaica,considering that the muscovado market
was diminishing.
This impetus to the work of the Encumbered Estates
Court in Jamaica was checked by disturbances associated
with Eyre's Rebellion during Governor Eyre's term of
office. These disturbances brought commerce in Jamaica
practically to a standstill.23 A Colonial Office dis¬
patch (of 1867) quoted the Commissioners as having
stated, - "Owing to recent events in Jamaica commercial
prosperity there was temporarily paralysed and in con¬
sequence the Commissioners thought it advisable to defer
for the present the sale of estates."
While /
While from November 1862, to February 1864, twenty-
eight estates in Jamaica were sold by the Court, during
the period from February 1864 to the end of 1865 only
three applications for sale were made.^ The latter
period approximately covers that of Eyre's rebellion.
These interruptions were short-lived and by 1866 the
Court was again busy in Jamaica. Some of the largest
and what were formerly prosperous estates passed through
the Court. A few examples of these are as follows.
Worthy Park, the first estate sold by the Court in
Jamaica^ and containing about 4,000 acres, had been con¬
sidered one of the finest estates in the island, despite
its landlocked location in the centre of the colony.
This estate formerly belonged to Sir Rose Price, Baronet,
who died in 1834 and had devised it to his trustees to
manage and cultivate it and to raise portions, for his
younger children. The trustees carried on the culti¬
vation for several years at a great loss and ultimately
applied for sale in the West Indies Encumbered Estates
Court. The estate was sold by the Commissioners in
1863 to the Earl of Shrewsbury for £8,550. At the time
of sale the total amount of encumbrances on the estate
exceeded /
exceeded £68,000. The whole of the purchase money
was paid to the trustees.85
Swanswick estate in Jamaica, containing 1,162 acres
had belonged to Edward Hyde Clarke who in pursuance of
a family arrangement charged it with an annuity of £700
a year, in favour of his younger brother. The annual
profits were insufficient to keep down the annuity, and
the annuitant applied for a sale. The estate was sold
in 1863 by the Court for £2,300.
Garbrand Hall and lots of land adjoining containing
in all about 15,000 acres had belonged to the Barrett
family and had been charged in the early part of the
century with two legacies of £10,000 each. Reid, Irving
and Company, who had carried on the cultivation for many
years, finally petitioned for sale of the Court. The
total number of encumbrances were found to be £69,600.
The estate sold for £4,450, the bulk of which went to
Reid, Irving and Company.85
Many other cases dealt with by the Court were similar
to these. Mexico, Hyde, Mickleton Pen, Up Pen were all
large estates of 2,000 acres and over;8,7 in a number of
cases the owner had abandoned the estate and could not
be /
"be found. In practically all instances the estates
were "burdened with heavy encumbrances, many times the
market value of the estates.
Following Jamaica, Antigua adopted the Act in 1864,
Montserrat in 1865, Grenada in 1866, Dominica and Nevis
in 1867.28
In Antigua more estates were sold by the Court than
in any other colony excepting Jamaica. Estates in An¬
tigua were not so large as in Jamaica, but they were
also heavily encumbered. Unlike Janaica sales in
Antigua were practically all to the consignee merchant
in the first few years. Perhaps the reason why most of
the estates in Antigua were sold to the consignee merchant
was that these estates, although heavily encumbered, were
in cultivation at the time of sale and under nominal
ownership. Thus a consignee merchant was usually actively
connected with the estate and petitioned for its sale,
being granted priority under the consignee's lien. In
Jamaica most of the estates sold in the first five or six
years were those which had been many years abandoned and
no active connection with a consignee merchant was in
effect. Petitions for sale of the first Jamaican estates
were /
were usually lay those who had claims on the estate in
the capacity of nominal owner, legatee, annuitant or
mortgagee.
Most of the estates in Antigua sold for small sums
- for example, Elmer Greek in Antigua containing only
161 acres, "but with total encumbrances of £27,000, sold
for £700, the consignee merchant obtaining the estate
for this sum. Vernons, containing 440 acres had be¬
longed to the Vernon family for several generations and
was subject to divers legacies and family charges. The
cultivation of this estate had been carried on by the con¬
signee until 1865 when the Court provided the means of
quick sale. The total amount of encumbrances on this
estate was £31,000.A number of sales made through
the Court, in Antigua and Jamaica revealed that the
mortgaging of legacies was not uncommon in the years of
depression following the abolition of slavery.It
was also shown that the consignee merchant often worked
the estate without having purchased it, due to the im¬
possibility of obtaining a clear and speedy title through
the legal institutions in the colonies.Thus no time
was lost in bringing the estate to sale when the in¬
stitution /
/y
stitution of the West Indies Encumbered Estates Court
offered a Parliamentary title in a manner that cut through
a maze of claims. In St.. Kitts only one estate was sold
in the first two years following the adoption of the Act.
In Tobago there were ten sales in the first four years
of the Court's jurisdiction. As in Antigua estates were
brought to sale most often on petition of the consignee.33
Barbados, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana
did not place themselves under the Act. These colonies
considered that sufficient remedy was obtained under laws
prevailing in each colony, based in the case of the last
three colonies, on the French, Spanish and Dutch systems.
Barbados declined the Act on the ground that no need
for an Encumbered Estates Court existed. There were no
abandoned estates in Barbados and there were few estates
so heavily mortgaged that they could not carry the charges
imposed on them. In the few instances where an estate
fell into Chancery, it was worked profitably by the Re¬
ceiver, who distributed profits earned to meet charges
on the estate.33
The St. Lucia system was as followsEncumbered
estates could be brought to sale under the law "saisie
reille /
retlle". The sale was made in an open court before the
judge, a clear title "being granted free from all previous
encumbrances. The proceeds of the sale were paid into
court and distributed according to a scale of ranking
drawn up by an officer of the Court - according to the
nature of privileges and priority of mortgages. Any
balance remaining was returned to the late owner of the
estate. This system, which was similar to that of the
West Indies Encumbered Estates Court, except that it
recognized no priority of a consignee's lien on the
corpus of an estate, had worked well in St. Lucia. There
had been no complaints nor appeals to the Privy Council.
Two thirds of the estates in St. Lucia were held under
this title. 36
In British Guiana a sale of land was effected by
advertising the transfer for three consecutive weeks in
the official gazette, the vendor and the purchaser ap¬
peared before a judge, there were no title deeds, the
purchaser was simply put on the register as the proprietor
of the estate. Every mortgage was dealt with in a similar
manner, that is by registration, and anyone had access to
ascertain what mortgages were placed on an estate.
Proprietors /
I"
Proprietors in British. Guiana spoke unfavourably of the old-
fashioned long rolls of title-deeds that prevailed in most of
37
the other British West Indies.
In Trinidad, as in British Guiana, a system of registering
mortgages prevailed, and, as in British Guiana and Barbados,
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heavily encumbered or abandoned estates were not common.
The system of mortgages prevailing in all the British
West Indies differed from that in England in a material point
that appears to have had appreciable effect on the solvency
of estates. In England the. rule of 'tacking' was recognized.
Under the rule of 'tacking' where there were several mort¬
gages, the third or subsequent mortgagee might tack his
mortgage to a precedent mortgage and thereby obtain a pre¬
ference to the intermediate encumbrance or encumbrances, of
which he had no express notice served on him at the time he
executed his mortgage (registration of a mortgage was not
in itself notice).
In addition, a mortgagee (not necessarily the first)
might tack to his security further sums if he had no notice
of the intervening encumbrance or encumbrances at the time
of making such further advances.
This rule of 'tacking' was justified on the ground that
the person holding the precedent encumbrance, and having the
priority that went with it, had law on his side, and in
addition /
addition because no notice was given at the time he executed
the encumbrance which he tacked to the precedent encumbrance,
he had equal equity with the intermediate encumbrance. Slimm¬
ing up, the person who implemented this 'tacking', having both
law and equity on his side, had preference over the intermediate
encumbrancer, who had only equity on his side.
"where there is a legal title and equity on one side,
and equity only upon the other, they will never suffer the
side in which both these rights concur, to be hurt by that
in which one of them only is to be found".
The consequences of the rule of 'tacking', was that in
England no precedent person would lend on a second mortgage
unless he was represented by the same solicitor as the first
mortgagee, or had otherwise established such relations that
he would be certain no third mortgagee would be allowed to
get possession of the first mortgage, and thus, by virtue of
the rule of tacking, deprive him of his priority. Also if
an owner succeeded in borrowing from several independent
mortgagees, the subsequent mortgagees as soon as they dis¬
covered how matters stood, would compete with each other for
the first mortgage and very soon all the mortgages would be
in the same hand, or in those of persons understanding each
39
other and ready to work together.
The /
d~v
The Registry Acts of the British West Indies did not
39a
recognize the doctrine of tacking. No reason is given
as to why this was so, but the explanation may be that as
there was only one registry office in each colony, it was
possible for a person executing a mortgage to ascertain what
other encumbrances were on an estate. In England, where
there was no central registry office, this would have been
physically impossible.
In the British West Indies mortgages had priority ac-
39b
cording to the date they were registered. This re¬
gistering was however often haphazard as was found out by
the Commissioners of the Encumbered Estates Court.
During the period of prosperity,prior to Emancipation,
the owner of a sugar estate might encumber with a dozen
independent mortgages the same property. The income from
sugar estates in these years of high prices, was usually
sufficient to meet the interest of charges imposed on them.
Since the doctrine of tacking was not recognized, and because
priority was assured according to date of registration, there
was little inducement to consolidate these mortgages.^0
During the depression years after Emancipation when
sugar prices dropped from a maximum of 97s, a cwt. in 1814
to a low of 20s. a cwt. in 1854, estates could no longer meet
interest /
interest and claims to which they were subject. Mortgagees
were no?; faced with the difficulty of trying to realize what
they could from insolvent estates. Various procedures could
be adopted. A mortgagee creditor whose interest was overdue
could enter upon and take possession of an estate. If he
did this he would be faced with the task of advancing large
sums of money for carrying on cultivation. Estates of in¬
solvent owners were likely to be in a run-down condition,
and it took at least two or three years to bring an estate
back into cultivation if once allowed to lapse. There was
also no knowing when another claimant, with a better title
than the mortgagee-in-possession professed, might come for¬
ward to dispute the right of possession.
The mortgagee-creditor, when he took possession of an
estate, abandoned the position he before held of a mere
creditor having a lien upon the estate for his principal and
interest, and having a right at any time to secure his satis¬
faction after the debt was due. By taking possession, to
some extent, he put himself in his debtor's shoes. He was
now accountable to the other creditors and must record on oath
the whole of the current accounts, proceeds of sale, and how
much was applicable and had actually been applied to his mort-
gage.^a Taking possession of an estate was not a cheerful
prospect /
prospect, it gave no right to sell the estate, and, unless
the mortgagee creditor was an experienced planter and with
capital, it was apt to he more trouble than what it was worth.
As an alternative to taking possession, the mortgagee creditor
might obtain a judgment for his debt. The judgment could be
executed at any time, provided it had not lain dormant for a
year or more, in which case a new writ of execution would
A
have to be obtained. With the writ of execution, the
judgment creditor could levy on the goods and personal effects
of the debtor. These were however likely to be worth little,
if estates sold by the Encumbered Estates Court are considered
to be representative.
It was found that in the case of many of these estates
the erstwhile proprietor had stripped them of anything of
value, and, in a number of cases in Jamaica had sold the sugar
machinery to Cuba.
Execution of judgments in the British West Indies differed
from England in that, the British statute, 5.Geo.11;C.7.
"lands, hereditaments and real estate within the colonies
are liable to debts, and subject to the like process of exe¬
cution as personal estate."^0
This ruling meant that in the sugar colonies a writ of
execution for a judgment authorized the provost-marshal to
levy /
levy on the lands as well as on the goods and personal effects
of the debtor, if the latter were insufficient to meet the exe¬
cution. In the Windward Islands, when the debtor's lands were
more than sufficient to pay off the execution the debtor was
permitted to choose which part of his lands he would have sold
A Orl
and this was to be appraised by the provost-marshal. But
as a sugar estate did not readily bear partition this quali¬
fication in the Windwards was of little help to judgment cre¬
ditors concerned there.
In all the sugar colonies, except Antigua, the proceeds
of the levies were applied according to the order in which the
executions were delivered to the provost-marshal. In Antigua
the proceeds were applied equally to all executions as were
lodged^e within a certain period of time (usually thirty-nine
days).
The obtaining of a writ of execution for a judgment was
usually the signal for other mortgagee creditors to do likewise.
Finally, unless the estate found a purchaser, there was little
value in executing a judgment. Estates after Emancipation
were very much reduced in value, and charges on them were so
great that the proceeds of a sale often failed to satisfy even
the first creditor. This was the frequent experience in re¬
gard to sales through the Encumbered Estates Court, where
legal /
legal expenses were much less than usually obtained in the
Colonies.
Another course that a mortgagee creditor might take to
recover his debt, was to file a foreclosure bill in Chancery.
By filing a bill of foreclosure the mortgagee did not take
possession. If there was some prospect of working the es¬
tate, the Court of Chancery could appoint a Receiver who took
possession and worked the estate, distributing net income to
creditors according to priority. As soon as an estate had
been in Chancery for twelve months, the Receiver was called
to bring in his accounts, all vouchers and receipts, and to
report to Chancery. If an application by the mortgagee for
a sale was pending, the Court of Chancery summoned a number
of appraisers (usually seven sugar planters). They put a
value on the whole property, including crops, stock and all
machinery, and the property was then set up for sale. If
the estate was not sold at the expiration of twelve months it
was appraised again and set up for sale once more, the Receiver
in the meanwhile working the property. This procedure would
be repeated until the estate finally found a purchaser.
When a decree of sale was completed, the liens on the
plantation were ranked and a statement made showing the lien-
holders who came within the appraised value. The purchase
money /
money was distributed according to this statement of priority.
If a purchaser failed to complete his purchase the plantation
was taken possession of again by the Receiver.
As the expenses incurred by the Receiver in cultivating
and managing the estate were granted a first lien on the
property, and as the legal expenses involved in a sale through
Chancery were usually very high, the process of putting an
estate in Chancery was only successful if the property was
highly productive as in Barbados. In the other sugar colonies
estates that fell into Chancery after Emancipation were often
abandoned for years, as the records of the Encumbered Estates
Court reveal.
Only in Barbados did the Chancery system work satis¬
factorily and,in this colony, few estates were ever abandoned
or fell into Chanasery. The few instances where the Receiver
worked estates in Barbados they were profitably cultivated
and /
and to-date were able to meet demands made on them.
The variance in existing laws of the different
colonies and the inadequacy of the general laws re¬
lating to real property in meeting the requirements of
the changed conditions were obvious by the first decade
after the emancipation of the slaves, and thus the clear
parliamentary title granted by the West Indies Encumbered
Estates Court was preferable to the system of title deeds
and the indefinite multiplication of mortgages. Under
the old system estates had remained in the Court of Chan¬
cery from thirty five to forty years in many instances.41
The West Indies Encumbered Estates Court usually required
two to four years to bring an estate to sale. There was
still much tracing of titles and ascertaining of boun¬
daries which, in conjunction with the required six months
notice of sale, drew out the period required to make a
sale. Local lawyers, from the first, opposed the Court
and engendered criticism of it because it took from them
uTWA (A
the lucrative business as existed in the local Chancery
Court.42 Much of the later criticism of the consignee's
lien, came from the lawyers, and planters warned by the
lawyers that they would lose their estates under the
jurisdiction /
jurisdiction of the Court.
The consignee's lien, although the principle was
invoked frequently in the first ten years of the Court's
life, did not evoke any appreciable criticism in the
colonies. Evidence of the extent to which the principle
could he pressed was evinced in Antigua where the con¬
signee' s lien was granted precedence over earthquake
loans made to estates on the credit of the colonies of
Antigua and Montserrat in 1843. These charges on es¬
tates were passed over by the Court in granting priority
of the consignee's lien and four estates were sold in
Antigua free of their liabilities. Apprehension was
caused in Montserrat by this action of the Court in
Antigua and representations were made to the Colonial
Office. When asked for information the Commissioners
of the Court stated that they could not depart from the
usual procedure in regard to the earthquake loans. The
matter was apparently dropped at that.^®
The West Indies Encumbered Estates Act had been re¬
newed in 1862 for a further period of five years and when
in 1867, the question of further renewal came up, the
cost of maintenance of the Central court in London also
arose /
arose. The Colonial Office notified the colonies that
in addition to the expenses of the local courts which
they had agreed to defray from the first, they would he
asked to contribute to the cost of the central court
which to date (1867) the Home Government hadmetIn
July 1868, the Colonies were circularized as to the
various modes for making the Court self-supporting and
at the same time the Colonial Office expressed the view
that each colony contribute fifty pounds towards the
diminishing annual vote for the Central Court, made by
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the British Treasury, and which was to cease in 1870.
Reception in the colonies was unfavourable to any
contribution towards the London Court. Most of the
Governors reported that while the title granted by the
Court was considered to enhance the value of the estate,
and that estates which had passed through the Court were
being recultivated, there was a disinclination to support
the Court. This disinclination resulted, so it was
stated, from a feeling that the bulk of work to be done
already
had/been accomplished by the Court. In St.. Vincent,
additional objection was that the estates in that colony
had been concentrated in the hands of a few individuals
as /
as a result of the Court's recognition of the consignee's
lien.^7® Governor Grant of Jamaica said that the Court
discouraged resident proprietors and gave the merchants
in London an opportunity of buying up estates at a cheap
rate as the result of lack of competition at sales.47
The Governor of Dominica also complained of the Court's
giving merchants in London a monopoly of sugar estates
in that Colony. The Governor of the Leeward Islands
remarked that a title granted by the Court was now a
common condition of sale but there was a feeling that
ACi
the Court played into the hands of the merchants.
As a result of this lack of enthusiasm on the part
of the colonies to make any contribution towards the
London Court, the Commissioners of the Court in a report
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of December 1869, summed up their work to date pur¬
portedly to show that the Court had done good work and
to answer some of the criticism in the colonies con¬
tained in the replies to the request that they contribute
to the maintenance of the London Court.
The Commissioners considered that the London Court
commanded the confidence of suitors more than a purely
local tribunal, and even in cases where some of the parties
concerned /
■>°
concerned were resident in the colonies the fact of the
Court "being independent of local influence was deemed a
"boon. In one case a sale was made in England directly
on the grounds that the local commissioner was interested
in the estate.50
The difficulty in obtaining colonial legal assistance
and the high scale of legal charges prevailing in the
colonies, was another inducement to prefer the London to
N\o>r ef:
the local court. A3A the fifty estates sold in Jamaica
to 1869 had "been sold in London, "where all the West
India merchants had their agents and representatives. "5-*-
The sixteen estates sold in Tobago by 1868 had all been
sold in London to the merchant consignee52 and in Antigua
since 1864, thirty five estates had been sold practically
all to the consignee merchant.53 The Commissioners
denied that estates were undersold in London and stated
they did all in their power to prevent the sale of an
estate at less than its real marketable value, and that
the value of it was fixed upon information of eminent
West India merchants and the assent of petitioners.54
Pees of the Commissioners were reasonable, they
pointed out, 8# on the purchase money, and a fee of two
pounds /
pounds for each petition, fees in the local courts were
very small, the local commissioners receiving ±% on the
purchase money. 55
The Commissioners quoted from letters of various
merchants advocating the continuance of the Court and
giving testimony of estates resuscitated. The purchase
of one merchant alone had "brought an*increase of 1,102
hogsheads of sugar apart from the molasses and rum.
Arnos Vale, in St. Vincent, after "being out of cultivation
for five years, was now producing from 300 to 500 hogs¬
heads of sugar a year. Porter and Company in Sh Vincent
had obtained 1,000 "barrels of arrowroot and 1,110 hogs¬
heads of sugar in 1868 from the four estates they had
5"7
purchased through the Court.
The Commissioners of the West Indies Encumbered
Estates Court calculated that as a result of their sales
in nine colonies under their jurisdiction import duties
on sugar alone, irrespective of rum and molasses, had
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shown an increase of at least £40,000.
Following the report of the Commissioners the Colonial
Office stated at the end of 1869, that though the value
of the Court was undisputed it was a question whether the
advantage /
advantage to the United Kingdom was such as to justify
contributions from the British Government. At the same
time it was agreed that the charges of West Indies law¬
yers were usurious and that in London proceedings were
cheap and speedy.
The West Indies Committee alarmed at the possibility
\
of the abolishment of the London Court, passed a resol¬
ution in 1870, expressing the views of the London mer¬
chants as to the advantage of the central court. A depu¬
tation awaited on Lord Granville and expressed the opinion
that the West Indies Committee members felt they could in¬
duce the colonies to contribute to the support of the
Court in London.60 The British Government decided to
continue financial support for two years.
Considering the report of the Commissioners that the
Court was an instrument of good and if, as was maintained,
even by some of the sugar proprietors, it had brought
estates back into cultivation, why was there growing
criticism of the Court? The statement made by Colonial
Legislatures that the bulk of work, in the British West
Indies to be done by the Court, was finished, was not true.
The number of later estates sold by the Court disproved
this /
this statement, and in addition, Governor Grant of
Jamaica had stated in 1867 that there was still much
work for the Court to do in Jamaica.61 Most of the
criticism of the Court from 1870 onwards was to the
effect that it was hut an instrument of the merchants
and that hy its recognition of the consignee's lien it
was beggaring proprietors and their dependents. Com¬
plaints were that, instead of attracting capital as it
was purported to do, the Court's decisions were deterring
capital from entering the colonies in that no one, not a
consignee merchant, would invest and take the risk of
having his claim overridden hy the consignee's lien.
Lawyers in the colonies warned their clients that under
the Act, their dependents were liable to lose all their
claims on an estate in case of sale,62 in view of the
consignee's lien as recognized hy the Court.
An explanation of the opposition to the continuance
of the West Indies Encumbered Estates Court, it would
seem, requires a clarifying of the principle and history
of the "consignee's lien".
One thing is certain from an examination into the
history of the consignee's lien, and that is, that it
was /
was claimed long "before the West Indies Encumbered
Estates Court gave it recognition.
Prom the earliest days of the British West Indies
mortgages of property in the sugar colonies contained
covenants and stipulations not found in mortgages of
property situated in England.
The risk to which a West Indies estate was subject,
the fluctuations in the price of sugar and the necessity
of arranging for its marketing in the United Kingdom had
made the sugar proprietor an early applicant to the British
merchant for a loan of money. Hence it became the prac¬
tice that the merchant vrould make it a condition of the
loan that the debtor consign to him for sale, on the usual
commission, all the produce of the mortgaged estate, ship
it in the vessels sent out by the merchant, and take from
the merchant all the supplies required for the estate.
The performance of this condition at first rested upon
the honour of the proprietor but towards the latter part
of the eighteenth century it became the subject of express
contract, not introduced into the mortgage deed, but con¬
tained in a separate instrument.6® The mortgage ex facie,
would become forfeited if the mortgagor did not pay the
principal /
principal and interest on a given day, usually six or
twelve months after the date of mortgage. But "by
separate instrument the mortgagee agreed to extend the
period for payment and to take no steps to foreclose
against the debtor if he consigned all the produce to
him, on "board his vessels and received from him his sup¬
plies. Covenants "by the mortgager to perform these
stipulations were also contained in this separate instru¬
ment®^.
It would not have "been thought that these stipul¬
ations would have "been sustained under English law, as
they gave the mortgagee a collateral advantage "beyond the
legal interest on his mortgage and were therefore ex¬
cessive and tending to usury. The few times the validity
of these covenants were submitted to judicial inquiry in
England, decisions upheld them, (there is no evidence of
their being submitted for judicial inquiry in the colonies).
Both Lord Eldon and Lord Brougham decided in their favour.65
In the case of Scott versus Nesbitt, 1808,®® the
Master1 s r§> ort, in regard to the enquiry on the petition
of the consignee, stated that no evidence having been laid
before him he did not find that there was any law or usuage
in /
in Jamaica for a lien either by a consignee in respect
to supplies, or a tenant-in-common having made advances
for that purpose. Lord Eldon however admitted the lien
and stated:-
"The concern of a Vi/est Indies estate cannot he
carried on without consignees and all moral justice
requires that, for what in the fair discharge of
their duty they became liable to in respect of the
management of the estate, they should be indem¬
nified with priority to the claim of those who
have interests in the estate to be so managed
before any person can have any benefit from it. "
In the case of Bunbury versus Winter6*7, two years later,
Lord Eldon also stated
"The ground on which the mortgagee lending money
on a West Indies estate is allowed the benefit of
a covenant for the consignments is two-fold, first
because it furnishes him a security for his debt
and secondly because the commission he receives is
supposed only to be a fair compensation for his
trouble. "
In /
In the case of Scott versus Nesbitt Lord Wynford had
stated:-
"This is the known mode of dealing between planters
and merchants and stopping it would produce mis¬
chievous derangement of business. This practice
is beneficial to the mortgagee as he derives from
it the security of produce, and is beneficial to
the mortgagor who, when his produce is consigned
to his creditor, is certain of getting its value,
and in event of bankruptcy his debt will be awarded
to him under the bankrupt laws. 1,68
The decision given in the case of Miles versus Ather-
ton in 1821, also recognized the priority of the consig¬
nee' s lien69 and the High Court of Chancery acted upon it
subsequently. In the case of Morrison versus Morrison
in 1854 the priority of the consignee's lien was recog¬
nized in accounting for compensation money for slaves.70
The consignee's lien appears to have been peculiar
to the sugar colonies, although an analogous principal
was found in maritime law as regards the priority given
to the latest bottomry bond.71 That is where supplies
to /
to ships took precedence of mortgages on ships. How¬
ever the master of the ship had the imperative duty to
notify the o?m.er if at all possible and in this sense it
was different from the consignee's lien, which did not
have to be publicly registered in any way and in fact
was often known only to the owner of the estate and the
consignee.72
The West Indies Encumbered Estate's Court referred
to the case of Scott versus Hesbitt as the precedent for
their decisions and it was referred to in the first es¬
tate sold by them, Arnos Tale, in St. Vincent sold in
1858 (see p. }.75 In the case of Davie and Bodoington
in 1859, the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Stonor again allowed
a consignee priority of lien. In the case of Harriott
and Pengelly in 1862, it was ruled
"The consignee Is entitled to a lien on the corpus
of a lest India estate for the advances aia.de to him
for its cultivation in priority to all other en¬
cumbrancers. 1,7-
Throughout the years 1S62 - 1670 the priority of
the consignee's lien appears to have been invoked in.
approximately half the sales of estates. In the two
cases /
cases tliat were brought before the Privy Council the
principle of the consignee's lien was not in question,
the decision turning on a different point. However
in one of the cases, that of Praser versus Burgess, 1860,
Lord Kingsdown declared, in reference to the consignee's
lien:-
"When the authorities are examined the question
in what cases and against what parties and to what
extent the consignee is entitled to a lien on the
corpus of an estate seems left in some degree of
uncertainty. t,r75
In the other case before the Privy Council, that of
Chambers versus Burge, the consignee's lien was spoken
of as "this presumed lien. Thus from looking over
the cases where the consignee's lien had been recognized
it appears that what was needed was a test case in the
Privy Council to decide once and for all the validity of
the consignee's lien. Unfortunately, throughout the
history of the Court, this was never obtained, chiefly
because, so it was claimed by persons in the colonies,
those who were injured by the lien could not afford the
necessary /
necessary expense of such an eppeal.
Prior to Lord Eldon's decision there is no recog¬
nition of the consignee's lien in English law. Under
Act 5, Geo III cap. 7 it was ordained that all just debts,
duties and demands "are ultimately chargeable on the
corpus of an estate" but there was no mention made of the
consignee's claims or of their priority.'7'7
It would seem from the above that although the con¬
signee' s lien could have been invoiced against the colonial
courts, prior to the establishment of the Encumbered Es¬
tates Court, that this did not happen must be attributed
to the unlikelihood of any colonial judge recognizing a
principle directly in the face of the planting interest
and, in addition, its invoking would have availed little
without the sale of the estate. The West Indies Encum¬
bered Estates Court performed both functions, and con¬
tinued to deliver judgments based on the precedents men¬
tioned above. Criticism of the consignee's lien, as has
been stated, was not too apparent in the first few years
of the Court's existence. Between the years 1862 - 1874,
one hundred and fifty-four estates were sold. One third
of those had been completely abandoned and many partially
so /
so.78 Towards the latter part of this period the practice
of bringing to sale estates, although heavily encumbered, still
actively cultivated under the nominal ownership of a sugar
proprietor, became common. It was a result of this growing
practice that active criticism became manifest by the early
1870's. Many so-called abuses were said to arise from this
practice.
It was stated in 1873, that merchants were petitioning for
the sale of estates in London where there was little competition
in the way of purchasers. These merchants were able to obtain
the estates at very low prices. The priority of his lien as
consignee being assured, the merchant had an advantage in bidding
to the amount of his lien. There were local courts in the
colonies but these were not usually resorted to. During the
history of the Court's activities in Jamaica, of the total of
one hundred and forty-eight estates sold in that colony, only
79two were sold in the local court. In Antigua, where seventy-
three estates were sold there were fourteen petitions for sale
80in the local court; in St. Vincent, of a total of thirty
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sales, only three were in the local court. In the islands of
Nevis and St. Christopher, considering the total number of es¬
tates sold, a greater proportion passed through the local court
than /
than in any of the other sugar colonies. By 1874, all thirteen
estates sold, passed through the London Court, "but of the eight
estates sold after 1874, seven were petitioned for sale in the
local court. These seven estates were however of small size
and were purchased for small sums. For example, Belmont and
Dasent's, sold in May, 1880, "brought in a total of only £2,420.
Op
Usually local sales were all to resident proprietors, but in
the case of these two estates the London merchant consignee pe¬
titioned for sale and purchased the two estates through the local
court. It was observed in regard to the seven estates sold in
St. Christopher and Nevis, that the local courts were much slower
in granting titles of sale than the London Court and that legal
expenses were much higher - these factors in themselves, were
sufficient reasons for preference for the London Court.
The continued sale of large estates through the London Court,
so residents in the colonies claimed, was to prevent any bids from
G-S
those, who living in the colony, knew the real value of the estate. *
The Jamaican legislature in 1873 made an attempt to stop this drift
of sales through the London Court by establishing in addition to
the local court, created by Imperial Act, an independent Encum¬
bered Estates Court possessing the same function as the Court in
84.
, London and having concurrent jurisdiction with it. * This
attempt /
attempt was not successful and by 1879, the Chief Commissioner
of the West Indies Encumbered Estates Court stated that the
Jamaican Encumbered Estates Court had not diminished business
85
from Jamaica.
The first outspoken opponent of the Court and the consignee'
lien was Sir Graham Briggs, a Barbadian planter who had gone to
Nevis and was singularly successful there in introducing a garden
like cultivation that he had practised in Barbados to his profit.
Briggs had supported Governor Pope Hennessy in 1874, when the
o n
question of the federation of the Leeward Islands arose. Mer¬
chants connected with the Leewards opposed this federation on the
ground that their influence in the individual islands would be
thus diminished if federation took place. Briggs continued to
support Hennessy and was extremely critical of the West Indies
Encumbered Estates Court, both local and London, in recognizing
88the priority of the consignee's lien. In 1875, Briggs cor¬
responded with the Colonial Office and denounced the Court,
stating it was beggaring resident proprietors by its decisions,
that it was conducive to the growth of absenteeism, and that it
placed /
placed a monopoly of estates in the hands of the United Kingdom
merchants, and that it prevented capital from entering the
89
colonies. In further correspondence with the Colonial Office,
Briggs criticised the local Encumbered Estates Court in Nevis,
and stated
"The cost of putting an estate through this Court is,
I maintain, now scandalous."
Finally, Briggs accused the Court of inventing the priority of
the consignee's lien in favour of the English merchants.
The disclosure that the West India Committee had made a con¬
tribution of £250 towards the salaries of the Court in London in
90
1872, tended to confirm opinion held in the colonies that the
Court was but an instrument of the merchants. This subsidy from
the West India Committee occurred only once, and was given in the
interval between the cessation of Imperial grant for the upkeep
of the Court, and the establishing of a basis for remuneration by
fees and commissions for sale of estates. But as stated in a
Colonial Office dispatch, it was an "unfortunate occurrence" and
raised doubts in the Colonies as to probity of decisions of
the /
the Commissioners in London.
Further attention was drawn to the consignee's lien
"by events in Barbados in 1879. Barbados had not adopted
the West Indies Encumbered Estates Act. Land in Bar¬
bados had long been considered as first-rate security
for investments and it was the common practice in Bar¬
bados when purchasing estates, for the vendor to leave
a portion of the purchase money in the form of a mort¬
gage on the estate because returns on such an investment
were considered as certain and lucrative. A considerable
portion of the interest paid on mortgages on Barbadian
estates went to residents on the spot and was spent in
the island. Abandoned estates in Barbados were -unknown.
Estates in Barbados that got into difficulties and could
not meet obligations imposed on them were put in Chancery.
The Master took possession of the estate and carried on
cultivation for the benefit of the creditors by the ap¬
pointment of a Receiver, whose expenses for that purpose
were allowed to take precedence of all claims against the
property^2 (the nearest approach to the consignee's lien
was recognized in a West India colony.). Merchants
took security for their advances according to date and
all /
all claims had to "be registered with the Master of
Chancery. 93 Good estates did not remain long in Chan¬
cery and even indifferent ones sold in Barbados. The
majority of liens and encumbrances affecting estates
sold in Chancery represented money due to people who did
not want the principal sum, hut only their regular in¬
terest. Mortgages held good in Barbados no matter how
many times an estate was sold. The law in Barbados
allowed money accumulated in the island's Saving Banks
to be invested in sugar estates on mortgages^4 and the
Barbados Mutual Life Assurance Company had substantial
investments in the sugar industry of Barbados.Un¬
like the other islands it was claimed that advances were
never made in Barbados to prevent estates from being
abandoned. Securities affecting every plantation in
Barbados were recorded so that every merchant could know
the claims against it and would know the actual money
value of the estate.
The Barbadian system, as described, had worked well
to date. In the 1870's the muscovado system of this
colony was still prosperous and there was little sign of
the depression that would be felt within the next decade.
Thus /
Thus when in 1879, an attempt was made to introduce the
consignee's lien it met immediate opposition.96 Thos.
Daniels and Company of Mincing Lane, London were a leading
firm of West India merchants, with large interests in
Barbados, as well as elsewhere in the West Indies. In
1879, the estate of a planter to whom this company had
made large advances was placed in Chancery. Thos.
Daniels and Company, well aware of the decisions of the
Encumbered Estates Court in the other colonies, lodged a
claim for their advances, alleging that as consignee for
the estate their claim took precedence of all mortgages.
This claim caused considerable excitement among the
planting interests in Barbados. The Barbados Association
for the Protection of Liens against Plantations was formed.
The Barbados Mutual Life Assurance Company had invested
£150,000 in plantations in the colony, and along with the
Savings Banks gave their support in opposing the consignee'
claim.Following Messrs. Daniels' attempt to invoke
the consignee's lien, the consignee creditors of Messrs.
Hardy sugar proprietors, threatened to put in a consignee's
claim at the Court of Chancery.100 Faced with the pos¬
sibility of a general attempt by consignee merchants to
introduce /
introduce this principle, the Association of Planters
decided to hire counsel to fight their case.101 The
Colonial Office was notified that the threat of the Con¬
signee' s lien was damaging investment possibilities and
destroying confidence in the sugar industry in Barbados,
and at the same time, it was stated, Barbadians did not
want precedents established in other islands to be intro¬
duced in their colony.108
The Colonial Office, in a dispatch commenting on
Brigg*s complaints a short time previously, had stated
that if the consignee's lien was not desired in the colo-
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nies they could legislate against it. This Barbados
now did. The Barbadian Legislature passed an Act against
the consignee's lien in the spring of 1882, stating:-
"Glaims have recently been brought forward to have
advances ranked as first liens, but there is no
difficulty in borrowing money for estates or else
in selling the estates at a good price. Such
priority claims are inconsistent with and repugnant
to the system of real property security. In Bar¬
bados real estate, as in England, is capable of
alienation /
alienation, mortgage and charge and thereby
affording investments for capital which have
always "been considered sound and reliable, and on
that account, been sought after with the same con¬
fidence as similar investments in England. Allowing
such claims would cause a serious depreciation in
the value of real estate; let these advances be
ranked by priority of date and be open to inspec¬
tion in the Record Office. "104
Daniels and Company had expressed an intention of
taking their case to the Privy Council but in the face
of opposition raised in Barbados and as the Legislature
had passed the Act abolishing the consignee's lien in
Barbados, they did not press their claim, and the Colonial
Office was informed that "On the advice of council, the
case before the Privy Council has been abandoned. "
Daniels and Company resigned themselves to the usual
Chancery process.105
Perhaps if Daniels and Company had pressed their
claim before the Privy Council a test case might have been
made and a decision obtained as to the validity of the
consignee's /
consignee's lien. No such opportunity presented itself
again.
Lord Kimberley, in 1880, commenting on Sir Graham
Brigg's complaint against the abuses of the West Indies
Encumbered Estates Court which were followed by the
Messrs. Daniels incident, expressed the need of a Com¬
mission of Inquiry into the working of the Encumbered
Estates Act in the West Indies.10® By the early 1880's,
the finances of a number of the sugar colonies, chiefly
those in which the Court had jurisdiction, were in su«h a
confused and indebted state resulting chiefly from loans
for coolie immigration and unpaid debts dating from the
hurricane relief of 1843. In addition the tariff systems
were a cause of vexation due to lack of uniformity of
duties in the various colonies and complaints that food¬
stuffs were too severely taxed.107 The Home Government
had decided in 1882 to appoint a Royal Commission to in¬
vestigate and report on these matters, and, as the recent
incidents had arisen in regard to the consignee's lien,
it was decided that an examination into the working of the
West Indies Encumbered Estates Court could be made in con¬
junction with the investigation of finances and tariffs.100
The /
The Royal Commissioners Colonel William Crossman and.
George Baden Powell went to the British West Indies in
Dec. 1888, returning in April 1883.109 Distinct from
their main r^>ort and evidence on finance they issued a
smaller report and summary of evidence on the Encumbered
Estates Court.110 Briefly speaking they had little that
was good to say about it.
The Royal Commissioners of 1883 first commented on
the expense of the Court and stated that it belied the
original intention of giving an indefeasible title to an
estate at a cheap rate- for example, fees and costs were
£400 in the case of estates in Nevis which sold for a
total of £2,400.111 The remuneration of the judges of
the Court by a 2% commission on the gross amount of pur¬
chase price led the community to distrust the Court as
having a vested interest in bringing estates to sale.11^
The Royal Commissioners criticised the Court for the length
of time It took before a title of sale was granted - cases
were kept on an average two and a half years and as many
as five years in some instances before being sold.113
Above all the Royal Commissioners indicted the Court
for its recognition of the priority of the consignee's
lien /
lien. This was a construction of the Court, - so Cross-
man and Powell claimed, - "based on an old decision of
Lord Eldon's under an entirely different state of affairs,
when advances were necessary for the upkeep of slaves.114
Apart from Lord Eldon' s decision there was little to sup¬
port the Court's decisions granting priority to the con¬
signee's lien. In the two cases "brought "before the Privy
Council,118 although the question of the consignee's lien
was not threshed out, the issue of the cases not depending
on that principle, still the Privy Council had not spoken
in favour of the lien and apparently deliberately refrained
from pronouncing on it.11®
The Royal Commissioners admitted that a limited lien
was recognized in some of the colonies as St. Lucia,
Trinidad and British Guiana, but the lien was recognized
on the crop only and the year of the crop was specified.11^
There was no express law by which a person furnishing an
advance for supplies had any lien on the corpus of the
estate itself, and furthermore to assert that it had
priority over other mortgages and claims on an estate was
definitely not recognized by any law of the British West
Indies .118
Crossman /
Crossman and Powell repeated the criticism that had
been made "by Briggs and other planters that the Court was
but an instrument of the consignee merchants. As there
existed but a snail number of merchants trading with each
colony at any one time there existed no competition at
sales in the London Court,119 the merchants not inter¬
fering with each other's business. Many examples existed
for the Royal Commissioners to draw on to illustrate their
charge that the Court was creating a monopoly in the hands
of the merchants. In St. Vincent, the firm of Porter and
Company had acquired most of the twenty estates they owned
in that colony, through the Court.120 In Montserrat, the
house of Sturge of Birmingham had acquired seven estates
through the Court, and in Jamaica. Cottam Mortan and
Company had added to their holdings there by purchases
through the Court, and many more examples were available
of companies acquiring numerous estates in Jamaica and the
other colonies.121
Prom the evidence examined in the Colonial Office
and from evidence obtained by Grossman and Powell there
is no indication that the local merchant in the colonies
was concerned in petitioning for the sale of estates under
the /
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the consignee's lien.12'2 The merchant in the United
Kingdom apparently invoked his claim of priority in all
instances where it was.effected.
Numerous incidents of hardship wrought hy the Court
on legatees, widows, children and others whose claims were
passed over, were given hy the Royal Commissioners. Much
hardship resulted from persons, who had claims on the es¬
tates, being prevented by distance and expense from at¬
tending the London Court in person or in obtaining legal
services to press their claims.12®
Proof of the injury to the colonies caused by the
Court's decisions, was that in those colonies as British
Guiana, Trinidad and Barbados, where the Court had no
jurisdiction, conditions were much more prosperous and
production there was increasing while in the islands
where the Court obtained there was little or no improve¬
ment in conditions.1^4
Finally, the report of the commissioners urged the
abolition of the Encumbered Estates Court.1^5
The commissioners of the West Indies Encumbered Es¬
tates Court in London were given an opportunity of reply¬




This criticism offered itself to rebuttal and the
Commissioners of the Encumbered Estates Court had an easy
task of picking it to pieces, which they did effectively.
There had been some criticism of the manner in which
evidence for the report had been gathered in the colonies,
in that it was not representative of all opinion and that
it was not kept distinct according to persons giving it.
Letters from witnesses appeared in Jamaican papers and
claimed misinterpretation of their evidence.Much of
this so-called misrepresentation may be attributed to the
fact that the Royal Commissioners had no short-hand writer
and verbal evidence by the time it was recorded no doubt
was inexact. This alleged deficiency in the Royal Com¬
missioner' s report did not add to its trustworthiness.
As regards the expenses of the Court, the Commissioners
denied that these were unduly high. The example given of
Q
estates in Nevis was an exceptionable instance. The
total fees for the sale of twenty-four estates in 1870
only amounted to £817. The length of time that es¬
tates remained in the Court before being sold was much
less than formerly under Chancery. Instances were
frequent: /
frequent of estates remaining in Chancery as long as
forty years.188 Considering the legal work involved in
tracing out the ownership and claims on estates, the time
it took for exchange of correspondence "between the Colonies
and the United Kingdom, the difficulty in ascertaining
boundaries of estates, which in the West Indies were al¬
ways vague,180 often marked only by a stone, in view of
all this, the time required to bring an estate to sale
was easily -understandable. There was always the certainty
that the West Indies Encumbered Estates Court could grant
a clear parliamentary title much appreciated by purchasers.
The statement of Grossman and Powell that the decisions
of the Court were inflicting injury to persons with claims
on the estate this was, so the commissioners of the Court
claimed, strange ground on which to criticize the decisions
of an English Court of Justice.150 The case of Mount
Pleasant estate in Grenada, where the dispossession of a
Mrs. McEwen and others was alleged to have taken place,
did not result from any injustice on the part of the Com¬
missioners of the Court.151 In this instance many of the
were
claims / purely got up for the occasion and proved to be
groundless. It was unavoidable in selling large estates,
on /
on which small holders had encroached during the period
of the estates abandonment, but that some of these persons
should suffer hardship.
Referring to the chief criticism that the Court had
established the priority of the consignee's lien, the com¬
missioners of the Court said that Crossman and Powell had
fallen into the not uncommon error of identifying the
Court with the law that Court applied.^32 The Encumbered
Estates Court was bound to recognize the consignee's lien
as established by legal precedent, and if the consignee's
lien was not wanted in the colonies it lay within the
power of the local legislatures to reform that law.133
Regarding the charge that the Court's jurisdiction
militated against an influx of capital the commissioners
of the Court quoted merchants who stated that only because
of the Court and its recognition of priority of the con¬
signee' s lien would they make advances to sugar estates.13^7
The growing depression in the sugar industry resulting from
increasing beet and cane sugar competition, the abolishment
of the sugar duties in the United Kingdom in 1874 which had
favoured the muscovado type of sugar, made it increasingly
difficult to obtain advances unless such security as that
given /
given by the consignee's lien priority were granted.
In some respects, the statements made in the rep ort
of Grossman and Powell were correct. There was little
competition at sales of West Indies estates in London
(although there were exceptions as could be discerned
from newspaper accounts of such sales) This lack
of competition was not wholly attributable to the in¬
ability of would-be local purchasers prevented from at¬
tending because of distance, nor was it wholly a result
of the inability of any bidder competing on favourable
terms with a consignee merchant who could play on the
margin of his lien*, other reasons concerned were the
great fall in the price of sugar which was increasingly a
deterrent to investment in sugar estates, and in addition
there did seem to be a tacit understanding between mer¬
chants not to interfere with each other's business. In
all the cases handled by the Court there is only one where
there is evidence of one consignee's lien overriding the
lien of another consignee, and in this case, that of
Chambers versus Davidson (1866), no doubt was expressed
as to the priority of the last consignee's lien, the
question here depended rather on whether such a lien had
really /
really been covenanted.157
Large estates were usually sold in London where
buyers with sufficient capital could be found. In the
colonies legal fees were usurious and legal services
inefficient compared with those obtainable in London.
Many of the West Indies colonies imposed stamp duties
on the conveyances and processes of the Court. These
charges were not levied in the English Court.
On the whole the Colonial Office view was in agree¬
ment with that of the Commissioners of the Encumbered
Estates Court, and much of the criticism of the Royal
Commissioners, Crossman and Powell, was discounted.
What was revealed, however, was that the general consensus
of opinion in the colonies was against the continuance
of the Court. As regards the consignee's lien the Colo¬
nial Office view was that this was not a construction of
the Court, but was definitely recognized before the Court
began its work. Even if the Court were abolished it
could scarcely be assumed that the colonial courts would
not now take a different view of the consignee's lien.14G
There was also good reason to think that if the consignee's
lien were abolished by legislation in each colony, it
would /
would "be difficult to replace it by any less severe
system of raising money when a property was in extremis. 14-L
The argument of Grossman and Powell that colonies in
which the Court did not obtain were more prosperous44^
did not take into account many other factors which accoun¬
ted for this apparent prosperity. In British Guiana
and Trinidad the consignee system never existed to the
extent that it did in the other colonies and there was
less need for an Encumbered Estates Court and the priority
of the consignee's lien. ■ In addition these colonies had
dependable indentured labour, modern methods of manu¬
facture, absence of heavily encumbered estates, and mar¬
keting practices in these colonies were more in accord
with the needs of the time. It was erroneous to equate
the absence or presence of prosperity in the colonies
with the presence Of absence of the Encumbered Estates
Act.
As regards the statement of the Colonial Office that
there was no assurance that the colonial courts would not
recognize the consignee's lien this possibility was
quickly removed. In 1882, as has been mentioned, the
Barbados Legislature had passed an ordinance making the
consignee's /
I
consignee's lien in that colony illegal.143 Jamaica
passed a similar act in 1885144 and the same course was
followed in the other colonies with slight variations,
usually to the effect that a limited lien only on the
crop of the estate was recognized in regard to advances
of merchants.143
When in 1885 the legislatures of the various colonies
were invited to express their views on the West Indies En¬
cumbered Estates Court not only had a number of the colo¬
nies passed acts against the consignee's liens, but they
had all passed resolutions in favour of the abolition of
the Court with one exception,143 Tobago which subsequently
did so.
The work of the Encumbered Estates Court was largely
finished by the time the Royal Commissioners' report had
been discussed and acted on, and by April 1889, all the
colonies had applied for and passed Orders in Council foe
the abolition of the Act.14'7' It was decided to carry
on the Court in London for a further three years.which it
was thought might be required for the completion of pending
cases already in the hands of the Commissioners.143
Within a year or two of the abolition of the Court
in /
in the colonies and the nullifying of the consignee's
lien, difficulties arose that might have been eased if
the Act had still been in effect. The year 1884 was a
year of depression in the British West Indies;sugar in¬
dustry. An exceptional increase of bounty to the beet
sugar industry in Europe in 1883 - 4 was felt by 1884 - 5
and henceforth competition was consistent and severe.14^
In Barbados the independent spirit exhibited in
1880 and the claim that the sugar estates were the
'Consols of Barbados' presenting opportunities for sound
investments, no longer held good under depression con¬
ditions. By 1886 a large number of estates were in the
Court of Chancery in Barbados and no purchasers for these
estates could be found.150 Merchants connected with
Barbados estates advertised that no advances would be
given without first-rate security.151
The West Indies Committee, the organ of West Indian
merchants in the United Kingdom, in 1885 petitioned the
Colonial Office to authorize colonial governments to
guarantee advances of money made to sugar proprietors,
the limited lien in existence in some of the colonies
was no longer held to be sufficient security in the face
of /
of falling sugar prices.152 The Governor of Barbados
went to the extent of guaranteeing the security of the
colonial finances for advances made to sugar proprietors
in that island, without the sanction of the Colonial
Office. The Secretary of State for Colonies reproved
the Governor and said he "could not approve the pledge
of the government for advances made to private indi¬
viduals ... a precedent may be establishment which may
be interpreted as an encouragement for still wider and
more unsound schemes." The Secretary of State for
Colonies only forbore from disallowing the Bill "in con¬
sideration of the great expectations which had evidently
been raised" and the measure was not allowed to continue
beyond one year.153
The defects of the Chancery system in Barbados were
now revealed as a result of the depression in the sugar
industry.154
Estates in Barbados had for generations brought such
high prices that those now in the Court of Chancery still
were appraised at a much higher value than the price of
sugar warranted. This high appraisment was attributed
by the attorney General of Barbados to the corporate
opposition /
IA
opposition on the part of all persons in Barbados interested
in sugar estates. They opposed any reduction in price lower
than the estate would have brought in better times, because all
those whose debts did not come within the value of the plantation
at its reduced price would lose their money. Under this system
a mortgagee had the power to throw an estate into Chancery but
had no power to bring it to sale in the open market. In
Chancery, the estate was appraised and could not be sold below
this appraised value, which being too high, the estate was not
sold at all.155
The Master in Chancery of Barbados stated in 1897, that
some plantations had been appraised as many as eight times without
effecting a sale and that in two instances "the receiver got to
the end of his tether and applied to the Court of Chancery to
abandon the cultivation of the land and let it out into lots.n^*^a^
This system enabled many nominal owners to live on their
estates during the years of depression from 1884 onwards, because
no purchasers could be found for these estates at their high
appraisment /
appraisment.
In 1898, the Colonial Secretary of Barbados stated, as
regards the Chancery system:-
"it has only so far resulted in keeping fitful life in
a bankrupt estate, in keeping the owner still owner in
name, and in holding out a will of the wisp fantasy to
owner and mortgagees of better days to corne.«-^5(b)
By 1898, the Attorney General of Barbados was urging the
sale of estates in Chancery at public auction to the highest
bidder, but he was opposed by the majority of planters and
mortgagees. At the end of the century when the need fox-
central factories could be postponed no longer, difficulties
also arose because of the opposition of mortgagees to sugar
proprietors entering into contracts for the manufacture of
1 *">6
their cane. This aspect will be considered in detail in
a later chapter.
The West Indies Encumbered Estates Court, which
was continued on in the form of the London Court for three
years /
years from 1889, disposed of its last estate early in
the year 1892, and on July 51st, 1892, the Court ceased
to exist. The Chief Commissioner, Mr. Cust, as a reward
for his long service from the passing of the original Act
in 1854 to the final winding up of the Court, received a
knighthood.-'-5'7 The records of the Court were transposed
to the Public Records Office in January, 1893.158
By 1893 a final summing up of the work of the West
Indies Encumbered Estates Court is possible. In all, a
total of 382 estates had been sold. Figures given here
show the number of and total prices received for the es-
I PsQ
tates sold in the various colonies.
No. of estates Colony Purchase money
£
148 Jamaica 233, 483
75 Antigua 119,540
15 St. Kitts 61,890







Of these 382 estates, thirty-two had been sold in the
local /
local courts.
The most noticeable feature of these sales was that
they tended to concentrate estates in fewer hands than
prior to the existence of the Court. In examining the
records of sales we find for example, twelve estates in
Jamaica sold to one petitioner and nine to another.1®^
A few of the United Kingdom merchants who purchased
Jamaican estates were - Hawthorne Shedden and Company, who
already owned Goschen and Whitney estates in Jamaica and
who added to these Holland and Spring Garden estates,
-i s? -i
"both of large acreage. H. Sewell and Company, owners
of Harmony Hall, purchased Cave Valley and Vale Royal
through the Court. J. Bravo and Company; Davidsons and
Company; Sliffe, Henry and Sweet; Bosanquet, Curtis and
Company,also acquired a good number of estates. Many
of these firms, as for example Bosanquet, Curtis and
Company, already owned estates in the other colonies.
Similar amalgamations took place in the other colo¬
nies. In St. Vincent, Cavan Bros, and Porter and Company
had acquired large estates through the Court. Cavan Bros,
had at the same time large holdings in British Guiana,
Trinidad and Barbados.In Tobago, we have seventeen
estates /
estates passing to the ownership of one person;165 in
Antigua the same trend.164 took place and likewise in the
other colonies. This amalgamation of estates is more
fully treated in a later section.
In evaluating the work of the Court it is evident
that the "benefits to the merchants in England were more
immediate and direct, while benefits to the colonies in
general were more prospective and indirect. Letters
from merchants to the Commissioners of the Court gave in
detail production figures of sugar obtained from estates
they had obtained through the Court (see p. )• By
1885, Porter and Sons were stated to have cleared a profit
of £100,000 from estates purchased through the Court, in
the five years ending at this date.166 In Montserrat,
the Sturge Bros, of Birmingham had taken to the growing
of limes and reported success.166 In Grenada, a number
167
of the estates had been converted into cocoa plantations.
In St. Vincent, a large number of estates were cultivated
in arrowroot and sugar. In Jamaica, the most beneficial
effect of the encumbered Estates Act was experienced.
That this was so is attributable to that colony having
the greatest number of abandoned estates to be catered
for /
for by the Court, and when these estates were purchased
they were not always brought back into sugar cultivation.
Jamaica by the 1890's to a greater degree than any of the
other British West Indies, had turned to other products.
Sugar no longer was considered to be all-important, having
dropped to third place in the list of exports.-5-®® The
banana trade with the United States had grown to large
proportions and abandoned sugar estates proved to be ideal
for banana growing. A number of the estates purchased
through the Court became cattle pens or were farmed for
their logwood, the latter product finding a ready sale
towards the end of the nineteenth century and the export
of which was equal in value to that of sugar.
When the West Indies Royal Commission of 1897 pre¬
sented its findings in 1898, the long range effect of the
Encumbered Estates Court was more discernible after the
lapse of a few years. There are two sides to the picture
obtainable from evidence in this report. In Antigua; and
St. Vincent, where more estates had been sold through the
Court than in any other islands of similar size, it was
found that practically all estates were unmortgaged in
contrast, for example, to Barbados where the majority were
heavily /
heavily encumbered.^0 In Jamaica, where the Court had
been the most active, conditions were found to be most
prosperous and this was attributed to the decreasing
emphasis placed on sugar cultivation. Most of the es¬
tates sold through the Court were in prosperous culti¬
vation of other products. In the analler islands, as
TTevis and St. Kitts, estates sold through the Court were
hanging on when others had given up. A number of the
planters giving evidence voiced the wish that the West
Indies Encumbered Estates Act might still be in effect
and spoke of the greater facility with which advances
were obtained when the consignee's lien was in effect.
The other side of the picture is that in Antigua and
St. Vincent, notably the latter, merchants who acquired a
large number of estates at a small price, through the
Court, now that an over-all depression existed, decided
to reduce expenditure by limiting and finally ceasing
cultivation. Some of these firms could afford to do
this. Their estates had been acquired cheaply and the
muscovado system had been profitable without installing
expensive improvements, apart from centrifugals. These
firms having sufficient capital and other interests,
could /
could "bide their time and wait for a rise in price, whereas
resident proprietors would perhaps have continued to cul¬
tivate. The result of this state of affairs was dep ressed
labour conditions and hardship in these islands, more so
aggravated because of a land monopoly which these firms
had maintained to assure themselves of sufficient land¬
less labour when they so desired it. The Colonial
Office was aware of conditions existing in these
Colonies and especially singled out Porter and Sons in
St. Vincent and encouraged the Colonial Legislature there
to levy a tax on uncultivated land, thus posing the issue
of either cultivating or relinquishing land for non¬
payment of taxes. I"72
The British West Indies had to pass through a period
of adjustment if their sugar industry was to survive in
the latter half of the nineteenth century. In Trinidad
and British Guiana painful adjustment was largely avoided
due to the historical circumstances of those colonae s in
that they had not the traditional antiquated habits to
break away from and to a considerable extent had gone
abruptly into modern methods of sugar technique as soon
as these were available after the abolition of slavery.
In /
In the sugar colonies where the West Indies Encum¬
bered Estates Court operated, the period of transition
was hastened "by the work of the Court in bringing estates
under solvent ownership. It was difficult while
facilitating this transition, to avoid exacerbating
the feelings of many of the planting community. There
was no easy solution to their difficulties and some
measures such as the West Indies Encumbered Estates Act
introduced were necessary.
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PERIOD OF PROSPERITY, 1865 - 1874,
AND THE BOUNTY SYSTEM, 1875 - 1884.
The moderate prosperity in the British West Indies
Sugar industry (excepting Jamaica), at the year 1865, as
described in the introductory survey, continued for the
next decade with slight interruption.
The American Civil War, 1861 - 65, had affected all
the sugar colonies to some extent, chiefly in the matter
of increased price of foodstuffs and timber products, for
which the West Indies were increasingly dependent on North
■\
America. Trinidad and Barbados, both centres of distri-
bution for foodstuffs, shooks, staves and other products,
appear to have been most seriously affected, and in 1862,
the Governor of Trinidad remarked on the "checked state of
2
expansion" in that colony because of the Civil War. By
1865, the minutes of the Council of Barbados state,
"the prospect of the termination of the long and
deplorable struggle on the North American continent induces
a hope that our commerce with the ports of the United States
3
may return to the wonted channels with restored vigour."
Benefit /
Benefit from the Civil War appears to have "been en¬
joyed chiefly "by the Bahamas - Nassau "becoming an entrepot
for supplies to the Confederate States.^ A number of es¬
tates in Jamaica, St. Lucia, and Nevis had been turned to
the growing of cotton during the War. This development
was however but temporary and the cotton cultivation was
abandoned at the end of the War, when American cotton came
5
back in greater supply than before.
The sugar industry of the British West Indies was not
seriously affected by the Civil War. At this period only
a small (but increasing) portion of sugar, 4,652 tons in
1859 - 61, went to North America, (by 1882, 78,604 tons
went to that market)^. Most of the American ships bring¬
ing down foodstuffs in the late 1850's had returned with
very little sugar. The United Kingdom with a scale of
duties favouring muscovado sugar as was generally produced,
was the chief market for the sugar colonies at this period.
In 1858, of a total of 800 vessels clearing the island of
Trinidad, 108 were American, and of this.number, 67 were in
7
ballast.
Following the cessation of the Civil War, commerce was
again /
again re-established with the United States. In the sugar
industry there is evidence from all the colonies, Jamaica
excepted, to show that producing muscovado was profitable
and that producing vacuum pan sugar might be termed luc¬
rative .
By 1871, as regards British Guiana, it was reported
"All the estates in the colony, whose proprietors can
muster or borrow money are, since the last modification of
O
the sugar duties in England fast ordering out vacuum pans".
Many estates in British Guiana owned by mercantile firms
and persons of wealth, who had acquired them cheaply in the
years following Emancipation, and during the financial crisis
of 1847 - 8, were now returning good profits. Those es¬
tates on which the vacuum pan had been introduced were the
leaders both in quality and quantity of sugar produced.
Haarlem estate in 1865 was turning out an average of twelve
tons of sugar per day (for a period of 100 days) "all sugar
being of the best quality bringing 52s. per cwt. in the United
Kingdom". The manager of Haarlem in the five years ending
at this date drew a commission of six per cent on a total
of /
Q
of £50,000 profit - a salary of £600 per year. Plantation
10
Vergenoegen, in 1868, cleared a net profit of £15,000, and
Sehoon Ord, in 1870, netted what was termed an "Earl's in-
11
come" - 17,000. By 1871 it was stated that a planter's
revenue could he increased by £2,000 a year in British
Guiana if cultivation were extended by an additional 200
12
acres. The annual report of British Guiana for 1867,
states that the bonds of that colony were much sought after
in the United Kingdom, and "notes of planters are on the
whole paid with great punctuality, and legal proceedings
13
are seldom necessary."
In the neighbouring colony of Trinidad the vacuum pan
had also been introduced and, as in British Guiana, coolie
immigration had helped to ease labour difficulties. Profits
were also being made. Large estates making vacuum pan sugar
were increasingly profitable with reduction of duties on
that class of sugar in the United Kingdom. As in British
Guiana, a tendency to amalgamate estates was evident, and
we have planters as Iff. Lamont, adopting what he termed a
"policy of agglomeration", paying in one instance £10,000
■j Afor 250 acres to tack on to his already large holdings.
In /
In the other colonies, where muscovado sugar constituted
practically the only kind of sugar made, profits were also
evident. Governor Rawson of the Leewards, in 1869, after a
tour of inspection of the islands, spoke of the "busy scene
1 5
in Kingstown harbour, St. Vincent, with ships loading sugar.
Sugar exports from St. Vincent had increased by 5,000 hogs¬
heads in the period 1861 - 1871. (This increase was pro¬
bably attributable to the introduction of 1,800 immigrants
in the intervening decade). In St. Kitts, Mr. Berkely, of
plantation Peters Hall, stated that the plantations, in that
colony, by 1872, were in "the zenith" of their prosperity
and 'Were never so successfully cultivated as at the present
1 7
time". ' H. Pringle, a West Indian planter, writing in
1869, speaks of Barbados being pre-eminently the most pros-
18
perous of the sugar colonies. None of the 508 estates in
that colony were abandoned, labour was plentiful and muscovado
sugar which cost only £9 a hogshead to produce in Barbados,
sold in the United Kingdom as high as £25 and never lower
1 Q
than £15 per hogshead. In giving evidence in 1897 the
son of a planter in Barbados referring to this period stated,
"My father brought up his eight children and sent me to
Oxford /
on
Oxford on an estate of only 100 acres". In the 1860's
a number of Barbadian planters had settled in Nevis intro¬
ducing their art of garden-like cultivation and were also
21
prospering. Sir Graham Briggs, who opposed the West Indian
Encumbered Estates Court, was one of these Barbadian planters
22
who acquired property in Nevis at this period.
In contrast to what appears to be a rather rosy picture
of the sugar industry in most of the colonies, that of Jamaica
showed an industry decreasing in importance in comparison to
other products. In 1865 sugar comprised only 41.5 per cent
25
of that colony's total exports. In Jamaica the abandon¬
ment of sugar estates was continuing, by 1866 there being
but 300 remaining, "the best of upwards of 600 at the time
24
of Emancipation". Many of these estates abandoned con¬
sisted of land that ought never to have been cultivated, and,
in a sense, the progressive decrease was but a concentration
on the better estates where there still remained hope of
24a
profits. The sugar industry in Jamaica tended to shift
more and more to the western portion of the island. This
movement to the West was explained on the ground that the
eastern parishes as Portland, St. Mary and St. Thomas, were
the /
the wettest and hence the cost of working the land was
greater here. In these parishes cane juice was also said
to he more watery than in the drier parishes as Westmoreland
25
and Hanover m the western section of the colony.
Much of the decreasing importance of sugar in Jamaica
arose from scarcity of labour for the sugar estates. The
exodus of labourers to the hills and abandoned estates which
had begun after Emancipation had never ceased. Mr. Hossack,
Attorney General of Jamaica, attributed labour difficulties
entirely to the ease with which land and a living could be
26
obtained in Jamaica. In view of the fact that over half
of the sugar estates had been abandoned since Emancipation
and that the population of Jamaica was annually increasing,
it is evident that there was an over-all adequate supply of
labour, if such labour could be induced to work. There was
never however sufficient labour obtainable at those centres
where most required. Planters in Jamaica continued through¬
out the second half of the nineteenth century to request
Coolie labour; this subject is considered more fully in a
later section.
Jamaica also seems to have suffered from the superior
attraction /
attraction of Cuba and Porto Rico, as fields of investment
during the second half of the century. At the same time that
some Jamaican sugar estates were being dismantled and their
machinery sold to sugar estates in Cuba, Cuban sugar estates
27
were returning dividends of 17 per oent on capital invested.
Strangely enough several Cubans purchased Jamaican sugar
estates in this period and, in 1872, one Cuban planter in¬
stalled £4,000 of machinery on the Jamaican estate he had
28
purchased. Some of the better favoured estates in the
northwest portion of the colony continued to make profits
by specializing in high grade rums, but, on the whole, the
sugar industry in Jamaica continued to decline. Other
products more than compensated for this decline in sugar.
Many of the abandoned estates were converted into cattle
pens and logwood plantations, the logwood industry in Jamaica
receiving an impetus in 1869 when a rising in Haiti checked
29
the logwood industry there. Thus while sugar exports
dropped, the exports of other products increased. By 1870
the export of bananas was substantial and the revenue from
30total exports of Jamaica was higher than ever.
Much of the prosperity of the British West Indies sugar
industry /
industry as was manifested during the late 1860's and early
1370's is attributable to the scale of sugar duties as was
31
maintained in the United Kingdom.
The gradual equalization of the sugar duties in the
United Kingdom had been provided for by the Sugar Duties
Act of 1846 and a successive reduction was to take place
until 1854. In this year British West Indies sugar and
foreign sugar were made subject to the same duty on entry
into the United Kingdom.^
The duty as remained after 1854 was based on a graduated
scale, duties successively increasing as the quality of the
sugar ranged upwards. After some adjustment during the
Crimean war, the following classification and rates of
duties were in effect by 1864, - refined sugar,12/1Od. per
cwt.; equal to white clayed, 11/8d.; not equal to white
clayed, 10/6d.; equal to brown muscovado, 9/4d.; and not
33
equal to brown muscovado, 8/2d. Successive reductions
were made until 1874 when sugar duties were completely re-
3A
moved in the United Kingdom, but up to this year, both
vacuum pan sugar, which came in under the 10/6d. duty, and
yellow crystals and muscovado which came in at the lower
duties /
duties had an advantage over the white clayed and partially
refined sugars of Cuba, Brazil and Mauritius. These latter
sugar colonies had experienced a large development of their
sugar industries by the mid-nineteenth century, but, unlike
the British West Indies (British Guiana and Trinidad excepted),
had installed modern equipment for the expansion of their in-
35
dustry.
The scale of sugar duties in the United kingdom was of
such benefit to the British West Indies that an old charge
against them was that they deliberately lowered the quality
of their sugar to bring it under the lower scale of duties -
even to the extent of using "good agricultural mould" for
this purpose. In British Guiana, where vacuum sugar was
increasingly made, it was stated by Governor Barkly
"the spoiling of sugar when it seems likely to pass
the lowest standard is not of unfrequent occurrence on es-
37
tates where the vacuum pan is used."
In 1862, in evidence given before a Royal Commission on
Sugar Duties, it was stated,
"the removal of the 16s. duty on higher quality of
sugar /
sugar would entirely destroy many of the small West Indian
estates."^®
When a further slight reduction of sugar duties took
place in 1869 a memorial from sugar proprietors in Montserrat
claimed that one half of the muscovado estates had been
abandoned because of this reduction and, in the same year,
Dominican sugar planters stated that the reduction in duty
39
had hurt their low quality sugar. But as both these
colonies were notoriously backward, even as muscovado produ¬
cers, these complaints were no indication that muscovado
producers in the other colonies, at this date, were suffering
from depression.
The method of testing sugar on entry into the United
Kingdom for duty purposes by the somewhat rough-and-ready
process of terming sugars as white clayed, not equal to white
clayed, brown muscovado etc., was by the 1860's unmeaning
and deceptive. Vacuum pan dark grey crystals, open steam
pan yellow crystals, and various forms of sugar as hie lad o',
and •concrete', were now being made.^
In 1867, the United Kingdom adopted a classification of
sugars /
sugars similar to that known as the Dutch system and which
permitted of finer distinctions in the scale of duties than
4.-1
that hitherto used.
The old Dutch sugar merchants had used a series of glass
jars containing sands of different and accepted shades of
colour. The darkest colour was number 1, whence they graded
upwards to the lightest, usually number 18. The shade of
the 16th jar in the scale was the limit of raw or muscovado
sugar. Thus 16. d- s. was the dividing line between sugar
for refining purposes and sugar for direct consumption.^2
As the result of a chemical analysis carried out at
Cologne in 1866, a certain percentage of sucrose was as¬
signed to the various classes in the Dutch Standard. This
scale was adopted by England, France, Belgium and the Nether¬
lands in 1867.^ The chief defect of the Dutch Standard,
despite the Cologne experiments was that, being based on
colour, it permitted manipulation or doctoring of sugar
crystals.
The classification of duties adopted in 1867 was not
much improvement on the old and the West Indies muscovado
producer still enjoyed an advantage until sugar duties were
finally /
finally abolished in 1874.
The complete removal of sugar duties in 1874 was a
jolt to the British West Indies muscovado sugar producer
despite the gradual reduction in duties that had taken place
over a period of years.
For the remainder of the nineteenth century the United
Kingdom was committed to Free Trade principles and after
1874 all classes of sugar entered the United Kingdom on
equal terms. The immediate effect of the abolition of sugar
duties was not so much a drop in the price of muscovado as
a drop in the price of higher classes of sugar and hence a
greatly increased consumption of these sugars.^ Con¬
sumption of sugar in the United Kingdom had been increasing
ever since the Sugar Duties Act, 1846, and had paralleled
the successive reductions of sugar-duties since that date.
The figures of sugar consumption in the United Kingdom per












Over-all consumption of sugar in the United Kingdom
rose from 650,000 tons in 1870 to 930,000 tons in 1880.
The British West Indies sugar producers, although maintaining
exports to the United Kingdom (a yearly average of 188,746
tons for the period 1870 - 4, compared to 208,173 tons for
the period 1875 - 9), felt that they did not share in this
increased consumption. The loss in value of muscovado,
which had averaged 24/7d. per cwt. for the period 1870 - 4,
compared to 2i/8d. per cwt. for the period 1875 - 9, (the
final figure would have "been much lower hut for a high price
4.6
in 1877 caused hy the failure of the European beet crop)
also v/as a cause of grievance to the British West Indian
sugar producer.
To add to the difficulties of the West Indies sugar
producer the threat from bounty-fed beet sugar took a serious
form within a year or two of the removal of the sugar duties.
The history of sugar bounties is an involved one and
covers practically the second half of the nineteenth century.
In this thesis the bounty question is considered briefly and




The cultivation of the beetroot in Europe was first
encouraged by Napoleon I, as one of his plans to injure the
commerce of England and to make France independent of im¬
ported sugar. After the Napoleonic War, the production of
beet sugar in France increased annually. Previous to 1838,
this beet sugar was exempt from all taxation by the French
government in contrast to French colonial sugar which paid
a duty on entry into France. In order to satisfy colonial
and maritime interests the French government imposed a tax
on beet sugar in 1838 and in 1847, the duties on French
47
colonial and home-produced sugars were equalized.
Bounties had their inception with the placing of this
tax on beet sugar and the manner in which they arose is as
follows
If raw beet sugar gave a yield, for example, of 90 per
cent of refined sugar, and if the refiner was debited with
duty on this raw sugar on the supposition that it produced
only 80 per cent, he had therefore 10 per cent of refined
spgar left in his hands free of duty paid but for which he
AO
would receive a drawback when exported.
This defective analysis of raw sugar was attributable
to /
to the Dutch standard by which sugar was graded for duty
purposes according to colour. This scale with its eighteen
different shades of colour gave no true indication of sucrose
content and, as it was remarked, "to standarize sugars on
4.9
this basis would demand the use of standard eyes". Re¬
fining in bond would have been the solution to this inaccuracy
in estimation, and this was later urged by the English govern¬
ment but opposed by France.
Bounties were not in their origin formally given as
bounties but in a decade or two, the fact of their existing
was fully acknowledged and before the end of the century
laws were passed in European countries with the full know¬
ledge that bounties would arise and with the intention that
they should be given.
The effect of imports of bounty-fed sugar on the English
market was at first imperceptible. Czarnikow and Company, a
large firm of sugar brokers of Mincing Lane, London, speak of
50
receiving these sugars for the first time in 1858. By
1865, 80,027 tons of sugar out of a total import of 503,187
tons into the United Kingdom was beet sugar, chiefly coming
50a,
from France in the form of refined loaf sugar.
There /
51
There were two branches in the sugar refining industry
in the United Kingdom - the moist sugar refiners of "pieces",
chiefly located in Liverpool and on the Clyde, who used both
foreign and colonial sugar cane for refining - the other
branch consisted of the loaf sugar refiners, centred chiefly
52
in London and Bristol. The loaf sugar refiners also used
cane sugar but preferred foreign, fine Java, Havana or Mauri¬
tius sugars to West India muscovado, maintaining that "100
pounds of loaf sugar could be obtained from one cwt. of these,
while only about 76 pounds of loaf sugar could be obtained
53
from one cwt. of West Indian muscovado."
The loaf sugar refiners in the United Kingdom were those
principally affected by bounties prior to 1875, and from these
refiners came the growing opposition to bounties in the first
years after they appeared.
The loaf sugar refining industry in the United Kingdom
(a much analler branch than the moist sugar refining industry)
used but a comparatively small amount of British West Indian
5 A
sugar. Much of the sugar from the sugar colonies went to
the refiners of moist sugar prices, and some of it also went
into direct consumption; (by 1862, one half of the Barbados
crop /
crop was directly consumed as raw sugar in the United King¬
dom as also were Demerara yellow ciystals).^ Thus the
producers of sugar in the British West Indies were not too
concerned over "bounties prior to 1875, and, in addition, the
sugar duties of the United Kingdom still favoured the class
56
of sugar commonly made in the sugar colonies.
In 1864, the British government heeding the agitation
of the loaf spgar refiners, and the French government, now
aware of the inducements that led sugar to "be exported, agreed
57to a removal of the conditions that engendered "bounties.
A conference was held in 1864 between the two countries,
attended also "by Belgium and Netherland representatives, and
an attempt was made to solve questions regarding drawbacks.
This conference! accomplished very little, as it was found
that the Dutch Standard was an inadequate scale on which to
base duties. Arrangement was made for a series of experiments
to be held at Cologne to devise a more accurate test of the
sucrose content of raw sugar.
The Cologne experiments reduced the number of colours
of the Dutch Standard to four and by a process of chemical
analysis assigned a certain percentage of supposed sucrose
content /
59
content to each of these colours. The adoption of this
classification in 1867, by both France and England was of
little avail in stopping bounties. Each class catered for
too wide a range of sugars, and the arrangement was still
defective in that it adhered to colour and led to artificial
fin
colouring or doctoring of sugar both beet and cane. What
was needed in the sugar industry was an instrument which
would test immediately the amount of crystallizable sugar
in any parcel of raw sugar, regardless of its colour. Such
an instrument came later in the form of the polariscope, but
by the time it became commonly used, bounties were given
intentionally and directly to beet sugar exports. In the
meantime despite the Cologne experiments, the continental
refiner (chiefly the French refiner of loaf sugar) was per¬
mitted to receive a bounty by obtaining a larger percentage
of refined sugar from raw than the legal yield.
Following the Cologne experiments the British loaf
sugar refiners continued their opposition. After the
Franco-Prussian War, France more than doubled her bounties
to meet competition from Austrian (and later German) bounty-
fed sugar that now appeared. The loaf sugar refiners in
England /
r
England strenuously urged the British government to take
action and demanded that sugar should he refined in "bond, so
that the exact amount of refined sugar obtainable from a lot
of raw sugar could be ascertained. The beet root pro¬
ducers in France were also indignant over the bounties the
French refiners (chiefly in Paris) were enjoying and in which
they had no share. A conference was again held in 1876
between England and a number of the European countries but
also proved to be of little value, The Paris refiner*s
influence was too strong and France only tentatively agreed
to the principle of refining in bond - postponing indefinitely
65the date of adoption. As Austria and Germany were now
potential competitors, France was also chary about putting
herself at a disadvantage in competing for the United Kingdom
market, the largest sugar market in the world. Thus the
1876 conference ended, as many others did, with little result.
At this conference it was revealed that many of the loaf
sugar refiners in the United Kingdom had collapsed - and by
1875 "sugar manufacturers in the Lower Hamlets had one by one
succumbed".
It is from the date of the conference of 1876 that West
Indian /
Indian sugar colonies difficulties in regard to bounties
begin. Up until 1875 France had been the chief exporter
of bounty subsidized beet sugar, chiefly in the form of re¬
fined loaf sugar. In 1875, Austria and, a few years later,
Germany came on the scene. These two countries adopted a
different system of levying duty that illustrates method and
foresight.^
Germany and Austria levied the duty not directly on the
raw sugar as in France but on the beet root itself. A cer¬
tain quantity of sugar was estimated as extractable from a
given weight of beetroot, it being calculated that 12% cwts.
of beet were required to produce one cwt. of sugar. It was
proved however that in consequence of the increasing sucrose
content of the beet and improved extracting processes that
one cwt. of sugar could be made from 10.82 cwt. of beetroot.
The result of this miscalculation was that the Austrian and
German raw sugar manufacturer instead of paying 10 marks,
the excise duty on one cwt. of raw sugar, really paid but
8 marks. This method of levying duty offered strong induce¬
ment for improvement in the beetroot. The result was a
large increase in its sucrose content which from being 4 per'
cent /
I<p
cent at the beginning of the century and 8 per cent in 1870,
had risen to 11 per cent by 1884. (By 1913 it was 17 per
cent.) 70
Neither Austria nor Germany w&tb represented at the
1876 conference. No assurance could be given to France
that if she refined in bond, she would not have to compete
with these countries in the English market, and the conference
came to nothing. It was however evident that no settlement
of the bounty question could now be discussed without in-
71
eluding bounties on raw as well as on refined sugar.
West Indian producers of sugar from 1876 onwards were
now faced with increasing competition from raw beet sugar
which came into the United Kingdom at prices below any hither¬
to experienced and which quickly prejudiced the refiners of
soft moist sugar in favour of beet sugar.
The consequence of the appearance of this bounty-fed
raw beet spgar was that the loaf sugar refiners and British
West Indian sugar interests joined hands and urged the
British government to levy a countervailing duty against all
72
imported bounty-fed sugar.
By the late 1870's complaints from the British West
Indies /
Indies and resolutions against bounties by the West India
Committee in London, with its able organization were frequent
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and loud. That ever growing import of raw beet sugar
was directly depressing the price of cane sugar appears
evident when, in 1877, the European beet crop failed and the
price of muscovado sugar immediately rose from 21/71/£d. per
cwt. to 26/4%d. per cwt.^ As a result of this failure of
the beet crop in 1877*, the Colonial Company owning large
sugar estates in British Guiana and Trinidad increased its
dividert from y/z per cent to 5 per cent; however, in the
following year beet sugar was back in greater amount than
before and the Colonial Company again had to reduce the
75
divid end.
By 1878, the price of muscovado had been depreciated
by £1: 6: Od, per ton - as a result of bounty-fed raw beet
Vfi
sugar - so the colonial sugar producers claimed. Even
in Glasgow the stronghold of the muscovado market Austrian
sugar, so it was stated by 1877 "could always be placed there
at 6d. per cwt. less than the current price of West Indian
77
sugar".''
Bounty-fed beet sugar imports into the United Kingdom
rose /
rose from 80,027 tons in 1865 to 505,000 tons in 1878, at
the latter date total consumption of sugar in the United
78
Kingdom being 826,584 tons. During the same period,
1865 - 78, exports of British West Indies sugar to the
United Kingdom had not seriously altered in volume, being
176,593 tons in 1865 and 191,960 tons in 1878,^ but had
not risen commensurate' with increased consumption. A de¬
crease in price had taken place and raw beet sugar was in¬
creasingly used by the moist sugar refiners in lieu of cane
sugar, thus the West India producer had a grievance and
linked up with the diminishing loaf sugar refining industry.
The West India Committee was very active at this stage urging
the Government to levy a countervailing duty against bounty
sugar, and emphasized the injury inflicted, on colonial sugar
interests.®^
The first result of the British loaf sugar refiner and
the Colonial sugar producer joining hands was the appoint¬
ment of a Select Committee in 1879 to inquire into the whole
question of bounties. The Committee sat for two sessions
talcing much evidence from British West Indian interests and
the United Kingdom refining industry. During the same
period /
period, 1879 - 80, a Convention was held with French and
other European representatives to consider means of removing
bountie s.
Despite the claims of aggrieved parties who came before
the Committee of 1879 - 80, there is no substantial evidence
to show that up to 1879 bounties had seriously affected sugar
production in the sugar colonies. In Barbados and British
Guiana in recent years there had even been an increase in
the quantity of sugar produced. Evidence showed that fifty-
eight estates had been abandoned in the sugar colonies since
1875 and thirty eight in 1878 were advertised for sale with
op
no purchasers. This evidence cannot be accepted as in¬
dicating distress. Abandonment of estates was a continuing
process throughout the second half of the century, and sales
of estates were continually advertised by the West Indies
Encumbered Estates Court for periods of six months before a
sale was permitted.
The cost of production had not been reduced in the sugar
colonies, being the same in 1879 as in 1865. Bounties had
caused a drop in the price of sugar' and it was the reduced
profit that engendered much of the opposition to bounty-fed
sugar /
/■yw'h
sugar. Witnesses;as N. Lubbock, director of the Colonial
A
Company and la„ter chairman of the West India Committee, ex¬
pressed the typical sugar planter's attitude, in seeing no
hope of any other product superseding sugar, and did their
best to present a gloomy picture of conditions in the sugar
industry. In summing up, the Report of the Committee stated-
"All witnesses agree in looking forward to the abandon¬
ment of sugar cultivation and estimate that in ten years one
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half of the West Indian production will be destroyed".
This pessimistic outlook was not realized in full and despite
the active work of the West India Committee, little public or
governmental sympathy could be evoked for the colonial sugar
producer. By 1879, Free Trade principles in the United
Kingdom were adopted, in some sections of the government,
with the full fervour of a religion, let alone a policy.
The Board of Trade, looking to consumer interests, contained
the chief protagonist of Free Trade in the person of Lord
Farrar, Secretary of the Board, and he and Cobdenites re¬
butted all claims of the West India Committee as to injury
to colonial interests, emphasizing that the great boon of
bounty /
bounty-fed sugar to the consuming public far out-weighed
any disadvantage caused to a minor interest supplying but
178,376 tons of the total 931,168 tons consumed in the United
Kingdom (1880).85
In answer to the claim of the West India Committee that
countervailing duties be imposed, the Board of Trade had
stated in 1881, "The general principle which governs the
financial policy of this country is that the Government
shall not interfere with the course of trade, either by giving
bounties or by imposing duties ... To impose countervailing
duties in order to neutralize the indirect sugar bounties
would therefore be to take the first step in reversing that
free-trade policy which was adopted on the clearest grounds
of argument, and has conferred immense advantages on the in-
86
dustrial classes of this country."
In addition to this statement of view, there was the
practical difficulty of estimating the exact amount of
bounties given in any country and at any one time, the suc¬
rose content of the beet root was continually increasing, and,
in addition, subsidies were being given by differential rail¬
way rates (and later by steamship subsidies). The United
Kingdom /
Kingdom government, although, opposing the levying of counter¬
vailing duties, was willing "to take any steps to induce
foreign governments to give up bounties" because of the
"general benefits to be derived from such governments adopt-
87
ing a Free Trade policy".
It was this lukewarm attitude and the definite feeling,
now prevailing, that the British Government would not strenu¬
ously oppose bounties that partially accounts for failure of
numerous conferences and the protracted discussion for the
removal of bounties, that lasted for the rest of the century.
Already in 1876, Lord Derby, Secretary of State for Colonies,
spoke to the effect that if Germany, Austria, and France were
taxed to give the British consumer sugar at a cheap price -
why complain! and, "the natural market of the West Indies
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was America-not Europe."
The 1879 - 80 Convention broke down because Britain and
France would not agree to the principle of countervailing
duties. It was already evident by this date that unless
there was some indication of the imposition of countervailing
e
duties, there was little liklihood of the removal of bounties.
No real evidence had been forthcoming before the Select
Committee /
Committee of 1879 - 80 to show that distress in the sugar
colonies was genuine. However there was little doubt but
that the British loaf sugar refiner had been seriously af¬
fected by bounties. The loaf sugar refining industry was
practically extinct by 1880. At this date, of the thirty
loaf sugar refiners in the United Kingdom in 1864, who re¬
fined 200,000 tons of raw sugar yearly, there were but two
remaining. These were Martineau of London, and Finzell of
89
Bristol, the latter going into liquidation in 1881. At
first sight this would indicate a considerable diminution
of the refining industry, but what had really taken place
was a transfer of capital to the other branch of the re¬
fining industry, that of producing soft moist refined sugar.
An example of this change-over was Duncan's refinery which
transferred to this branch in 1875, but at the cost of intro¬
ducing new machinery and undergoing inconvenience.^ Both
on the Clyde and at Liverpool there was increased moist
sugar refining at this period, many of the refiners using
both cane sugar and bounty-fed beet sugar. Great improve¬
ments had been made in the refining industry with the intro¬
duction of the centrifugal and vacuum pan and in the process
of /
of decolourizing sugar. The use of the white of eggs and
bullocks' blood for decolonization was superseded by fil¬
tration through charcoal, at first in very shallow and, later,
very deep cisterns. The drying of sugar by draining through
earthen moulds, which took from one to six weeks, was re¬
placed by centrifugalling which gave a much drier sugar in
a few hours.
In 1862, it took refiners about three weeks to convert
raw sugar into refined, but by 1879 it was done in as little
92
as two days. The cheapening in the refining process plus
the boon of bounty-fed sugar both brought down the price of
sugar and encouraged consumption, which by 1883, had risen to
931,168 tons, (71.74 lbs. per head compared to 31.14 lbs. in
I860.93
By 1880, the West India Committee was practically alone
in carrying on opposition to bounties. The refiners of soft
moist "prices" were not, as yet, concerned about bounties
which gave them raw material at a low price. The confec¬
tionery industry, given the impetus of cheap sugar - the
Scottish confectionery industry had expanded four-fold in the
twenty years ending in 1884 - was definitely opposed to any
countervailing /
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countervailing duty on bounty sugar.
By 1882, England and France bad a 'most favoured nation'
clause in their commercial treaty and, according to the law
officers of the Foreign Office, to impose countervailing
duties "would be contrary to the most favoured nation
95
clause". France in turn had a favoured nation clause
in a treaty with Austria and would not agree to the prin¬
ciple of countervailing duties, and thus the possibility of
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their imposition was less than ever by 1882.
During the three years that followed the Select Committee
of 1879 - 80 sugar imports into the United Kingdom fell off
by one-fourth, but production of the sugar colonies as a
whole did not decrease. Sugar was increasingly being sent
to the United States, where dark grey refining crystals from
British Guiana especially were in demand. By 1885, 104,642
tons of sugar were sent to the United States market out of
97the total British West Indies production of 244,450 tons.
During the three years 1880 - 2, the abandonment of
poorer estates continued and was even accelerated with the
need to economize. In Demerara, where hitherto little
effect of bounties had been registered, six of the less
favoured /
1?
favoured estates were abandoned in the latter half of 1880.
In Jamaica, twenty-six additional estates were set up for
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sale in this period, and increased abandonment was re¬
ported, but did not always signify a very great drop in
production. For example the abandonment of 7,000 acres in
the parish of Trelawny meant a loss of only 266% hogsheads
4, 100of sugar.
Increased pressure on the sugar industry of the sugar
colonies is also reflected in reduced machinery imports,
small though these usually were, in most of the colonies.
In British Guiana imports of machinery dropped in value from
£126,436 in 1879 to less than half that figure in the next
101two years. In Glasgow and Liverpool sugar engineering
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firms reported a falling off in orders for machinery.
On the whole by 1882, there is still no real evidence
of serious distress in the British V/est Indies sugar in¬
dustry. Profits had been reduced but were still being made.
Muscovado sugar in the United Kingdom market brought £22 per
ton in 1882, and the cost of production was always below this
figure, being as nearly as can be ascertained, as low as £10
on some estates and as high as £16 on others. Barbados was
in /
103
in a class "by itself, producing sugar as low as £9 per ton.
Concentration on the better estates, and a few installations
of centrifugals were the chief economizing measures of mus¬
covado producers. In British Guiana and Trinidad, the con¬
version to vacuum pan manufacture continued to take place
and helped to meet sugar beet competition.
If conditions had remained as they were during the three
years following the Committee of 1879 - 80, West Indian mus¬
covado producers might still have maintained a satisfactory
margin of profit, without having to radically adjust their
position and reduce the cost of production,Conditions
did not however remain the same, and a rude awakening came
in 1884.
Up to 1882, Austria had been the chief exporter of bounty-
fed raw beet sugar to the United Kingdom, most of which sugar
came via Germany.'0'
In 1876, after it was found out that the amount paid in
/<>
drawbacks was far more than had been received as excise due,
t"n
the Austrian government had made adjustments, which, although




In the early 1880's Germany made her appearance as the
greatest beet sugar producer in Europe. The volume of sugar
from this country quickly increased and, when in 1883 - 4
108
Germany doubled bounties on export, the effect was immediate







France in 1884, realizing that the German system of assessing
duties was inducing great yields of sugar from the beet root,
adopted the German method with immediate results, the sucrose
content increasing by two per cent within a year, (by 1897 it
*110
was 11.4 per cent, compared with Geimany's 12.79 per cent)
The dumping of beet sugar in the United Kingdom began
in earnest in 1884; the following figures illustrate the
111
volume of beet sugar imported.
Average of the three years 1880 - 2 376,909 tons
» " » » " 1883 - 5 514,318 "
» " " n n 1886 - 8 611,590 "
The se /
These increased imports of beet sugar came principally from
Germany where a prohibition tax on sugar kept down internal
consumption.
The immediate effect of this great increase in beet
sugar production was fall in price. Demerara sugar fell
from 26s. to 15s. within the year 1884. Muscovado sugar
fell from 20s. per cwt. at the beginning of 1884 to 13s. per
112
cwt. at the end of the year.
By the end of 1884, distress in the British West Indies
was genuine, the price of sugar remaining at 13s. per cwt.
(£14: 6: Od. per ton) which was equivalent to, or less than,
the cost of production on many West Indian estates. As in
the crises of the 1830fs and late 1840's a number of West
Indian firms collapsed, principally those financing muscovado
estates in the smaller islands, although a number in British
113
Guiana and Trinidad also went under. George Little and
Company, Cotton, Morton and Company, A. W. Perot and Company,
a
and A. W. Gillespie and Company, were/few of these firms
which collapsed as a result of losses incurred in finding
114
money for carrying on sugar estates. Gillespie and
Company had in their hands, either in the capacity of owner
or /
or as consignee merchant, the majority of the estates in
Tobago and the failure of this firm resulted in their abandon-
115
ment and neglect for the remainder of the century.
Grenada's production dropped from 10,000 to 4,000 hogs-
A "i f)
heads within the year and a half ending 1884. By 1886
two-thirds of the sugar cultivation in St. Vincent was
117
abandoned. In Jamaica the drop in price of sugar coin¬
cided with the exodus of labourers to work on the Panama
Canal and aggravated the difficulties of the sugar planters
who were attempting to economize by reducing wages (already
very low). The logwood industry in Jamaica was also now
depressed. Haiti was back in the market and in 1885 it was
stated, "logwood is a drug on the market and will not pay
for exportation".'1''8
As in former periods of depression, a spate of resolutions
and complaints were forthcoming from the various colonies
testifying to the difficulties in the sugar industry as a
result of the drop in the price of sugar occasioned, so they
119
claimed, solely by the unfair competition of bounty-fed sugar.
West Indian anxiety was further deepened when it was
reported that at a meeting of sugar fabricants at Halberstadt,
in /
in Germany on August 30th 1884 it was stated that the
object of beetroot manufacturers was not to give the United
Kingdom cheap sugar, but to ruin the colonial sugar industry
and thus obtain a monopoly and raise the price of sugar at
120
their own will. " That this was the object of Germany's
beet sugar industry does not seem likely, considering the
small proportion of West Indian sugar consumed in the United
Kingdom. There is little to indicate that the history of
bounties in the second half of the nineteenth century is
other than that of competition between European powers,
especially between Germany and France.
That the British West Indies sugar industry's difficul¬
ties were merely incidental to the bigger game between
European governments did not make them any the less real.
The close of 1884 saw the beginning of commercial depression
in the sugar colonies, some colonies being affected more than
others, depending generally, but not solely on the degree to
which they had failed to break away from the old muscovado
process. The first reaction of the sugar planter, with the
drop of price in 1884, was to reduce wages and this generally
proved to be the most unwise measure. There were other ways
in /
in which economy might be effected in the sugar industry.
A consideration of the sugar industry in the British West
Indies in all its practical aspects is the subject of the
next section.
in which economy might he effected in the sugar industry.
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METHOD OF SUGAR MANUFACTURE
IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES.
The first reaction of the sugar planters when faced
with the drop in price of sugar in 1884, was to reduce wages.
In British Guiana, where the industry was already receiving
a large contribution from the general revenue, for immigr-
A
ation (estimated at £2 per ton) , nevertheless, the Colonial
o
Company immediately reduced wages. Attempts to reduce
wages in Trinidad were not so successful. At a meeting of
Trinidad sugar planters in 1884, it was agreed that a 20 per
cent reduction in wages would be made, but within a few weeks
planters were forced to raise wages, not only to the old rate,
but 5 c. in advance of it. The scarcity of labour and the
plentitude of land in Trinidad, on which labour could settle,
made several attempts to reduce wages in that colony of little
avail.^ As has been stated the reduction of wages in
Jamaica coincided with heavy emigration to Panama and in
addition, Port Rican railway woiks and banana plantations,
also, enticed many labourers from Jamaica. Reduction of
wages was more successful in a number of the smaller islands,
as Barbados, and St. Vincent, where there was little alter¬
native but to submit to wage reductions.
Considering the low rate of wages paid in the sugar
colonies /
colonies varying from 10d. to 1s. for a nine hour day in
Jamaica^, to a high of 1s 3d. per task in Trinidad (where
it was possible to perform three tasks per day), it would
seem that the labour factor offered little field for economy.
Where labour comprised, as was estimated, approximately one-
6
third of the cost of producing sugar , there were other
economies possible, but only in some colonies were they
effected.
Most muscovado estates, by 1884, were still employing
the open-pan system described a century and a half earlier
7
by the Dominican, Pere Labat. The advice he gave then
might well have been followed by the sugar planter of the
mid-nineteenth century - so little advance had been made.
The most prominent characteristics of the West Indies
muscovado sugar industry were wastefulness and slovenliness.
The first process - extraction of the cane juice -
offered the greatest and easiest opportunity for preventing
losses. The sugar cane contains about 87 per cent of its
weight in cane juice, but the ordinary mills on muscovado
estates extracted but 50 - 60 per cent of this juice, the
O
over-all losses of juice were therefore enormous. As late
as /
as 1897, an agricultural chemist, Professor Albuguerque,
out of 100 lbs. of crushed megass taken from the usual type
of mill, recovered an additional 17 lbs. of juice, by im-
9
proved extraction. That the crushing was imperfect was
evident, without such tests as this, by the very fact that
the megrass had to be dried before it could be used as fuel
on practically every muscovado estate.
Many of the sugar planters (Barbadians especially)
maintained that the unextracted juice was less rich in
sucrose and thus no loss was entailed as the superior quality
of the rich juice obtained more than compensated for the
juice lost. This was a fallacious argument as was demon¬
strated by Frances Watts, Antiguan Agricultural chemist after
10
his appointment in the 1880's.
Defective crushing was attributable to the poor type
of mill in use - usually the single mill type, composed of
three rollers, with the roller on top pressing on the two
11
beneath. In these mills the rollers were hollow and were
kept almost inflexible in one position, and if either cane
or some foreign body was forced into the mill so that it
could not pass between the rollers, either the mill/ choked
and /
I*
and stopped, or something had to break. The Bourbon or
Otoheite cane in general use throughout the West Indies had
a dense bagasse and if slightly over-mature (as was often
the case) became quite hard and numerous mill breakages re-
12
suited causing loss of time and sugar. For example, on
Sheldon estate in BerbMe substantial losses and breakages
were reported, the old mill "either choking or going around
13
without crushing."
The few variations of the horizontal single mill were no
improvement. The vertical mills, as used on some estates,
J
with rollers place" vertically and usually operated by cattle
power, had the same defects as the horizontal single mill,
and, in addition, the difficulty here was uneven distribution
along the rollers, the cane tending to pass between the
lower portion of the rollers.
Loss by bad crushing was avoidable by using other than
single crushing, by having heavier mills without through
bolts that made them inflexible, and by having solid rollers,
smoothed and with regular feeding.
Apart from British Guiana and Trinidad only in rare
instances were better types of mill introduced in the other
colonies /
colonies. Mr. Levy, owner of a number of estates in
Jamaica, introduced an improved mill in 1896 and was agree¬
ably surprised at the 70 - 75 per cent extraction obtained,
when 65 per cent extraction was considered to be very good
14.
on most other muscovado estates. At the same time, ex¬
traction on a vacuum pan estate in Antigua was only 54 per
cent and losses of 25 - 30 per cent of the juice in Barbados
1 5
were reported. By 1885, in British Guiana, four roller
mills made by Mirlees of Glasgow, giving three crushings,
were being installed on large estates. By the late 1890's
almost all estates in British Guiana had double or even triple
16
crushing. On Windsor Forest, by 1894, over three times
as much sugar was made as in 1865 and it was to improved
mills that much of this gain was attributed. Similar gains
17
were reported by Diamond and other large estates. In¬
stead of the old inflexible rollers these new mills had
hydraulic attachments giving equal compression to large or
18
small feeds. 'With these mills 75 - 80 per cent of the
19
juice could be extracted and this figure could be increased
to almost perfect extraction by the maceration and diffusion
process, introduced into British Guiana in 1878, by William
Russel /
I
Russel (The Sugar King) at La Bonne Intention estate. With
this process the megasse was shredded into small pieces,
steam was then "blown into the megasse or it was soaked in
20
warm water to dissolve out all sucrose. Short-comings
of the diffusion process were, that a great quantity of fuel
was required to evaporate the excess water, knives needed
21
constant sharpening, the megasse took much longer to dry
and was often unfit for fuel, the small pieces clogging up
22
the grates of the boilers and presenting draught. The
diffusion battery also produced juice more quickly than the
vacuum pan could take it away, "the boiling house was always
23
behindhand and the syrup always stale." The diffusion
process was only installed on a few of the large estates as
Providence and Anna Regina in British Guiana and the Cul de
Sac factory in St. Lucia.^ The fuel problem was probably
the greatest objection to its wider adoption and the view
also, as expressed by Mr. Lulbock, chairman of the Colonial
Company, that there was little value in the diffusion process
25
where a satisfactory double crushing plant already ekisted.
Motive power for mills took various forms. Steam power,
despite the development of multitubular boilers in the late
1850's /
1850's, which, had eased fuel difficulties, was still the
exception on muscovado estates, as late as 1884. Mr. Lloyd,
a Montserrat planter in giving evidence before a Royal Com¬
mission stated
"We have no steam engines or any of that botheration
here.
In Barbados in 1862, out of 500 estates there were but
thirty with steam mills, and by 1897, this number had risen
27
to only ninety. In Jamaica steam engines were also in a
small proportion as the low value of machinery imports in¬
dicated. £4,758 for steam engines in 1870, could not have
meant the introduction of, at the most, more than four steam
po
engines.
Apart from the capital outlay for steam engines other
factors retarded their introduction. The scarcity of fuel
was always a problem only partially alleviated by multi¬
tubular boilers. In British Guiana with all the latest
appliances sugar exports were seriously affected by a short-
29
age of coal in 1881. In a number of the colonies as
Antigua and (Trinidad scarcity of fresh water also was a
deterrent /
deterrent to steam power. In Antigua, by 1882, the in¬
voking of old water ordinances of slave days, that had com¬
pelled planters to maintain reservoirs (called 'body ponds'),
30
helped to alleviate water shortage in that colony.
The installation of a steam engine on an old-fashioned
muscovado estate/ did not fit in with the existing appliances.
Some of the steam engines were not governed properly and the
mill rollers travelled much too fast causing re-absorption
of part of the cane juice by the squeezed but spongy megasse
31
- m some cases as much as 20 per cent. Until existing
mills v/ere improved there was little purpose in installing
steam engines both because of the steam engine being too
powerful for the mill and causing breakages and because
half-squeezed megasse could not be used as fuel in the steam
engine. In some instances in Barbados, steam engines super¬
seding windmills were not sufficiently powerful for the mills,
32
although more reliable than the windmill. Windmills in
Barbados provided a cheap but undependable power, as when
in March 1892, there was "a terrible calm during crop season
and some mills made no more than three and four hogsheads
33
per week". In a number of the islands, St. Vincent and
Jamaica /
Jamaica especially, water power was found to be very satis¬
factory when available, but droughts were frequent and a
failure of water power during crop time was a serious con¬
sideration. Many of the estates sold through the Encumbered
Estates Court, listed as their assets motive power derived
from water wheels. Some of the best estates depended on
water power, such as Worthy Park in Jamaica, Belvidere in
Antigua and Castle Bruce in Dominica. These water wheels
of great diameter, (twenty-five to forty feet being common),
five feet or more in width, built of iron, and with large
wooden'buckets, gave a massive crushing force where water
ry a
supply was dependable.
On the whole the loss in extraction of cane juice was
more attributable to defective mills than to the form of
motive power in use on muscovado estates. The loss of sugar
entailed in faulty extraction, did not stop at this point
but continued on through the process of sugar manufacturing.
In most muscovado factories, following extraction, the
cane juice flowed from the mill bed along a gutter fitted
with a strainer. A child or aged person, armed with a long
stick, was usually employed to keep the gutter and strainer
from /
from being clogged by fragments of megass. The strainer,
stick and gutter were rarely changed and became saturated
with liquor hastening fermentation in the passing juice which
was conveyed to the 'clarifiers*, 'racking copper' or simmers,
as they were variously called. Here the juice was raised to
a high temperature (about 140°C.) and milk of lime was added
to coagulate impurities which formed a scum on the top.
When this scum 'cracked' the liquid was withdrawn by a cock,
the scum being left in the clarifier. After being usually
twice filled and emptied the 'mud' was cleared out and used
35
in setting up distillery ferment in the making of rum.
Upon the accuracy of tempering with lime, during the
process of clarification, depended the success of the whole
operation. If not sufficiently tempered the juice refused
to crystallize or formed a doughy, moist sugar with a small
grain, (very common in the small backward islands as Grenada
and Dominica). If over-tempered the liquor turned a green
colour from particles of chlorophyll being dissolved by ex¬
cess of lime and, as it approached concentration, it formed
a dark sugar with much molasses and had an unpleasant smell
when in the hogshead. There were various opinions in the
colonies /
colonies as to whether the lime should he added hot or cold.
Jamaican planters said hot, because if added cold the tem¬
porary drop in temperature halted coagulation. Irregularity
in the use of lime was the most serious defect in clarific¬
ation. A means of determining the correct amount of lime
to he used had heen devised hy Doctor John Shier in British
Guiana (see Introductory Survey, page 31) who introduced the
37
litmus test, later improved on hy Francis Watts, agricul¬
tural chemist in Antigua. Watts found after experimenting,
that phenolphthalein when added to the clarifiers gave a
strong pink to red colour if too much lime had heen added
and if too little there would he no change in colour. If
the amount of colouring were correct, a faint pink colouring
would show. By 1870, the phosphoric acid test could he
used in the liming process, this enabled the use of a large
quantity of lime which destroyed impurities in the juice,
hut at the same time to precipate the excess lime in the form
39
of phosphate of lime. These tests were not used on many
estates and Watts, writing in 1892, criticised the common
method of guess work in the use of lime, and commented on
the lethargy of muscovado planters in not using simple tests
available /
available.^
Following clarification there took place evaporation
and concentration of the cane juice in a range of copper
boilers, placed over the same fire, the heat from which was
to a large extent absorbed by the mass of brickwork built
around the copper boilers. These 'coppers' were usually
five or six in number, the smallest, the tayche, of this
range being immediately over the furnace, the flame of \vhich
4-1
afterwards acted upon the others in passing to the flue.
The size of the coppers was progressively increased as they
receded towards the flue, the last being the largest and was
often capable of holding as much as the clarifier (usually
500 gallons). The clarified liquid ran first into this
last large copper, and as evaporation proceeded it was ladled
into the others, progressively until it arrived at the 'tayche'
where the concentration was completed. Further scum was
gathered off the liquor in the coppers, being removed by a
person stationed at each copper, wielding a 'skimmer'. The
scum was brushed back from each copper until gathered in the
last and removed. This scum too was usually used in the
distillery in making rum.
One /
One of the most careful, points for the planter was the
skimming of this scum.
"The liquor was not considered to have been thoroughly
cleaned until every boiler had his shirt sticking to his
back with perspiration".^
As this was the final cleansing process and as it was
often imperfectly done, it was the one cause operating more
than any other in producing the bad name which some of the
sugar brokers in the United Kingdom gave to British West
Indies sugars as revealed in evidence given to the Commission
on Sugar Duties in 1862, and the Commission on Sugar Industries
1878 - 9. Confectioners in the United Kingdom, in the late
1880*s stated that this unclean sugar was one of the reasons
4.3
for their preferring beet sugar. Jamaican sugar estates,
especially had a name for turning out dirty sugars, probably
attributable to the chronic labour shortage in that colony.^
Sugar proprietors found that the smaller the tayche, all other
things being equal, the better was the quality of the sugar.
This was because a smaller tayche permitted quicker boiling




The chief defect in the process of evaporation was that
to boil the syrup required a very high temperature and in¬
version usually followed with great rapidity producing much
Aft
glucose. Much of the question of profit and loss on
muscovado estates depended on this factor of inversion -
the change of sugar to glucose. The art of the sugar manu¬
facturer was, and is, to extract the sugar from the juice
with as little inversion as possible. The large quantity of
molasses produced on muscovado estates resulted from the in¬
ability to prevent inversion. If molasses were to be kept
down there were two points to be attended to - care in tem¬
pering and brisk boiling, long continued boiling especially
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being one of the greatest producers of molasses.
In addition to the difficulty of preventing inversion
much of the cane juice was burned on the copper wall, and in
some of the most backward colonies as Tobago and Grenada, the
Aft
loss incurred in this manner was considerable. Most mus¬
covado plants had no thermometer by which the correct tempera¬
ture for boiling could be ascertained and in addition the type
49
of furnace permitted of no control over the heat applied.
What /
What was needed in lieu of the copper wall was an
appliance which would permit rapid boiling at a lower tem¬
perature and thus avoid the inversion and burning so common
with the open pan system. The solution to this difficulty
involved perhaps the greatest advance made in sugar manu¬
facturing.
As the temperature at which a liquid boils depends en¬
tirely on the pressure to which it is subjected it follows
that any means whereby pressure can be reduced will lower
the temperature at which boiling takes place (thereby pre¬
venting inversion and enabling more speedy evaporation). The
vacuum pan, which was the means whereby pressure was reduced,
had been invented in 1813, and had been erected on Vreed en
Hoop (John Gladstone's estate) in Demerara in 1832, and, by
1850, had been installed on other large estates, such as
50
Richmond, and Land of Plenty in British Guiana. The scale
of duties in the United Kingdom, although retarding adoption
of the vacuum pan, had not prevented the gradual conversion
of all estates in British Guiana to this type of manufacture.
The removal of sugar duties in 1874 gave a further impetus
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to the use of the vacuum pan sugar. From the superior
quality /
quality of sugar made in these early installations came the
term 'Demerara crystals'. In Trinidad a similar conversion
to the vacuum pan took place on the several large estates in
52
that colony.
The vacuum pan was not introduced into any of the other
colonies except in rare instances. The chief obstacle was
the great amount of capital involved in setting up a complete
vacuum pan manufactory. In 1878, it was calculated that to
equip a sugar estate manufacturing 1,000 hogsheads of vacuum
55
pan sugar involved an outlay of from £40,000 - £50,000.
On most of the small muscovado estates this would have been
a prohibitive undertaking. Considering that of the 500
estates in Barbados by 1897, 325 were of less than 300 acres,
making never more than 4 - 500 hogsheads each, it is under-
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standable why there were only nine vacuum pans in that colony.
In 1872, there was only one vacuum pan in use in Jamaica at
55
Abbion estate. The other islands had still less adopted
it, there being but one vacuum pan in St. Kitts-Nevis at the
end of the century. In a number of the smaller estates,
where steam power was used, clarifiers and boilers were heated




was limited and lacked the fuel economizing and complete
crystallization features of the vacuum pan. Most of these
steam clarifiers and boilers were found in Jamaica and An¬
tigua, both colonies in which steam engines ?/ere most common
- Angigua for example having 54 steam engines out of a total
of 71 estates by 1894.*^
By boiling in vacuo at a low temperature, a great saving
in fuel was effected and vdth improved extraction no other
fuel was required than megass. Crystallization was obtained
by the vacuum although skill was required in its operation,
it sometimes happening "from bad manipulation that the whole
of the mass became cloudy from the formation of minute crystals.'
This condition of things was known as "false grain" and led to
a considerable loss as the massecuite would not part with its
molasses and a sticky unsaleable produce resulted. It was
quickly found that it was best to discharge only a portion of
the massecuite from the pan and to take fresh syrup upon the
remainder, this was known as "doubling". By working in this
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manner, the size of the grain was increased and time was saved.
Already by 1862, as a result of the use of vacuum pans, Demerara
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sugar had established a reputation for having the best grain.
The /
The acme of the vacuum pan came in the late 1880's when
the "triple effect" was developed. This was a form of the
vacuum pan} "but with three pans instead of one. The vapour
from the first pan, as on the principle of a compound engine,
was conducted into the second and from there to the third
pan. Vacuum pumps were attached so that under reduced air
pressure the boiling point was reached at successively lower
temperatures in the second and third pans. Finally in the
complete vacuum the sugar was boiled till granulation set
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in. The advantage of the triple effect was that the steam
from the boiling juice of the first pan could be used to heat
the juice in the second pan because the temperature here was
lower than in the first, and similarly with the third pan in
relation to the second. With complete control in the triple
(and later multiple) effect, crystals could be built up to any
size. Considering the great quantity of sugar that was
manufactured by these appliances, a saving in fuel v/as ef¬
fected although the megasse was not always sufficient. The
working of the vacuum pumps required extra steam power, and
thus coal was required in addition to the megasse. The great
cost of multiple effects and their large capacity made them
feasible /
feasible on only the largest estates and here they were
installed in British Guiana, as at Uryheid's Lust, Hampton
Court, and Enmore.^
The operation following importation and concentration of
the cane juice was that of 'striking'. In the open pan
system the syrup called the 'strike' or 'skip', was taken
from the tayche at a temperature of from 234° - 238°F. and
was usually removed by ladling into a gutter and then con¬
veyed to the coolers. Sometimes a copper vessel with a
valve in the bottom was made to fit inside the tayche and
lowered by a crane or other contrivance, by this means the
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whole of the strike could be removed at once. The last
portion of the strike invariably left a portion adhering to
the tayche in the form of caramel which increased the colour
and otherwise injured the succeeding strike.
Most of the ordinary muscovado estates did not use a
thermometer by which the correct point at which to strike
or discharge to the coolers could have been ascertained.
Much depended on the skill of the copper boiler, and skilled
boilers were not always obtainable with the labour difficulties
and disintegration of the apprenticeship system experienced
in /
feasible on only the largest estates and here they were
installed in British Guiana, as at Uryheid's Lust, Hampton
Court, and Enmore.^
The operation following importation and concentration of
the cane juice was that of 'striking'. In the open pan
system the syrup called the 'strike' or 'skip', was taken
from the tayche at a temperature of from 234° - 238°F. and
was usually removed by ladling into a gutter and then con¬
veyed to the coolers. Sometimes a copper vessel with a
valve in the bottom was made to fit inside the tayche and
lowered by a crane or other contrivance, by this means the
whole of the strike could be removed at once. The last
portion of the strike invariably left a portion adhering to
the tayche in the form of caramel which increased the colour
and otherwise injured the succeeding strike.
Most of the ordinary muscovado estates did not use a
thermometer by which the correct point at which to strike
or discharge to the coolers could have been ascertained.
Much depended on the skill of the copper boiler, and skilled
boilers were not always obtainable with the labour difficulties
and disintegration of the apprenticeship system experienced
in /
in the latter half of the 19th century. The importance
of the boiler is evident in the wages of #70.00 and #30.00
per month paid to the head and second boilers on large
British Guiana estates. On muscovado estates the boiler
did receive slightly more than other labourers but in no
sense had the prestige and remuneration as in British Guiana.
The striking operation completed, the strike was con¬
veyed to the coolers, large wooden trays 12 or 14 inches
deep, usually capable of containing one half to one hogs¬
head of sugar. "The coolers were placed in that part of
the boiling house most exposed to the air and at a convenient
distance from the coppers." If after being placed in the
coolers the sugar did not granulate and harden rapidly it
was repeatedly stirred by hand operated appliances known as
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"oscillators," to hasten deposition of crystals. Oscill¬
ation was also said to enable sugar to part with its molasses
more freely. Oscillated sugar was especially sent to Bar¬
bados for the chief reason that only in that colony was there
sufficient labour to spare for this process. Oscillation
usually produced a confused and irregular granulation, the
sugar being prevented by the stirring from crystallizing
evenly /
evenly. The reputation that Barbados sugar had for being
full of 'foots* and streaks, was largely attributable to
this practice of oscillation.
After remaining in the coolers until sufficiently solid
the sugar was dug up with cutters and shovels and carried in
pails to the hogshead into which it was thrown regardless of
temperature. During crop time there was usually a rush to
clear the coolers to make room for another strike, thus the
sugar was generally very warm when casked and much sugar which
would have crystallized in cooling, was drained off with the
molasses.
Veins, dark streaks, and spots were observable in the
sugar produced by the different strikes in the coolers. Much
of the inaccuracy and difficulty in sampling sugar for duty
purposes on entry into the United Kingdom:, prior to 1874,
arose from the unequal quality of sugar in one hogshead.
fi 7
As regards British West Indies sugar it was stated, -
"the contents of a cask of sugar from the West Indies
varies very much. If a hogshead be allowed to remain on
one side, the upper portion of it will be of a better quality
than the lower ... the lower contents are brown and almost
black /
black, the top side of it might be 5s. or 6s. better than
the centre or bottom".
"In London they take care that the hogshead is drawn
from the ship and kept up as it stood in the hold, so that
the foot and molasses sink down, and the top part will be
the best and thus take the sample from the middle."
Hogsheads were only partially drained when loaded and
much molasses was retained in the sugar and aggravated con¬
ditions in the heat of the ship's hold. Leakage as des¬
cribed in the Introductory Survey also entailed large losses
during the second half of the century. In "1877, sugar from
Tobago was losing as much as 16 per cent from leakage at sea
- equivalent to a loss of 320 tons of sugar in a crop of
2,000 tons. Sugar from Barbados to Hew York, throughout
the second half of the century, lost 5 per cent, in transit,
although Barbadian planters maintained that the higher polar¬
ization of such sugar after drainage more than compensated
69
for the loss - an unsound argument.
In Barbados loss of molasses in loading muscovado sugar
was sufficient to warrant the establishment of a small re¬
finery in 1860 which obtained its material for making second
sugar /
,5*
sugar and rum from the bilge water of ships loading sugar
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in Carlisle Bay. The molasses draining on board ship
tended to crystallize on the outside of casks and hogsheads
and on the •skin1 of the ship and these scrapings were always
saved. The mixture of bilge water and molasses sold "usually
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at 2 or 3 shillings below the value of good average molasses."
Up to the mid-nineteenth century the separation of mol¬
asses from the crystals of sugar was by natural drainage
although a form of pneumatic suction drainage had been tried
on Oaks and Dodson estates in Demerara in 1832, with little
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result. The big improvement in drainage of molasses came
with the invention of the centrifugal in 1837. The centri¬
fugal was a container which being revolved rapidly, threw off
the liquid from the crystals, the syrup passing through a
mesh. The centrifugal came to be used extensively, both
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in the refining industry in the United Kingdom and on some
sugar estates in the West Indies, where it was the most
practical and easily installed improvement that could be
made on a muscovado estate. Whereas under the old system,
drainage took two or more weeks and was imperfectly done,
the centrifugal produced a much drier sugar in the matter
of /
l'*1
of a few hoars. In Jamaica, as has "been stated, a number
of merchant firms, who purchased estates through the En¬
cumbered Estates Court, installed centrifugals and by 1897,
48 of the 140 sugar estates in Jamaica were equipped with
centrifugals."^ These estates were chiefly the northside
rum estates where perfect drainage of molasses was of im¬
portance .
With the centrifugal, the vacuum pan sugar could be pre¬
sented to its best advantage. If a fine coloured sugar was
required it was the practice to wash the crystals during their
revolutions with a small quantity of water or bright syrup.
Bright coloured sugar could be obtained by centrifugalling
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the massecuite warm. The almost complete extraction of
sugar by the vacuum pan and the perfect drainage by using the
centrifugal resulted in vacuum pan molasses being of much
less value than the old muscovado molasses, and scarcely paid
for the cost of packaging, freight and other expenses, (vacuum
pan molasses was selling for 3d. per gallon by the late 1890'sj*
Muscovado molasses containing more sucrose both because of
imperfect boiling and drainage, had a steady market and
brought a higher price (10d. per gallon in 1896).
With /
With, the centrifugal a much drier sugar could he obtained
and the old awkward hogshead dispensed with and sugar packed
in bags, easily handled and costing but a few pennies each
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compared to the hogshead costing usually about a pound.
The other by-product of sugar - rum - was made from the
skimmings of the coppers and the very refuse and sweepings
of the establishment after going through the process of
distillation with diluted molasses.^ Most of the stills
on muscovado estates were of the retort type, known as the
common pot still with a capacity usually from 100 to over
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1,000 gallons. The value of rum depended largely on its
flavour and aroma. The substances confirming the dis¬
tinctive character of rum are very volatile and hence were
found in greatest quantity in the first runnings from the
or\
still. Thus stills of the old or 'discontinuance' type
were preferred as they enabled the first half of the returns
or any desired portion to be separated, in order to produce
a spirit of the first quality. During the latter half of
the century excise taxes were levied on rum in the various
colonies as a result of increasing financial difficulties.
Regulations requiring stills to be kept under lock and key
and /
and that continuance type stills be used, interfered with
the separating of various qualities of rum. Much of the
difficulty in levying an excise tax arose from resentment at
O-J
this interference. In British Guiana and Trinidad where
one standard of low grade rum was made, this problem was
not of importance.
Rum was usually coloured by means of burnt sugar (caramel)
in solution with strong proof rum, and this mixed with rum
so as to produce the colour desired.8*^ The most skilled
part of rum making lay in setting up the proper ferment and,
as in Jamaica, to have the proper ferment or wash set up was
almost a fetish. "It was a nuisance and a loss if the wrong
ferment got into a vat, it had to be cleaned out, the vat
scoured and whitewashed before the proper ferment could be
planted"
Much of the skill and attention required in the making
of the best rum went hand in hand with the leisurely wasteful
muscovado process. A contrast between efficient modern
method of producing rum and the muscovado system, was to be
seen in the case of British Guiana and Jamaica. In the
humid, very high temperature of British Guiana, the low grade
vacuum /
vacuum pan molasses went through, a process of fermentation
P>A
in no more than 48 hours, compared to at least a fortnight
in the case of rich muscovado molasses in the drier air of
Jamaica, where great care and time v/as taken in setting up
ferment. The two different methods were reflected in the
value of the two rums. Jamaica better rum "brought as a rule
five times the price of Demerara rum throughout the period
1865 - 1900.85
The whole question of rum and its chemistry was hut
little understood by the muscovado sugar planter, and until
the later years of the nineteenth century there was little
need for a scientific knowledge. The old skimmings un¬
do ctored with chemicals turned out what was considered by
connoisseurs to be a delightful rum. The flavour of the rum
was due to various causes such as the type of caramel abided
and the organic matter present. Of this complex question,
the muscovado producer knew little and cared less. Apart
from the northside rum estates, in Jamaica, there was long a
feeling in the West Indies that rum made itself and required
no looking after. The molasses was diluted and the wash
distilled and if the results were low, the molasses was blamed,
and /
and if the rum was bad the distiller got a 'reminder'.
is was the case with muscovado sugar, British West
Indies rum had long enjoyed a favoured market in the United
Kingdom, up to 1860 having an advantage of 9s. per gallon
over foreign spirits under the duty rates of the United King-
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dom. From 1860 duties on all imported spirits into the
United Kingdom were approximately equalized. The United
Kingdom producer however paid an excise tax 2d. less than
the British West Indies producer. This advantage given to
the home producer was criticised by the West India Committee
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throughout the remainder of the century.
The decrease in the price of sugar after the removal of
sugar duties had also brought a decrease in the price of rum
and consumption of this spirit rose steadily reaching its
maximum in the period 1873 - 80, when rum was as low as 12s,
per gallon (1880), and an average of five million gallons
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were consumed. This high consumption of West Indian rum
was not maintained. In 1881, the duty on colonial spirit
was raised from 10/2d. to 10/4d. and foreign reduced from
10/5d. to 10/4d. (for mere clerical convenience, so claimed
the West India Committee). This alteration of duties gave
the /
the British distiller an advantage of 4d. per gallon over
West Indian rum and the West India Committee continued their
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opposition, more strenuously than ever against the British
distiller.
In conjunction with the great influx of bounty-fed beet
sugar after 1884, an increasing quantity of continental beet
root spirit, called rum, was also thrown on the English
market at reduced prices. Thus home buyers of rum were
becoming more fastidious and critical of 'West Indian rum.
By 1888 it was evident that the old attitude of mind towards
the making of rum must change, and it was necessary to know
what were profitable and unprofitable processes especially
in Jamaica.
Jamaica of all the West Indies colonies specialized
most in the production of rum. By the end of the century,
when sugar prices had dropped and the reputation and price
of Jamaica rum remained high, it was stated by Jamaican
planters that sugar was but a by-product to the main industry
of manufacturing rum. As late as 1896, the Planters
Association in Jamaica stated that as long as rum remained
as valuable or more valuable than sugar, their existing
appliances /
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appliances involved no loss of the juice obtained.
The growing emphasis on rum is evident in the increasing
proportion of rum to sugar made in Jamaica. In 1837, the
proportion was 36 puncheons of rum to 100 hogsheads of sugar,
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by 1869 - 79 it was 55 puncheons to 100 hogsheads , and at
this date, rum was "the most profitable manufacture in the
colony". At the International Exhibition at Philadelphia
in 1876, Jamaica rum was "unexcelled by that of any country"
with such a high reputation that all rum sold in the United
States was termed Jamaica rum "although only 65 puncheons of
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Jamaica rum were exported to the United States in 1876".
By 1897, on some estates in Jamaica, the proportion of rum
to sugar had risen to 70 puncheons to 100 hogsheads (seven
estates in St. Amies parish, in 1896, yielded 740 puncheons
of rum and 1,039 hogsheads of sugar),^ compared to 30 pun-
94
cheons of rum to 100 hogsheads of sugar as made m Demerara.
During the latter half of the 19th century Germany be¬
came an increasing importer of rum and a profitable business
grew up in Jamaica supplying this German demand. A number
of the rum estates on the northside of Jamaica began to
specialize in a high priced rum, not for drinking purposes,
but /
but exported to Bremen and Hamburg, where it was used for
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mixing purposes. ^ This Jamaica 'ether' rum, as it was
termed, had a remarkable power of imparting its own flavour
to six or seven times its own bulk of 'silent' or beet
spirit made in Germany. This enabled the whole mixture to
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be sold as Jamaica rum. By the 1880's German houses had
their buyers in Jamaica "going aroung and spotting distilleries
with the right kind of ferment in the liquor loft ... a man
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with a good nose spots this immediately." These "German
rum estates" depended more and more on the high value of their
rum. The use of the centrifugal enabled a greater quantity
of molasses in much quicker time and, when an agriculture
chemist was appointed in Jamaica, experiments and analysis
of fermentation were carried out. The smelling process was
also complemented by the use of Lovebond's tintometer so that
98
quality could also be more accurately ascertained by colour.
Rum estates in Jamaica continued to make profits long
after many others had collapsed, and by the end of the century
when ordinary rum had dropped from 2/9d, per gallon to 1/3d.
Jamaican German rum was fetching 5s. per gallon a drop of
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2s. from the 7s. per gallon it brought in 1891. (These
prices /
prices are those obtained in the Colonies).
Trinidad and British Guiana continued to produce a
low-grade vacuum pan molasses (suitable for a poorer brand
of rum) which, by "1897, wa,s selling in the colony as low as
3d. per gallon."1^ Trinidad molasses, for several years
prior to 1897, had a market in Martinique, where, owing to
protective duties, it could be worked up at a profit and sold
in France. Vacuum pan molasses sold as low as 4%c. per
gallon in Trinidad in the year 1894, but brought 10c. per
gallon in Martinique. The Martinique outlet ended in 1897
when that colony imposed an import duty of #10.00 per pun-
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cheon. Trinidad had another outlet for her molasses in
the considerable amount of rum used for the manufacture of
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Angostura Bitters, the base of which is rum.
In the smaller islands, where muscovado sugar was made,
as Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis, and St. Vincent, em¬
phasis was on producing a rich molasses which established
a specialized market in the United States and Canada in the
last two decades of the century. St. Kitts-Nevis sent some
of their molasses to the Martinique market as Trinidad did,
this market was also shut to St. Kitts-Nevis in 1897 by the
prohibitive /
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prohibitive import duty in that colony.
That improvements had reduced the labour involved, and
had speeded up sugar manufacturing in the period 1863 - 1900,
especially in the years of depression 1884 - 1894, was most
evident in British Guiana, where sugar estates were models
of efficiency.
The old wagon boilers had been replaced by new boilers
utilizing all the back pressure steam and enabling the triple
and other effects already described, to be used. The old
logies, the megasse carriers, boilerman on the copper wall,
and the boxtop men, were all done away with and represented
a saving of £2 per ton„^^ In the curing house small boxes,
or buckets, running on lines into which the pan strikes were
placed, cooled the sugar much more quickly. Hydraulic lifts
were used for emptying the sugar into the sugar bunk (store¬
house) where it was put through a sifter to remove any lumps ~
(previously it had been tossed about by spades, and, in re¬
gard to this practice, there was an idea current among United
Kingdom consumers that these lumps were caused by trampling
bare feet of the labourers - one estate in British Guiana
had provided a canvas boot for this purpose)
On /
r
On many estates, by the 1890's, in British Guiana, auto¬
matic megass firemen were in use whereby green megass could
be fed by hopper and a cold rush of air excluded. On the
first estate where this improvement was made a saving of
twelve men was claimed.*1^ A similar automatic firemen was
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installed in the greatUsine St. Madeline in Trinidad.
The effect of all these improvements in British Guiana
was a speeding up of the whole tempo of •grinding* and *crop
time1. In the 1860's grinding lasted from August, when the
arrow was in the cane and the juice poor and full of starch,
and continued on till February or even March, with many stop¬
pages to allow the megass to dry and to work off accumulation
of molasses. Under the old system the operations were never
finished at the same time, and to keep the syrup from spoiling
it had to be boiled sweet and kept overnight or over the week¬
end. By the 1890's everything was turned into massecuite,
not syrup. There was no difficulty in obtaining operators
or mill workers, compared to the mid-century when the building
overseer had to make out a list of those men told off to man
the factory, and pass it to the field and other overseers, to
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By 1880, in British Guiana, it was stated that the
average cane juice was "both purer and richer than twenty
years previously "because of shorter and more intense grindings
when the canes were most fit to be cut. The greater strength
of the factories on the large estates in British Guiana and
Trinidad was particularly noticeable at the end of the year.
Canes bloomed or arrowed about September and the best time
for reaping was when the arrow began to dry and fall off -
generally in October or November. A sharp brisk grinding
of six or eight weeks disposed of the same amount of cane
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as formerly lingered over four or five months.
The muscovado estates on the other colonies provided a
contrast to the atmosphere of efficiency in British Guiana.
There is no one chief reason for the limited improvements on
the muscovado estates. The root of the trouble extended a
long way back, and perhaps the heavy burden of mortgages from
which many estates never escaped may be taken as one of the
more important reasons for non-improvement. Throughout the
depression years more than one sugar planter voiced his
belief that but for interest and debt, he could make headway
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and make capital improvements. Estates sold through the
Encumbered /
Encumbered Estates Court were those which came through the
difficult years most easily, and thefe were estates which had
been freed from the great weight of encumbrances.
Mortgagees at a distance were not always in sympathy
with progressive ideas that would delay receipt of their
annual income, nor did they always understand that the luc¬
rative days of the past were gone .for ever, and that the
alternative to improvement was collapse.
In addition to the retarding of improvements by mort¬
gages, the fact that the old muscovado system had been
profitable on most estates right up to the mid 1880's (and
on some estates always remained profitable) suggested no
reason why expense should be incurred for improvements. With
the growth of beet competition, uncertainty about the future
and hesitancy to give up a small but certain income for what
was more speculative and uncertain, deterred a number of
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planters from improving.
In summing up the result of improvements made during the
period 1884 - 94 as reflected in a reduced cost of production,
it is evident that the greatest reduction had been made on
vacuum pan estates. The large usine St. Madeline in Trinidad
had /
had reduced its cost of production "by 50 per cent within
the above period. In British Guiana vacuum pan sugar
which cost £16 per ton to produce in 1885, was being turned
out for £9 per ton in 1892. The £7 saving being made up
113
of a £5 reduction in manufacturing costs and £2 in labour.
Reduction in the cost of producing muscovado sugar
in the period 1884 - 94 is more difficult to ascertain.
Correct data as was increasingly recxuired on vacuum pan es¬
tates in British Guiana and Trinidad, was lacking on mus¬
covado estates, Many muscovado sugar proprietors had no
definite idea as to their cost of production and the manner
in which they attempted to reckon it at times is confusing.
In some instances the value of rum and molasses is deducted
from the total cost of producing sugar and its by-products
and in other instances this is not done and in many cases no
indication is given as to how the cost is reckoned. This
difficulty plus that of unfavourable location and varying
susceptibility to droughts make an,exact cost of production
on muscovado estates nearly impossible, as was found out by
the Royal Commission of 1897. An approximation is that the
average cost of production on muscovado estates, during the
period /
period 1865 - 84 was from £10 - £15 per ton of sugar. By
1894, this, average was from £8 - £13 per ton. The average
reduction of £2 per ton is almost -wholly the result of
lowering wages by roughly 30£ in the period 1884 - 94* In
those instances where centrifugals and improved extraction
were introduced, reduction v/as approximately £2 per ton.
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CENTRAL FACTORIES.
The ultimate solution to the prohlein of small sugar
estates unable to finance modern improvements in manu¬
facturing, was the establishment of central factories in
the early twentieth century. During the years *1865 - *1900
there was no general movement to adopt this system.
The leading feature of the central factory system was,
that instead of every estate however small, having its own
set of works and machinery, large manufactories would be
established at central places and would receive and grind,
■\
the crops of several estates.
Central factories were first established in the French
West Indies; Pointe Simon in Martinique, the oldest, was
p
established by an Englishman in 1847. In Guadeloupe, about
the same time, a local earthquake had damaged the existing
manufactories and instead of replacing them, a central
3
factory system was started. The question of central fac¬
tories was first raised in the British West Indies in con¬
nection with the Royal Commission on Commerce in the British-
West Indies in 1847 - 8, when Earl Grey considered that cen¬
tral factories were the ideal remedy for the post-Emancip¬
ation difficulties of the sugar colonies, and stated that
the /
the sugar proprietor was incapable of acting efficiently
in the many capacities of planter, merchant, manufacturer
and distiller.'" Earl Grey's suggestion evoked little
enthusiasm from the planters at the time. The ostensible
objection was that the planter already had existing works,
and that the layout of the estates did not lend themselves
to centralization. The real difficulty then, as later,
was the lack of capital and co-operation for such a venture.
The finances of the colonial governments were all in a poor
state; and opposition from mortgagees and merchants to any
prior claim of a central factory on contracting estates,
was also a real cause of discouragement to the movement.
Many planters felt they would suffer a loss of independence
and prestige, under this system, and finally, the improve¬
ment of conditions in the late 1850's made the need for
central factories less urgent.
In the French islands the central factory system was a
6
success. At first there had been considerable difficulty
in coming to an arrangement with proprietors who were under
engagements to consignees, but as the latter (here called
commissioners) were almost always resident, or represented,
in /
in the islands they were more amenable to the idea of
central factories. Also, commissioners did not have
C
financial dlairns on estates to the extent that merchant-
consignees had in the British West Indies, and in cases
where they did have claims on estates they were induced to
refrain from pressing them, the Usine (central factory)
taking up the planters debts in a number of instances.
After disconnection with the commissioners, advances were
obtained by the sugar planter through the local bank, the
Usine being security for their repayment. In some cases
the Usines made advances to their contributory estates to
7
assist in clearing land and extending cultivation. By
1370 central, factories in the French islands were "in the
highest possible favour as a means of investment".0 In
1884, when beet competition was greatly increased and prices
of sugar had dropped, of the ten usines in Martinique "all
9
but two gave returns of o% and upwards on vested capital".
Following the Report of the Royal Commission on Com¬
merce in the British West Indies 1847, no movement was made
to establish central factories until 1872. Bigelow, writing
in 1851, urged there/establishment in Jamaica, and stated
that /
that, "50 sugar mills of suitable dimensions and faithfully
conducted would manufacture the largest sugar crop ever
raised in Jamaica as well as 800 or 1,000 now do, and prob-
10
ably much better."
The Governor's report for St. Kitts in 1860 remarked,
as had Earl Grey, on the inability of the planter to per¬
form the various offices of farmer, miller, distiller and
manufacturer adequately, and called attention to the Mar-
11
tinique system. "
In Antigua in 1871 when a hurricane caused great damage
to buildings on the sugar estates, the leading planters
asked the Governor to appoint a commission to report on the
Martinique system. This report (very limited in its infor¬
mation) found the central factory system working success¬
fully in Martinique, and recommended its establishment in
Antigua where there was no physical difficulty except lack
1 2of fresh water. No further action was taken in Antigua
following this report and interest seems to have waned. The
West Indies Encumbered Estates Court was very active in
Antigua in the years immediately following 1870, and mer¬
chants were buying over estates at such low prices that
profits / .
profits made were sufficient to dull interest in central
factories,
Various objections arose whenever the question of central
factories arose in the other colonies prior to 1884.
In Barbados, high cost of land deterred any private
enterprise from purchasing sufficient acreage to support a
central factory. Any co-operative venture among the plan¬
ters to establish a central factory would have required a
first charge on their estates as security for loans raised,
and mortgagees, attorneys and managers were opposed to a.
scheme which, it was considered, would adversely affect
their position.
In some of the colonies flat areas 011 which tramlines
could be laid were difficult to obtain. St Vincent and
1 3
Montserrat were examples of these.
In Jamaica with the decreased importance of sugar pro¬
duction, interest in central factories was difficult to
awaken. In addition many of the estates were encumbered
or in the hands of merchant consignees, and it was felt that
central factories would interfere with their interests.^
Many of the sugar proprietors still prided themselves
on /
on being master ox their own affairs, and felt that "being
committed to send canes under a contract with a central
factory would lessen them in the eyes of the world. In
addition, the particular brand of rum, in liich some prop¬
rietors specialized could no longer be produced with central
factories. In Jamaica, as in all the colonies, the prospect
of scrapping existing machinery - especially steam engines
and centrifugals newly purchased - was not welcome. Some
planters said that the introduction of extensive tramways,
doing away with stock and wains, would decrease the amount
1 5
of manure available. There were also said to be few
localities in Jamaica that could command the 38 square miles,
felt to be necessary to support a large central factory.
There were a few distriots as St. Catherine's, Plantain
River Garden and the flat land along the seashore between
■i g
Montego Bay and Falmouth,' but in these districts there
seems to have "been some prejudice or other, as in Montego
Bay area, where emphasis was on fine rum production. Again
in Plantain River Garden region, where merchant consignees
were adverse to sugar planters making contracts with central
1 7
factories. In addition to these difficulties, there was
no /
no large "body of cane farmers in possession of land suit¬
able to support a central factory such as were found in
Trinidad and St. Lucia.
The need for central factories did not exist in British
Guianaj the large modern installations in that colony were
equal to central factories.
The first central factories in the British West Indies
were established in Trinidad and 'St. Lucia about approxim-
ately the same time, 1871 2. fo The Colonial Company,
owner of one of the two factories started in Trinidad, ob¬
tained canes not only from their own large estates, but also
from those of Messrs. Tennant and from an increasing number
1 9
of small cane farmers. The central factory system in
Trinidad got off to a good start. The Colonial Company,
owning large estates in British Guiana, was in a strong
financial position and there is no evidence of the Usine
St, Madeline experiencing losses during the remainder of the
century.
The first St. Lucia central factory was a less success¬
ful venture; it had. been established in 1873 as a result
of the influence of the French Usines in nearby Martinique.
Mr. /
Mr. Des Voeux, a French, planter who lived in St. Lucia,
interested the Governor of the colony in the scheme and "by
1870 - 1, the Governor was urging the planters to support a.
central factory, and extolled its advantages to them and to
the increasing body of cane farmers. Interest was awakened
and the report for the year 1874 stated that t!cane culture
received unwonted stimulus from the introduction of a central
factory during the year by Mr. Des Voeux with the support
20
of English capitalists!l. The Grand Cul de Sac Usine, as
it was called, experienced difficulties which prevented it
from being a success, and tended to prejudice sugar pro¬
prietors in the other sugar colonies against central fac¬
tories. Ill management under a Frenchman, who was formerly
the ruined proprietor of a usine in one of the French islands
and misappropriation of funds due to lack of a good audit
system, were some of its misfortunes. Difficulty was also
experienced in 1876 because of the had quality and insuffic-
22
ient quantity of cane, plus extravagant use of fuel. Too
many planters soiight advances because merchants refused to
finance them now that they were under contract to the fac-
23
tory. The factory soon found that it was unwise to rely
totally /
totally on sugar estates if canes were to "be always had
when wanted and, by 1877, the manager of the factory was
instructed to obtain possession of Crown lands bordering on
their tramlines, and thus avoid over-dependence on local
estates and cane farmers. By 1884, evidence shows that the
Cul de Sac factory had acquired a number of sugar estates,
°4
and was no longer relying solely on planters for canes.
The transfer of the factory in 1883 to a new company, in
which the St. Lucia government had an interest, and the
establishment of two other factories under the St. Lucia
Usines and Estate Company, firmly established the central
factory system in St. Lucia. These factories were seriously
25
hurt by beet sugar competition after 1884, but were, in a
much better position to meet this competition than individual
muscovada estates, many of which succumbed in that island.
Central factories in St. Lucia and Trinidad reduced
the cost of production by nearly 5055 in the period 1840 - 54,
and it was stated, "all the elements of successful competition
p f.
with beet sugar are here".1*
With the depression in the sugar industry that set in
after 1884, little was done in the other sugar colonies
towards /
towards establishing central factories. The increasing
competition frorn bounty sugar and uncertainty as regards the
future, deterred capital investment needed for such fac¬
tories. The difficulties experienced in St. Lucia, were
27
quoted as evidence that it was not a prosperous venture.
The question of central factories was raised a few times
in the period 1884 - 95, chiefly in the form of schemes
based on Government loans. Three such schemes, two in Bar¬
bados, and one in Antigua, in 1884, 1891 and 1895, were turned
down by the Colonial Office on the ground that they v/ere
unsound, considering the state of colonial finances, and
that unless a first charge on the estate was given as se¬
curity, the Colonial Government must not enter into suoh
speculation. Estate owners were usually agreeable to
28
giving this first charge, but mortgagees were not.
The central factory movement did not receive real
stimulus until the Royal Commission of 1897 recommended it,
and this subject is discussed in connection with the work
of the Royal Commission of 1897.
1r~~~ r'liS>
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SUGAR CANE CULTIVATION
Reduction in the cost of producing sugar in the British
West Indies in the 19th century was effected primarily hy
by improvements on the manufacturing side, and hy reducing
wages or skimping with labour. Opportunity for economy in
the field was admittedly less than on the manufacturing side
and hand cultivation in some of the sugar colonies was carri
out with a high degree of perfection. Much ignorance how¬
ever prevailed as to manuring and soil husbandry until prac¬
tically the end of the century.
Deficiency of organic matter in the soil, the principal
and most general soil difficulty on the sugar estates could
only be corrected by application of manure and fertilisers.
Fortunately, sugar cane is one of the staple crops least
likely to promote soil erosion, otherwise the"classical
sugar colonies" would have given up sugar production long
before the end of the 19th century. Because of the binding
power of the roots and the building up of organic matter in
the soil, sugar cane can be grown on the same area for gener-
p
ations without serious retrogression. This facility of
the sugar cane was exploited to the utmost in most of the
colonies, by ratooning and inadequate manuring.
The /
The West Indian practice of applying the manure to the
land when the cane was about twenty inches high was at vari¬
ance with the accepted practice in most countries of scat-
tering the manure prior to planting."' There is no reason
given why this different method prevailed in the West Indian
colonies. Perhaps the fact that crop time and planting
coincided and that there was usually a rush to get planting
done, left little labour or time for the work of manuring.
The slack period following crop time was usually the period
in which manuring was done.
The practice of burning trash in the cane field, instead
of ploughing It under, was common on most estates.The
rotted trash would have returned much organic matter taken
from the soil. Planters maintained that burning trash made
reaping easier and that the remaining ashes contained ele¬
ments required by the soil, (Agricultural chemists showed
pr
however, that tiey were largely lost in burning). The
custom of burning trash apparently arose from the supposed
fear of the negroes as regards snakes.^
Deficient and indiscriminate application of manure and
fertilizer was general. Even in Barbados where more was
used /
used than in the other colonies, the amount applied was
still below that used in foreign cane regions. In Hawaii,
for example, by the end of the century, £8 worth of fer¬
tilizer was used per acre compared to £3: 10: Od. in Bar¬
bados and 30s. per acre, average in the other British West
Indies. In Hawaii the highest return of sugar per acre in
the world (9 tons per acre) v/as obtained, compared to an
average return of 1% tons per acre in the British Indies
(excepting Barbados, where 2-3 tons per acre were obtained
The high price of imported fertilizer as Peruvian guano
no doubt deterred manuring in the sugar colonies, but it is
indicative of lethargy on the part of the sugar planters
that the rich deposits of guano on the Morant and Pedro
Cays, near Jamaica, were not utilized. This small group
of islands, lying thirty to fifty miles south of Jamaica
and governed from that colony, were being exploited by
Americans from the early 19th century, although by 1885,
small quantities of guano were being taken from these is-
Q
lands to Jamaica. Similarly in Antigua, where a need of
fertilizer existed there was no attempt to make use of the
deposits of guano on the adjacent island of Redonda, which
were /
were being shipped to the United States.^
The abandonment of estates and cutting down of stock in
a number of the colonies, that took place after 1884, also
reduced pen manure and caused soil exhaustion which in turn
10
reduced the resistance of the sugar cane to disease.
Professor Harrison, agricultural chemist, deplored "the
10
lack of thoroughly rotten heavy pen manure in St. Vincent,"
where cane disease was a serious threat in the 1890*s.
The indiscriminate application of manure, regardless of
type of soil and need could have been avoided by soil analysis
1 i
as urged by agricultural chemists in the 1880's. Jenkins
speaks of a driver on a sugar estate, who declared he could
1 ?
tell good cane soil by tasting the sugar in it, " and that
a peculiar unexplainable practice existed oh Albion estate
in Jamaica of applying a glass of "dunder" from the distillery
13
to each cane root. Such erroneous ideas as to soil fer¬
tility and needs would have been explained away by soil
analysis.
The great reduction in the price of fertilizers in the
1890's, especially the best of all, sulphate of ammonia,
14
proved a boon to planters so minded to use it. In
Barbados /
Barbados greater application of manure in the deoade ending
1 5
1897 increased crop production there by 15 per cent. The
majority of the sugar colonies, however, were by this date
in so depressed a condition that manure imports were reduced,
rather than increased.
There was no innovation of modern tillage on the sugar
estates of the British West Indies during the second half
of the century, The plough was still rarely used, and
*1
steam tillage was non-existent in most colonies. In
some islands the physical surface precluded its use - as in
1 7
Nevis where there were masses of rock and Montserrat and
i A
Dominica where there were ravines, or British Guiana where
the extensive drainage system prevented its use. In Trini¬
dad and Jamaica the expense of steam tillage in proportion
to the short time it was used was stated by some planters to
1 9
be their objection to its introduction. If the same
steam power could have been used to operate the sugar
factory and to till the fields, there might have been more
steam ploughs introduced, unfortunately crop time and
cultivation of the soil coincided.
In Antigua where heavy clay soils demanded, and the
general /
general flatness of the fields facilitated its use, steam
tillage, by the end of the century, was more common than
20
in any other colony.
The adherence to the hoe for all field work had long
been criticised and Kerr, a practical sugar planter, writing
in 1851, had stated:-
"planters should insist on their attorneys not em¬
ploying a single hoe" but "to plant the cane rows wide
enough apart to permit the use of the horse hoe or cul¬
tivator" . ^
By 1890, the horse hoe and cultivator was still un¬
common and the hoe was used for nearly all weeding and
cleaning. Cane holing was usually done with the hoe,
although a spade would have been more suited to the task.
However, a hoe could be used as well for other operations
as weeding cleaning and banking and the economy in the im¬
plements thus saved was sufficient to confirm the planter
to the use of the hoe alone. In addition there was the
objection to the spade that shoes would have to be provided
22
to enable it to be properly used by the labourer.
The /
The method of digging cane holes and planting the
pieces of cane perpendicular in these holes was necessitated
by adhering to the use of the hoe. With a plough the cane
jfciTrt£ FoUfcoUr. AGA/C'KTVMJ^
A0~ocAT0o
pieces would have been placed horizontal*planting because
it gave straight single cane stalks, whereas with perpendicular
23
planting, stoling often resulted. In addition the West
Indian practice of using the upper part of the cane for
planting, because it contained little sugar, was condemned
by the. same agricultural experts, on the ground that it was
more likely to rot and produced less hardy plants.2^ Watts
and Harrison urged the selection of mature fairly hard canes
and disagreed with the practice of leaving a late field of
canes as standovers or to alio?/ a crop to ratoon for the
2^
special purpose of planting.
There is less certainty in the twentieth century that,
in adhering to the use of the hoe, the West Indian planter
was perpetuating an obsolete method. According to soil
experts (Imperial Sugar Cane Research - Empire Marketing
Board Report, 1931) -
"It is a curious fact that countries with the best cane
cultivation are those using manual labour only, as Mauritius,
Barbados /
Barbados and Java ,., may it not be the case of the worker
transferring his skill or intelligence to his implement ,..
soil is an orderly microsm - temperature, particles of
mineral matter, constant chemical and physical changes,
living plant and animal forms" are all involved, "it is a
shock to see machine driven implements with no oare for the
mellowing and settling of the soil."
Reaping of the cane which took place when it was about
twelve months old, was invariably done by the cutlass. No
mechanical harvester has, as yet, been devised to harvest
cane, and in the mid-twentieth century attempts are still
being made to invent such a machine. Even in Cuba, where
most modern methods are in effect, the cutlass is still
27
used in reaping. '
The transport of the cane from the fields to the mill
was usually done by oxen cart in the older colonies. Tram¬
ways were only feasible where there were flat runs as on
large or contiguous estates, and were most common in Trinidad
and St. Lucia, where central factories were established after
1870. In St. Lucia haulage costs were reduced three shil-
no
lings per ton of cane as a result of installing tramways.
In /
In Jamaica there were a few instances of small railways
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but oxen were in use on most estates for haulage. In
British Guiana the system of trenches provided efficient and
economical navigation for cane haulage.
T/jt. Chief defect in the transport of cane from the fields
to the mill was insufficient carts or punts, so that drivers
and animals remained idle while loading and unloading. In
British Guiana, iron punts were expensive and an estate re¬
quired at least twenty punts, which had to be unloaded by
hand, although on a few estates the practice was to run
loaded waggons on to the punts, and tip the waggons to un~
"50
load them, The method of carrying canes in bundles on
the head could have been avoided by falling the canes to
allow carts to go up and down, or across the field, and cart
wheels should have been spaced to fit between the cane rows.
Depressed axles would also have facilitated loading and un-
31
loading.
The unintelligent care of animals on sugar■estates,
especially in Jamaica, was noticeable and visitors remarked
on the condition of draft cattle, bloated with guinea grass,
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straining in the heat of the day. In Barbados v/orking
cattle /
/ff
cattle were much "better treated and the practice was to get
the work done in the earlier and cooler hours of daylight.
In British Guiana mules were preferred to oxen for hauling
the punts, being much quicker, but required careful attention
"everyday, cuts, sores or bruises had to be attended to and
special attention was required in having well-fitted col¬
lars.""'1^
A knowledge of the botany and mycology of the sugar
cane was very limited among the sugar planters. Since its
introduction into the West Indies, in the late 18th century,
the Otfthaite (more commonly known as the Bourbon) was the
usual variety of cane grown. This cane acclimatized well
and had produced abundantly throughout most of the 19th
century. However, in the late 80's and in the 90*s, this
cane deteriorated and was attacked by cane disease in most
of the colonies, in some, as St. Vincent and Antigua, be¬
coming of grave concern. There are two theories as to why
the Ot&hfiite failed; "theory of deterioration - the end of
the life of a form long vegetatively reproduced", and "change
of soil through long continued cultivation and more hurried
35
preparation" and resulting exhaustion.
Little /
Little would have been done to counteract this cane
disease if the colonies had not in the late 1880's appoin¬
ted agricultural chemists, who, in co-operation with newly
foLmded agricultural societies, did much to prevent spread
36
of the disease and introduce new varieties. As early as
■1780 botanic gardens had been founded in St. Vincent and,
under the growing influence of Kew in London, had been es-
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tablished in most of the other sugar colonies.■ When the
Bourbon was attacked by cane disease, agricultural chemists
were able to replace it with stocks of White Transparent or
Caledonian Queen, fostered in experimental plots in the
botanic gardens,"5®
Cane disease was not entirely new, and had been des¬
cribed in 1828 from examples obtained in St. Vincent. It
attacked British Guiana crops in 1879, and had appeared in
Barbados and Trinidad in 1891; throughout the 90*s it re¬
duced some estates' crops by 30 per cent and in some distinct
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fields, 50 per cent losses were reported.
^ Important development in combating the disease was the
discovery by Harrison and Bovell in 1889, of the fertility
of the cane seed.^"® As the result of this discovery
systematic /
systematic growing and experimenting with new and more resis¬
tant varieties of cane took place. The discovery about
the same time of the eggs of the moth borer, which caused
the disease, enabled the fostering of a parasite to prey
4-1
on the eggs. By 1897, following the advice of Harrison
and others, planters had the disease under control but not
before substantial losses were experienced by proprietors,
as Porter, in St. Vincent, who had to destroy 70,000 plants
4-2
obtained from Barbados because they were infected. By
the end of the century the "old prolific Bourbon, now sadly
prolific with fungus", was being replaced by Caledonian Queen
White Transparent and other varieties, although, in colonies
where it was unaffected by cane disease, as in British Guiana
the Bourbon's good sugar content and well-developed stalk
4-3
still made it the favoured variety.
Another pest of the cane that seems to have caused ex¬
tensive loss during the 19th century, but which received
little publicity, was the rat. Records are available of
rat damage to the cane as far back as 200 years.^ Lunan,
writing in 1816, speaks of the rat menace and urged the use
4-5
of the mongoose as a rat catcher. Davy speaks of rats
causing /
causing great losses on Turner Hall estate in Jamaica in
the 1850's and as does Beaton in regard to Reunion estate.
In some parishes of Jamaica depredations of the rat caused
losses of nearly one-fifth of the produce. Forster Hall
estate in Barbados reckoned its losses from rat damage at
4-7
one-fourth of cane grown and in the 1870's both Barbados
and Ifevis passed ordinances giving a 1d. bounty for rat
4-8 1
heads. These ordinances were repealed in a year or two,
because assiduous hunters tore dovra fences and ruined canes
4-9
to extent of pounds damage. In their desire to rid them¬
selves of the rat menace the sugar planters displayed gul¬
libility to the extent of importing a species of ant from
Cuba, which was itself rendered useless by attacks from the
50
Chigoe flea. A gigantic toad was also introduced from
South America, and this creature, causing at first con¬
siderable commotion with its hoarse bellowings, was thought
51
little of as a rat catcher.
The final solution was that advocated by Lunan in 1816.
Mr. Espent of Spring Gardens estate in 1874, obtained the
mongoose from India, which quickly reproduced and was dis-
52
tributed to different estates. By 1878, savings of rat
batching /
catching expenses and eaten cane were averaging over £180
per annum on some estates, and rat damage was down on all
53
estates by 80 - 90 per cent. By 1890, the rat menace
54.
had "been nearly eradicated. The mongoose remained the
normal rat catcher throughout the remaining century. There
was a disadvantage in that the mongoose took to killing
55
chickens, ^ "but, as these usually "belonged to the negro
labourer, this was,presumably,of little consequence to the
sugar planter.
In dealing with this subject of cane cultivation and
improvements outside of the sugar manufactory, British
Guiana deserves a separate treatment. British Guiana is
unique among the British West Indies, in that the sugar
industry there is directly dependent on the maintenance of
an extensive and intricate drainage system.
The coastal belt of British Guiana, a strip of clay
about three to seven miles wide along the coast, contains
nearly all the cultivable land in the colony. The coastal
belt which is at or even below sea level had originally been
laid out by the Dutch in areas of 2 - 4,000 ft. frontage and
extending inland between parallel boundaries, for varying
distances /
.distances as much, as seven miles and terminating in the hack
dam, This layout had been effected along about half the
coast line for about 150 miles, between the Courantyne and
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Essequibo rivers. The sugar industry of British Guiana
is almost wholly confined to this coastal strip. Two prob¬
lems had to be solved, the keeping out of the sea at high
tide, and, in turn, some means of controlling the great
volume of fresh water that accumulated on the landward side
of the coastal strip and washed across it into the sea. The
difficulty lay in controlling these two operations simul¬
taneous ly, and was solved by a system of open drains termed
'trenches1 which entered the sea by sluices constructed in
the sea wall. These sluices could be controlled so that
when high tide was in, drainage from the inland region could
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be halted and then renewed when the tide was out.
As British Guiana, despite a heavy rainfall, is subject
to droughts, the fresh water behind the cultivated area was
usually conserved in reservoirs, often made by walling large
natural depressions, and then used for irrigation during the
dry periods,^®
The expense involved in maintaining this system of water
works /
worksj dams and sea wall was enormous, and it is significant
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that no major sea works was undertaken after Slavery.
A sugar estate's value in British Guiana was directly
determined hy its liability or immunity to damage from a
breach in the sea wall and to the state of its drainage
system. It was a great boon to the sugar estates when the
sea defences were partially placed under the control of
public works, in 1883; prior to this planters had taken ad¬
vantage of the embankment of the British Guiana railroad
constructed in 1858 and which ran parallel to the sea and
were using it as their sea wall.^
The layout of the former Dutch owners had favoured
large estates, and the expense involved in maintaining the
drainage system was such as to make it prohibitive for a
peasant proprietor or a small sugar estate to support the
undertaking. Thus the tendency in British Guiana towards
large estates/ is largely attributable to the fact that
f
drainage and irrigation was a large scale capital enterprise.
Amalgamation continued throughout the century, by adjacent
estates having their trenches linked up and the machinery
concentrated on one where formerly there were more than one
or /
or two estates. With lack of labour and depression in
the sugar industry during the later years of the century,
the drainage system and sea banks became a real burden.
Many of the coastal estates were continually threatened by
mud banks thrown up by the sea and which caused havoc to
the drainage system. Prom 1875 - 1888, plantation Leonora
expended £20,000 in fighting the sea and of this sum £8,000
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was to obtain stone, much of which came from England. In
one lucky instance, a mud bank was thrown up in the ideal
location/ for a sea dam and saved the sugar proprietor a
r r\
large sum of money.~ In 1894, the large estates of
Vryheid•s Lust, and Better Hope were almost completely inun¬
dated and temporarily ruined as a result of the mud banks
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thrown up on them. The abandonment of Bel Air, an ex¬
ceptionally fine estate, in 1892, was a result of the heavy
expense involved in the maintenance of the sea dam.°^ The
chief difficulty for the British Guiana sugar planter, posed
by the existence of this extensive drainage system was that
of finding some means of cultivating the land mechanically.
Steam tillage was essential to stir the heavy clay soils of
the coastal belt to an adequate depth of at least twelve
inches /
inches. The open system of drainage prevented the use of
steam tillage because of the impossibility of traversing
the trenches. Various devices were tried of turning the
engines, but due to the small fields, resulting from -inter-
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seating trenches, this proved to be impracticable. The
expense of enlarging the size of the fields would have been
too great. Some planters voiced the fear that to fill up
the trenches would take the top fertile soil exposing the
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poorer underneath. Many devices were tried such as
running the plough onto a skeleton platform, on wheels, which
could be moved up and down the trench permitting the steam
plough to traverse it. This involved extra labour and the
trenches were continually breaking down and had to be cleaned
out.^' The cable drawn plough already described in the
introduction (p. A")) was successful, but was expensive and
also required mechanical skill and extra manual labour.^
The admirable solution of combining steam ploughing
with drainage appeared to be the use of underground tile
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drainage, which left no surface obstruction.
Tile drainage was first, introduced: into British G-uiana
by Crura Ewing, owner of Enmore estate, who also brought
out /
out a Scottish "practical agriculturist" to superintend and
to set up tile making machinery. Swing*s efforts to intro¬
duce tile drainage were not a success. The tiles silted up
and had to "be dug up, or there was too much surface water to
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drain away quickly enough the tiles." Ewing also tried
what was known as the "Louisiana system" - planting the cane
rows parallet to the small drains so as to avoid crossing
them. This method was also unsticcessful because with the
stiff clayey soil the cane rows held water which was unable
to drain into the main side trenches. On porous soil this
system would perhaps have been satisfactory, but on stiff
clay soil it failed signally, "each cane row holding water
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like a basin". By the end of the century planters had
resorted again to using the hoe, and in 1896, the Louisiana
Planter stated -
"There is no part of the world except the Straits
Settlement, where so thorough a cultivation was given to the
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land by hand labour alone as in Demerara".
British Guiana planters were more successful in devising
methods of simplifying trenching than they were in tillage.
Crum /
Crum Ewing on his east coast estates had devised a method
of digging trenches by means of a powerful engine and cable
around well sunk piles, and with the engine place in an
iron punt. The engine wound up the cable and thus dragged
73
itself along, the punt ploughing out a ditch, Attempts
at horse husbandry never proved a success in British Guiana;
Breaking up the heavy clay soil proved too much of a strain
on horseflesh. Mules were used to haul the punts that
traversed the navigation trenches of the drainage system,
74.
and were imported chiefly from-the United States and Mexico,
Despite the handicap of maintaining the sea-works and
the extensive drainage system the sugar industry in British
Guiana derived certain unusual advantages from it. The
drainage system provided waterways on which canes could be
hauled in punts from the fields to the factory - thus haulage
expenses in British Guiana were less than in any of the other
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sugar colonies,'^ The open trenches teemed with fish,-
n (L
which provided a staple food for the coolie labourers.
The irrigation system provided water during periods of
drought which usually wrought havoc in the other British
West Indies colonies. As has been mentioned in the
introduction /
introduction, the seaworks and drainage system permitted
.flood fallowing - that is the flooding of fields (usually
every three years) which renewed the fertility of the soil,
to a degree not obtainable by any method of direct manure
77
application.
The yield of sugar per acre in British Guiana was no
higher than the average for other British West Indies colo¬
nies, being about two tons per acre at the end of the cen¬
tury. Despite the careful cultivation, that this was so,
was due to the lower sugar content in the cane, owing in
part to climatic irregularities, which made it necessary
no
to reap some of the cane before it was fully ripe, and
because soil fertility was less than for example Barbados.
On the other hand the double wet season permitting of two
planting periods, and the dry season allowing of two reaping
periods, enabled the factories to grind canes for nine months
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m the year. This was a considerable advantage as com¬
pared with competing areas and explains why vessels from
Demerara were bringing sugar to the United Kingdom long after
the other homeward cargoes of sugar from the other sugar
OA
colonies had ceased to arrive.0
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LABOUR PROBLEMS
Throughout all the sugar colonies labour supply con¬
tinued to be of prime concern to the sugar planter, in the
second half of the century.
The system of Coolie organization, as instituted in
the first half of the century, was functioning best in the
colonies of Trinidad and British and British Guiana. By
1870, 44,825 coolies had entered British Guiana and all of
the 128 sugar estates relied on coolies for their labour
A
force. Abuses of this indentured labour were not over-
evident. It took nearly two years, such was the calculation,
to make a seasoned worker, and it was to the interest of the
sugar planter to ensure that he did not lose labour just when
it was becoming proficient, and planters were always clamor-
ous for more coolie labour. Give me my heart's desire of
%\
coolies, was the Demerara planter's remark to Anthony Trollope,
"and we will supply the world with sugar."
Estates with bad names, as regards their treatment of
coolies, were avoided by re-indenturing labourers. The
bounty system provided a good test of the satisfaction of
the immigrant who originally indentured for five years, but,
if re-indenturing for a further five years, received a bounty.
Some /
Some of the estates, as Vreed in Hoop, made it a practice
to hire only indenture-served coolies, because of their
3
proved worth.
Regulations that planters would get no more coolies
if abuses took place were in effect in British Guiana, but
could be evaded. Immigration agents, gave at least a month's
notice of intended inspection visits to sugar estates, and
were dependent on the hospitality of the planter, when visit¬
ing
^ which made impartiality difficult.^ The Governor of
the Colony was empowered to enforce the good treatment of
coolies in that he could refuse to allot further coolies to
any estate on which there was excessive mortality, and could
remove all immigrants on that estate. This removal of im¬
migrants occurred only twice on record, in the case of
Arthurville and New Forest estates. Excessive mortality
was not always attributable to conditions on an estate.
Those sugar estates on which there were more fresh immigrants
had higher mortality rates. Planters maintained that the
Madrassee coolie was a better physical type than the coolie
from Calcutta, and that the peasant village coolie was also
more fitted for cane work than those picked up off the streets
of /
of large Indian cities. Medical treatment and hospital¬
ization seems to have been adequately provided on most sugar
estates and out of 128 sugar estates classified as to treat¬
ment of coolies in this respect, only eight were listed as
'had' in 1868.^
The British Guiana, sugar planter made the most of the
supply of coolie labour without seriously overstepping
regulations. Planters reported that labour was performing
a daily task of about seven hours, at a wage of 10d. to
O
1/4d. This may have been true out of crop time. But in
crop time, which lasted for some months in British Guiana
(prior to the great speeding up which took place in the last
two decades of the century), very long hours were worked.
Preference for work in the factory, because of the perquisites
as rum and shelter from the sun was exploited, and according
to the Agent General's report of 1873, boilermen were working
fifteen hours a day, firemen eighteen, and the ordinary
g
labourer never less than fourteen. Managers maintained
that it was impossible to regulate their mill work if short
specified hours of work had to be adhered to. The double
shift system, as carried out in large factories in the French
West /
West Indies and which would have shortened these hours, was
stated by British Guiana planters to be unfeasible because
10
night work was impossible with the water carriage system.
Coolie labour throughout the second half of the century
constituted the chief labour employed on the sugar estates
in British Guiana. Negro labourers were used to some extent
on estates located near negro villages, and the negro labourer,
because of his superior physical strength, was desired for
certain tasks, as for example, a black shovelman was preferred
at 4/- per day although the coolie could be had for 1/4d.
Work such as trenching, cane cutting, and some of the principal
1
mill tasks as boiling were more capably done by negro labourers
On estates, near negro villages the practice seems to have
been for task gangs, headed by a 'driver' to contract for a
certain amount of work to be done. The lump sum paid to the
driver, was divided by him among the members of the gang.
The intermittent manner in which the negro laboured and the
habit of working but three days per week made the coolie,
12
despite his inferior physical prowess, the favoured worker.
During the depression in 1884 and again in 1894, attempts to
reduce wages of the non-indentured labourer were not very
successful /
successful. The minimum wage of 1/4-d. per day paid to
the indentured coolie :could not he reduced, and other labour-
1 3
ers never consented to work for less. As in some of the
other West Indian colonies, planters more than once remarked
on the reliance placed on the coolie not merely in the sense
of his being a more reliable labourer, but from a feeling
that in any time of need he would be on the side of the plan¬
ter rather than the negro. The negro and the coolie never
tended to mix or intermarry to the degree that might have
been expected, considering the small proportion of coolie
14
women among indentured labour from the East.
Unlike Trinidad and Jamaica, where there was much avail¬
able land to attract labourers away, population in British
Guiana was fairly well confined to the narrow coastal strip
on which the sugar industry was chiefly centred and indenture-
served coolies had less choice of occupation, other than
1 5
sugar, than in the other sugar colonies. The gold mines
in British Guiana from the mid 1880*s onwards attracted much
labour but it was chiefly drawn from the negro portion of
the labourers who were more suited physically for the type
1 6
of work involved. Although, on the whole, no serious
discord /
£11
discord arose between the coolie immigrant and the sugar
planter, there was not complete harmony. Many petty
charges arose as a result of minor friction, much of it
avoidable by having proper interpreters. Misunderstandings
arose over stoppages of wages, medical care, absenteeism -
•
and trouble over overseers associating with coolie women.
For the five years ending 1870, there were 32,876 charges,
dealt with in the local courts, charges resulting from action
taken by employer and labourer against each other. Many
of these charges however came to nothing. It was found
that on those estates where correct pay books were kept
there was usually contentment; planters were often vexed
over absenteeism and deserters, some to Dutch Surinam.
Many of these charges perhaps would not have arisen but for
1 7
the coolies' love of litigation.
By 1897, although the number of estates was now only 64,
compared to 128 in 1870, coolie immigration was still in
effect. The number of coolies working on estates in 1897
18
was over 105,000, indicating a great concentration of labour
on estates, for example, lusignan, on the east coast of
Demerara, had 2,735 coolies quartered and employed on the
estate /
estate in 1891 .1 ^
The availability of reliable indentured coolie labour
throughout the second half of the 19th century was an im¬
portant factor in maintaining the superior prosperity of
British Guiana's sugar industry compared with that of the
other sugar colonies. The fear had been voiced in 1869,
20
that assisted immigration into British Guiana would retard
improvements in the sugar industry. On the contrary, im¬
provements had been more than commensurate with the increase
of immigration throughout the century. Manufacturing capa¬
city of the factories had so increased that intensive cul¬
tivation in the field was needed to cope with this increased
capacity. Coolie labour in ever increasing numbers was
imported to maintain this intensive cultivation.
Trinidad, next to British Guiana, had the greatest
coolie immigration of the British West Indies. By 1870, the
old negro Creole population had fallen back mostly into
villages on the borders of estates or newly opened lands of
the interior. Imported labourers were the main resident
population on the sugar estates. A rationing ordinance had
had been introduced in 1869 to ensure that indentured coolies
were /
were fed sufficiently. This measure did reduce mortality
in the first year of indenture and it was found that the
mortality rate increased in the second year when the Coolie
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fed himself. As in British Guiana estates with excessive
mortality (of over 7 per cent) were excluded from immigrants
by an ordinance of 1870. As a result of this measure, the
number of such estates was reduced from 20 in 1869 to 9 by
22
1872. In this matter of mortality of immigrants on es¬
tates, it was found, as in British Guiana, that on estates
where more fresh immigrants were employed, deaths were
greater in number than where more seasoned labourers were
employed.
Difficulties arose in Trinidad with Coolie labour on
estates, not experienced elsewhere. The opening of Crown
lands in 1868 saw many indenture-served Coolies leaving the
23
estates just when they had become skilled seasoned labourers.
Re-indenturing on sugar estates, as was. common in British
Guiana, was less so in Trinidad. The practice arose of
coolies purchasing out their remaining indenture at the end
of the third year (permitted by lav/). This practice led to
many Coolies becoming hopelessly indebted to their own country¬
men /
men who were merciless money lenders, and who induced
24.
labourers to leave the estates.
Sugar proprietors opposed the opening up of the Crown
lands and had it made a ruling that "plots chosen must bound
with land already alienated" and that these contiguous lots
be as close as possible to sugar estates to ensure a nucleus
of labour. To keep labour after indenture was served, planters
25
often offered lots of land on the estate,"^ but the desire
for independence and cheap Crown land usually proved to be
a stronger attraction.
The sugar industry in Trinidad never had enough labour.
There was this continual drift from the Crown land and to
the centres of population, and the later growth of cane
farming by coolies tended to draw off more labour from the
sugar estates.2^ In addition to East Indian immigration
there was during the latter half of the century a constant
stream of immigrants from the other West Indies colonies into
Trinidad. This stream of immigration to Trinidad by 1873
had reached large dimensions, 20,000 "deckers" in one year
27
alone entering from the "other West Indies colonies'. The
higher earnings possible in Trinidad was perhaps the main
reason /
reason for the drift to this colony. In Trinidad a labourer
could earn 1/3d. for a task, three of which could he per¬
formed in a day, while in Grenada and St. Vincent one
o o
shilling was received for a nine hour day. When crop
time was finished in Trinidad, labourers would return to
p9
their home islands, where dwellings and living was cheaper.
Establishment of steamship service in the 80's facilitated
this movement. Barbadian labourers also emigrated to
Trinidad in considerable numbers, but were never in favour
with the sugar proprietors. A reputation for truculence,
independence of spirit and reluctance to enter into con¬
tracts or remain for any length of time, made the Barbadian
30
little wanted on Trinidad sugar estates. A number of
Chinese also were introduced, about 4,000, by 1875, although
industrious and intelligent, they were difficult to manage
preferring to take up holdings or, more usually, becoming
31
shopkeepers.
Trinidad sugar estates never had sufficient labour
despite comparatively high wages and other inducements (all
livestock in the district of Naparima, was owned by coolies,
rzn
kept at the expense of sugar estates). Coolie immigration
continued /
continued throughout the half century and by 1900, ap¬
proximately 110,000 coolies had been introduced of whom
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some 18,000 had returned to India, taking savings with
them. In some cases individuals took back sums of over a
thousand pounds (not however from accumulated wages received
on sugar estates). These returning, apparently prosperous
coolies, did much to induce other coolies to emigrate to
the sugar colonies.
During the periods of deep depression in 1884 and 1894,
attempts to reduce wages in Trinidad were unsuccessful.
Labourers immediately left the sugar estates and the reduc¬
tion had to be cancelled. Planters had to fall back on
better supervised tasks and application for more coolie
35
immigrants.
The sugar industry in Jamaica, more than in any of the
other British West Indies colonies attributed its difficulties
to shortage of labour. The labour supply which had dis¬
integrated after Emancipation never responded to the needs
<7 /*
of the sugar industry during the remainder of the century.
The general claim of the sugar planter in Jamaica was
that labour was unwilling to work, and that the "orderly
well /
well "behaved old slave folks are dying out and being re¬
placed "by lazy vagabonds" and "persons turn out for a few
days in August and at Christmas who never handle a bill at
37
other times".
Bigelow, writing in 185 had attributed the depression
in the sugar industry to the result of the
"degraded estimate placed on every species of agri¬
cultural labour by the white population ... a pernicious
-ZQ
effect and an enervating example to the blacks"."
That there was a definite aversion, on the part of the
Jamaican negro, to labouring on sugar estates, more than
usual in the other colonies, is evident. Memories of
slavery receded more slowly than in most of the other colonies
The exodus from the sugar estates had been fairly complete
and rapid, without any period of adjustment such as had
existed in some of the other colonies as Barbados, Antigua
and St. Yincent where less available land confined the erst¬
while slaves to the estates. The negro labourer in Jamaica
tended to identify work on the sugar estates with slavery;
there had been no intermediate relationship experienced by
him /
him .
Besides this deepseated aversion, mixed with memories
of slaveiy there were other reasons for dislike of work on
the sugar estates. Jamaican planters never paid a wage
to attract the negro labourer, and on the slightest pretext
of economic difficulty wHieprone to reduce wages. During
the period of disturbances in 1864 - 5, during Governor
Eyre's term of office, planters reduced wages from 1/3d. to
1s. per day and increased tasks in the mill by enlarging
cyphones and pans, "only 7-9 could be done compared to 9-12
previously". The argument put forth by planters that the
negro would work only sufficient!, to obtain the necessaries
/
of life led them to adopt the attitude that if wages were
lowered the negro would work harder to attain the bare mini¬
mum necessary for the hand-to-mouth existence he desired.
To raise wages above this minimum was, according to the
planter, of no avail in inducing the labourer to work longer.
In addition to low wages, there was never steady work for the
negro labourer. Even in the period 1865 - 70, when sugar
production was prosperous and despite the diminished number
of estates and the increased population, sugar estates could
not /
4-1
not provide three or four days work per week.
Easily acquired land, continually "being augmented "by
the resumption of great areas for non-payment of
made available an attractive life of provision growing and
peasant settlement that drew off labour from the sugar es¬
tates.^ Unfortunately provision planting season was from
January to May and this was also the time of the sugar crop.
In the smaller sugar colonies provision grounds were usually
adjacent to the sugar estates, but in Jamaica were up to ten
4-'5
miles distant from place of labour. The best type of
negro labourer was generally conceded to be the mountain
peasant who was howevever not easily accessible to the sugar
estate. In some of the parishes as St. Elizabeth, part of
Manchester and St. James, where it was very dry, labourers
were desirous of attaining work on estates because provision
grounds were not profitable; however, sugar production also
suffered from the dryness, and estates had little work to
4-3
offer. Attempts to attract labour from centres where it
was plentiful to where it was in demand, never succeeded in
Jamaica, chiefly because of inadequate wages offered.
As in British Guiana and Trinidad, coolie immigration
had /
had "been introduced into Jamaica in the first half of the
century, "but never proved of great value in resuscitating
the sugar industry as it had done in the two above-mentioned
colonies. Almost from its incipiency in Jamaica, coolie
immigration was a burden on the revenue of the colony, and,
in addition, management of coolie introduction broke down.
Three times within the period 1855 - 1875, coolie immigration
was ceased. In 1858 the local Immigration Act authorised
indentures beyond the time permitted and was therefore promptly
disallowed.^ Failure to appoint an agent general of im¬
migration under salary conditions laid down by the Colonial
4-5
Office also brought cessation from 1865 - 66. ^ Another
cessation took place in 1870 because the compulsory require¬
ment that employers provide coolies with rations for three
months only and after that to be dependent on wages (rarely
Af)
1/- per day for a two to three day week) was inadequate.
By 1871, these matters had been corrected but difficulty
now arose as to the debt incurred for immigration. In
1865, the Colonial Office had refused to grant loans for
immigration owing to the poor state of Jamaican finances,^
(there still being loans outstanding from the hurricane grant
of /
of 1831). In 1866, an arrangement was made whereby cost
of immigration was to be apportioned, as in British Guiana.
This arrangement was not adhered to; planters who were to
have paid indenture feew by personal notes over a period of
five years, never fulfilled their part of the agreement.
The portion to have been paid for by export duties on sugar
and rum was also unpaid as the export of these products had
dropped to such an extent that the duty on them was far too
little to cover the portion they should have contributed.
By 1877, Governor Musgrove reported that the immigr¬
ation fund in Jamaica was insolvent,with a debt outstanding
AO
of £140,000. This attempt, as it were, to throw the full
cost of immigration on to the general revenue met with firm
opposition from the Colonial Office, coloured members in the
50
Legislature, and missionary elements in the colony.
In 1877, a deputation, consisting of persons opposed
to Coolie immigration into Jamaica, waited on Carnarvon,
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Secretary of State for Colonies. Their criticism was that
no need for imported labour existed in Jamaica if a decent
wage and steady work were provided. Instances of parishes
where surplus labour existed were given. In St. Mary*s
there /
there was such a surplus of labour as the result of abandon¬
ment of estates that labourers were appearing in the nude.
There had been 4,627 deaths out of the last 16,000 coolies
introduced and in the period, 1873 - 5, the immigration debt
had increased by £28,000. Practices 'as stoppages of pay,
holding back two weeks pay to ensure a return to work, in-
52
creasing task work without increase in pay, were all condemned.
Immigration controversy in Jamaica was mingled with many
inaccurate statements by planters, the local press "soi
disant" friends of the planters who attempted to represent
conditions in the colony as much distressed.
Allowing for contradictory evidence given, it is un¬
deniable that labour^ for the sugar estates was only given
in a haphazard manner by the negroes and that coolie labour
53
was inadequate for estates' needs.
In 1879, Musgrlve appointed a commission to report on
54
the state of the juvenile population of Jamaica. This
report and evidence taken gives a fairly accurate picture of
labour conditions on sugar estates in the vicinity of which
evidence was largely taken. The report does however mis¬
lead in that it would make the sugar industry the dominating
industry /
industry in the economic life of the island, where in truth,
sugar exports were giving place to other products. From
the report it seems that disintegration of the negro popul¬
ation, who contributed estate labour,was practically complete,
and that, apart from estates in Clarendon parish, coolies
were not in any great number on sugar estates. Estate
labour in some parts of the island was supplied by roving
gangs of young labourers, 14-16 years of age. These
"demoralized" gangs wandered from estate to estate sleeping
indiscriminately in trosh houses, and after remaining for
about a fortnight on a sugar estate, moved on. Usually
unskilled and indifferent, they contributed to the slovenly
air «^-~existed on most sugar estates. Women and children
were increasingly used; "pickaninny gangs" in charge of an .
elderly negress, were employed for trlsh gathering and rat
catching. Adult negro labourers were very few, preferring
their own provision grounds or growing bananas for the in-
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creasing market for this fruit in America. ^
There were places in Jamaica - Trelawny and Hamilton
parishes - where, on estates as Holland, Golden Grove and
Cobbs, the original negro barracks had been kept in repair
and /
and where slaves had not been driven off at the time of
56
Emancipation, A large negro village was permitted to
reside on these estates. As memories of slavery receded,
they became a sort of peasantry in the district, forming a
reliable labour supply. The superior prosperity of these
estates, especially Cobbs in Hamilton parish, was directly
57
attributable to this unusual condition.
On the other estates, where negroes had left at the
time of Emancipation, qiiarters for labourers had never been
maintained. Planters, prior to 1882, complained of the
house tax as being a deterrent to providing lodgings for
labourers. Other planters stated that even if houses were
provided, the labourer refused to live in them as detracting
from his sense of freedom, and would walk miles rather than
58
compromise this feeling of independence.
Labour conditions on the sugar estates in Jamaica were
further aggravated in the period of depression following
after 1884. In 1886, coolie immigration was temporarily
suspended at the instance of the newly elected coloured
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members of the reformed Jamaican Legislature. About the
same time a heavy exodus of labourers took place to the
Panama /
Panama Zone, where work had commenced on the Panama Canal.
Jamaica, being nearest to this project, geographically, lost
more able-bodies labourers than the other sugar colonies.
Approximately 25,000 Jamaicans were employed under the
French company when De Lessups suspended his operations.
When work was resumed by the United States, between 40 -
50,000 Jamaicans were working on the canal. Wages in the
Panama Zone were not high, #1.00 for a ten hour day, but
much more preferable to 9d. - 1s. a day for a three to four-
fiC)
day week on the sugar estates.
Some thousands of Jamaicans also went to Costa Rica
to work on the banana plantations there, others went to
Puerto Rico to work on railway construction. In Jamaica,
banana plantations, the Jamaica railroad and other public
works as the Rio lobre water works, all attracted labour.
Wages on all these projects were higher than those offered
on the sugar estates and evidence given by foremen in charge
of Jamaican labourers, spoke of their industry while labour-
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ing in these other fields.
As a result of these more desirable opportunities for
labourers, in the years following the collapse of sugar
prices /
3-"
prices in 1884, sugar estates in Jamaica were particularly
affected as need for economy was now greater than ever.
Attempts to reduce wages as an economy measure availed
little, although it should have been evident that higher
wages would have attracted sorely needed labour. As a
result of urgent appeals by sugar planters the local legis¬
lature advocated a renewal of coolie immigration^ and in
1891, an attempt was made to establish a form of contract
law, whereby negroes would be guaranteed certain conditions,
as were granted to coolies,, in return for a guarantee to
ry
work for a stated time and remuneration. No result accrued
from this contract law, it smacked too much of slavery for
the negro, who looked upon the indentured coolie as being
in such a state, and contempt for whom was expressed in the
bf-
term of "slave coolie".
With the failure of the contract law coolie immigration
was resumed and continued until 1897, when owing to a plague
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in India it was again suspended. This coolie immigration
was of little use, at this latter stage, in reviving the
sugar industry in Jamaica, and by this date coolies were in
greater demand on banana, than on sugar estates, sugar exports
having /
rr
having dropped to seventh place in the list of exports.
Labour difficulties in the smaller sugar islands of the
Leeward and Windward group were less pronounced. Coolie
immigration was carried on only to a minor degree and was
usually discontinued after a few desultory attempts.
Of the upwards of 4,000 coolies introduced into St.
Vincent and Antigua by 1880, but 250 remained at that date,
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the rest had left for other colonies or had died. In
1884, St. Vincent was still paying grudgingly for the ex~
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pense incurred in this brief period of coolie immigration.
In St. Lucia, the few thousand coolies introduced were more
successful in that crown land was available there and a
prosperous cane farming industry sprang up which contributed
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canes to the central factories established after 1870.
There was little need in the smaller colonies for coolie
labour. Abundant population and little available land,
plus discouragement of emigration, even to the extent of
ordinances making it a punishable offence to entice labour
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away, all tended to provide adequate labour for the sugar
estates. Wages were reduced from 20 - 25 per cent in these
small colonies during the serious depression periods of 1884
and /
and 1894, without serious incident, except in St. Kitts
in 1894, where a riot broke out over introduction of larger
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olarifiers ~ with no increased remuneration for task work.
Wages remained low throughout the half century and by the
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1890's were from 8d. to 10d. per day. Complaints were
frequent, of cutting and stopping of wages, and enlarging
tasks without increase of pay. In St. Vincent wages were
paid monthly, so labourers complained, to insure diligence,
planters, stated, however, that the labourer liked to have
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his pay accumulate. There was also a law in St. Vincent,
whereby a labourer who worked one day, was bound to work
five days by implied contract. When Antiguan labourers
tended to go to British Guiana in the late 1880's sugar plan¬
ters in that colony complained of the 'crimping' methods used
to entice them away and stated that only the able-bodied
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emigrated, leaving the decrepit women and children. The
proposal of the Governor in Antigua that a nursery be es¬
tablished for the children of parents who would thus be free
for estate labour was turned down by the planters, on the
ground of the increased tax involved in supporting such an
institution.^
On /
On the whole, these small islands could not attribute
their difficulties to the labour factor, as was done for
example in Jamaica.
Barbados, as in many other features, differed from the
other sugar colonies as regards labour supply. Although
labour was very abundant and Barbadians emigrated reluctantly,
there is not much evidence of abuse of this labour. Task
labour was largely prevalent in Barbados and was preferred
by labourers to day-wages. Amenities as provision grounds
at low rents, rum in crop time, and grinding the labourer's
cane, all tended to produce better relations between planter
and labourer. Apart from these factors there was a definite
feeling among Barbadians that they had roots in the island
Barbados in this respect is perhaps attributable to that
than any of the other British West Indies - over two-thirds,
compared to, for example, one-third in Jamaica. Planters
would to some extent in taking care of themselves, take more
care of the people in the colony. Skilled labourers were
common in Barbados, the Apprenticeship system and the train¬
ing /
and they were The peculiar position of
portion of resident planters
ing of skilled workmen, had not broken down so rapidly in
this colony as in many others. A soil of great fertility
and this skilled labour enabled the Barbadian sugar planter
to produce sugar more cheaply than anywhere else in the West
Indies.
Emigration of Barbadians did take place during the latter
half of the century because the sugar industry in that colony
found it physically impossible to employ all available labour,
and as the sugar industry was practically the sole industry
in the island there was no alternative employment.
Emigration of Barbadian labourers took place to the
Panama Canal, these workers however largely returned when
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work on that project ended. Many Barbadians also went
to Trinidad and British Guiana. Their aversion to contract
made them less preferred to the indentured coolie, although
no
superior skill was undeniable. In British Guiana, where
2,793 Barbadians went in 1872 - 3, refusal to live in ranges
on the estates, and a susceptibility to malaria, plus a
serious riot of Barbadian labourers in Dutch Surinam, all
tended to prejudice sugar planters against the Barbados
immigrant. Emigration agents were not encouraged in
Barbados /
Barbados, although one from Tobago was appointed to Barbados
in 1870, but as Tobago was about the most depressed sugar
colony at this period, little attraction existed for labour
OA
in that colony. It was found that immigrants from Bar¬
bados settled down much better if they were employed by a
planter who was, himself, formerly a resident of Barbados.
This was evident in the case of St. Kitts-Nevis where Bar¬
badian labourers were employed by men like Sir Graham Briggs,
81
who previously came from Barbados. In the other colonies,
where little understanding of the Barbadian's disposition
existed, and of how competition in his home island, had
sharpened his wits, the opinion, as expressed, was that
Op
"Barbadians when they leave the island are cheeky".
The usually good relations between employer and labourer
in Barbados were marred in the 1870's by an epidemic of cane
fires ~ attributable to various motives as revenge or, to
hasten cane cutting. Whatever the true motive, the practice
of insuring cane crops, which began in the late 1870's, brought
a marked decrease in cane fires. This decrease was attrib¬
uted to the realization on the part of the culprits, that




In regard to Coolie immigration into the British West
Indies, it is undeniable, from the manner in which it was
assisted by loans and by being a charge to a great extent
on the general revenue of the colonies concerned that it
was in the nature of a bounty to the sugar industry.
In British Guiana the general revenue contributed one-
third of the cost of immigration, the other two-thirds was
raised by indenture fees paid by the planters by a personal
note payable over five years, and by export duties on sugar
and rum. A similar arrangement existed in Trinidad and
Jamaica. In the latter colony however, the full charge
was ultimately thrown on to the general revenue, by 1884
amounting to £210,800.
In the crisis of 1894, additional assistance was given
to British Guiana and Trinidad. The Government took over,
in the case of British Guiana, two-thirds instead of the
former one-third of the cost of immigration. In Trinidad
assistance was given in the nature of a special grant, and,
by extending time for payment of planters' notes. Jamaican
planters already were receiving full assistance and little
additional /
additional help could be expected in the matter of immig-
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ration expenditure in this colony.
Coolie immigration from India into the British West
Indies did not come in unfailing numbers whenever the sugar
colonies so desired it, but rather was it determined by con¬
ditions in India, as for instance a bad harvest there in
1870, a demand for coolies on the tea plantations in Assam
and Burma, in the late 1880's and, a plague in 1897, which
effectively stopped immigration to Jamaica for a number of
years; all caused a diminution or cessation of coolie im¬
migration into the British West Indies for a time.8^
Transport of coolies from the East provided opportunities
for a number of mercantile firms as Sandbach, Parker and
Company and Booker Brothers, to employ their ships in bring-
ing back»to the British West Indies, chiefly to British
an
Guiana. The fairly advantageous rate for Carrying coolies
had added inducement in that import of rice could be carried
on in conjunction with coolie intake and the sailing ships
found a profitable business in this trade, in which steam¬




On the whole coolie immigration was carried on with a
minimum of mortality - an average of approximately 4 per
cent. This transport was entirely done by sailing ships
in the 19th century, and regulations were followed with a
minimum of friction. The adoption of Thiers Automatic
Ship Ventilator, in 1879, in coolie emigrant vessels further
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reduced possibility of mortality.
In some of the West Indian colonies attempts to solve
labour problems resulted in adopting an arrangement known
as Metayage, which was introduced from the French West
90
Indies shortly after the mid-century. Metayage originated
as a result of the inability of some sugar planters to pay
wages, and was a compromise whereby labourers shared proceeds
91
with the planter in lieu of wages. Under the metairee
system labourers cut the cane, did all cultivation and pro¬
vided all manual work involved in manufacturing. The sugar
proprietor under the system provided all equipment, stock
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and the manufactory. The sugar made was usually divided
in halves, the planter generally purchasing the metayer's
93
share of sugar.
In Tobago, where metayage was most common, it was
estimated /
estimated that "by 1884, two-thirds of the sugar estates in
that colony would have been abandoned but for the adoption
94
of this system, The bankruptcy of the house of Gilespie
in Tobago in 1884 had nearly ruined many estates, the greater
number of estates in the island being in the hands of this
firm. The reduced circumstances and difficulties of these
estates had led their proprietors to take up metayage which
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had already a foothold in the island. Metayage took hold
in a few of the other islands of the Windward group, as St.
Lucia and Grenada. In Barbados there was no need for meta¬
yage and in Jamaica negro labourers expressed a feeling of
96
dislike for the implied contract in the arrangement.
On the whole, metayage was only a temporary palliative.
In Tobago where most common, the Administrator, reporting
in 1874, had stated that -
"the present effete and obsolete system cannot last
97
and the planters are gradually being ruined by it".
The Royal Commission of 1883 - 4, had remarked that the
QQ
system was anything but a success. Many of the metayers
complained of a need for written agreements, and were
suspicious /
suspicious and exacting as to the price of the sugar they
99
sold to the proprietor. The sugar planter, for his part,
was usually critical of the cultivation, and abuse of his
stock and equipment, and, in cases where he ground a portion
of his own cane, interruptions to grind the metayer's cane
was a source of irritation.The chief reason for the
metayer system falling into disrepute was the lack of any
stated laws on the subject. Custom being adopted instead,
there was dissatisfaction on the part of both parties to the
101
arrangement. There was also a feeling, remarked on by
Governor Barkly of British Guiana in 1858, that the adoption
of metayage was tantamount to admission of failure of a
102
sugar estate, and loss of prestige was involved.
By the 1890's metayage had practically disappeared in
the few colonies where it had obtained. In Tobago .where
it still existed to a diminishing extent,at a meeting of
labourers.in 1897 a resolution was passed to the effect that
metayage was ruinous to the island and that cane farming
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should be substituted.
Cane farming, more successful than metayage, did not
develop until the end of the century, when it began in
Trinidad /
Trinidad and St. Lucia where there were central factories.
Under the system of cane farming, the labourer grew
canes, on land he owned, rented or lea,sed, and sold these
canes to a nearby factory, usually at so much per ton of
canes.
A few attempts were made to establish cane farming in
British Guiana, where there were large factories. The vast
drainage system could not be supported by small cane growers,
and estates were blocked in such a manner as to leave no
available location for the independent cane farmer. At
La Bonne Intention estate where the Colonial Company started
cane farming on a small scale in the 1890's, difficulty was
experienced in arriving at a basis of payment for canes.
Punts with their loads of cane, could not be weighed as
land carts and attempts to keep lots of cane separate in
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passing through the mill entailed much time and bother.
In Trinidad and, to a lesser extent, St. Lucia, cane
farming was taken up by indenture-served coolies. In
Trinidad there was a quick development and by 1902, cane
farmers were contributing over half the cane prodticed in
that colony.
Sugar /
Sugar proprietors in Trinidad objected to cane farming
as attracting labour away from sugar estates. By 1896, in
one district in Trinidad the production of sugar from sugar
estates was stated to have been reduced by 23% as a result
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of labourers turning to cane farming. Many coolies put
themselves in the hands of rapacious money lenders of their
own race in order to take up cane farming in Trinidad.
Practical difficulties found in cane farming were -
transportation costs limited the extension of cane farming
in any one area - cost of transportation from field to fac-
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tory was reckoned at as much as 30% of the value of the cane.
A satisfactory basis of payment for cane received at the cen¬
tral factory was still not found by 1900. Purchasers of
the cane claimed that weight in itself was no indication of
sucrose content. The use of the polariscope was tried,
but oane farmers did not understand its principle, and were
suspicious, and, in addition, the polariscope test of cane
juice could only be used if each lot of cane was put through
the mill separately. Central factories found it unwise to
rely solely on cane farmers for their supply of cane because
of irregularity of delivery. For example, the supply of
canes /
canes delivered "by cane farmers1 at one central factory in
Trinidad in '1900, were Feb, 24 - 92 tons; Feb. 25-164 tons;
and Feb, 26 - 545 tons, ^
The subject of cane farming really belongs to the 20th
century and is therefore outside the scope of this thesis.
Until central factories were established there was little
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AMALGAMATION OF ESTATES; CONSIGNEE SYSTEM,
AND GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN MARKET.
In addition to those developments that took place in
manufacturing, cultivation and in the labour supply of the
British West Indies Sugar industry, which were accentuated
in the years immediately following the great drop in the
price of sugar in 1884, another trend was also evident.
In the latter half of the 19th century there was a
noticeable trend in most of the British West Indies colonies
towards a purely commercial and speculative attitude in
regard to sugar production. The traditional sentimental
attitude to old family estates which had been seriously af¬
fected by the liquidation of property and withdrawal of
capital in the years following Emancipation,,and during the
crises of the late 1840's and early 1850's continued to be
weakened throughout the century.
Reduction in the number of estates and amalgamation in
the hands of fewer owners was associated with this trend
and was most marked in the case of British Guiana and least
so in Barbados.
In British Guiana the change had begun early and by
1870, amalgamation had proceeded to such an extent that of
the 404 sugar estates in cultivation at the time of
Emancipation /
Emancipation, there were "but 135 remaining - a reduction
in number effected chiefly by the unions of two or more
estates under one management and with one set of machinery
and buildings, where adjacent estates had come into the po-
•i
ssession of the same proprietor.
About fourteen or fifteen of these estates had the
proprietor or part proprietor residing on and managing them
Eighty-five were entirely owned by proprietors not resident
in the colony. The remaining thirty-five or thirty-six
were at least partially owned by colonists who were either
merchants, estateattorneys, or in some cases, managers of
other estates. Among the non-resident proprietors, the
largest holder was the Colonial Company with nine large
estates. Messrs. Daniels of Bristol, also owned nine es¬
tates; Messrs. James Ewing, Messrs. Sandbach, Parker and
Company, Messrs. Bosanquet, Curtis and Company, and other
well-established houses as Booker Bros., Barber and Company
and Winter and Preston, either by themselves or their part¬
ners individually held a large portion of the remainder.
Perhaps fifty out of the eighty-five estates owned entirely
out of the colony were in the hands of such merchants, and
these /
these included nearly all the largest, finest and best
cultivated estates in the colony/2
The extent to which these same houses held mortgages
upon the remaining estates is difficult to ascertain, but
the tendency of estates in British Guiana, since Emancipation,
had been to fall into their hands and the process was con¬
tinuing. By 1870, three fourths of the attorney'business
in British Guiana was in the hands of such firms, as for
example, McCalman and Hadow who were attorneys for eight
estates and Sandbach Parker and Company who,in addition to
the three large estates they owned,acted as attorney for
3
four others.
The resident proprietors .in British Guiana had all
purchased, not inherited their estates, and there did not
seem to be any strong feeling among these owners in favour
of treating an estate as a family property by devising it
to a single heir ~ a thing moreover which could not be ef¬
fected under Dutch colonial law, as prevailed in British
Guiana, except by an application of the doctrine of elec¬
tion.^ Since a sugar estate was of little value if broken
up, the death of a proprietor in British Guiana was frequently
followed /
followed by a sale. This difficulty, under Dutch law ex¬
plains why most sugar estates in British Guiana, even those
not in the hands of a mercantile firm, were held in the form
of limited companies by the end of the century. Members
of a family, faced with the division of an estate, found it
more feasible to form a limited company for the management
5
of the property. Most of the old families had disappeared
by the mid-century who were formerly associated with British
Guiana and by 1870, there was only one Dutch proprietor,
C. J. Van der Ondermenter, left in the colony, descendant
g
from the former planters of that nationality.
Upon the whole, the aspect of the sugar industry in
British Guiana in the second half of the century, was ex¬
clusively commercial. Utility, economy and the latest
manufacturing appliances constituted the chief features of
a sugar estate in British Guiana by 1884, when it was stated
that a fall in the price of sugar by a penny per pound would
cause the best estate in British Guiana to lose money, so
7
closely had the margin between profit and loss been drawn.
Amalgamation of estates under the ownership of large
West India firms had been largely carried out during the
years /
&
years 1840 ~ 55, when Governor Barkly reporting to Grey in
1851, had stated that -
"at least one fourth of the sugar plantations have within
the last two or three years, been taken into execution and
sold publicly at prices which brought the land to an average
of 40s, per acre, throwing buildings, machinery and all in¬
vested capital into the bargain".0
The low prices at which these estates had been purchased
enabled their owners to realize large profits during the more
stable period of the 60's and 70*s. Evidence of this pros¬
perity is given in chapter 3 p. g£-7- . A few other exam¬
ples of profitable estates are - Great Diamond estate, pur¬
chased in 1848 by Messrs. Steele and Loxdale for £2,000,
which by 1870, was producing 1,800 hogsheads of sugar and
9
was valued at between £40 - 50,000. Plantations Eccles
and Peters Hall purchased for a total of £4,800 in the same
year had been united into one estate which by 1870, was pro¬
ducing 1,600 hogsheads of sugar worth £56,000. Albion
estate, in Berbice, purchased by Cavan Bros, in 1847, for a
mere £200 was by 1870, one of the finest estates in the
colony /
10
colony, as a result of improvements made on it.
Amalgamation of sugar estates in British Guiana con¬
tinued throughout the century, and profits continued to "be
made, although decreasingly after 1884 when accentuated "beet
sugar competition took place. For example, Mr. Richter, a
London business man, who purchased Rismes estate in 1879 for
£13,500, reported that "it paid for itself twice during the
A A
first ten or eleven years".
As in the other colonies, abandonment of estates in
British Guiana, as stated by witnesses before Royal Com¬
missions of 1878 - 9, 1889, and 1897, was in many cases really
the uniting of one estate to another more productive and the
pooling of machinery and linking up of the trenches of the
12
drainage system. Diamond estate, the largest in British
Guiana, represented the amalgamation of five estates, as did
likewise Bal Air. Ewing's Sugar Estates Company owned a
great estate on the east coast of Demerara known as Fry-
heeds Lust, which was really a block of estates, some of which
1 3
had formerly been reported as abandoned. Amalgamation of
estates usually meant a decrease in cultivated acreage but
did not necessarily signify a decrease in production, because
of /
of "better cultivation and concentration on the remaining
acreage. For example, between 1886 and 1897, the Colonial
Company decreased their cultivated acreage by some thousands
of acres as a result of abandoning some of their less suit¬
able land. The total production of sugar however increased
by some 6 - 10,000 tons, as a result of concentrated culti-
14-
vation and more modern manufacturing applicances. In the
district of Berbice there were thirteen estates producing
sugar in 1882, only seven of these were in existence by
1898, and the production of these seven almost equalled the
1 5
former thirteen.
Amalgamation of estates and reduction in numbers never
ceased, and by the end of the century there were in British
Guiana but 90 sugar estates listed as such, of the 150 sugar
estates in existence in 1865.''^
In Trinidad similar amalgamation of estates occurred.
In the earlier part of the 19th century sugar estates were
outlined along the western part of the southeastern coast, ?
—
chiefly because there was easy shipment to Port of Spain.
After the abolition of slavery many small muscovado estates}
less favourably situated and lacking labour, had succumbed,
especially /
especially in the Toco and Mayaro districts. Cocoa and
coconuts replaced sugar on many of these small estates.
Sugar from the mid-century, tended to concentrate (where it
is today) in the drier and sunnier areas along the west part
of the island ~ especially in the coiinties of Carom, Victoria,,
part of St. George and in the Naporima district.'18
By 189 practically all the sugar estates in Trinidad
were in the hands of a few individuals and firms. Thirteen
alone were in the hands of the Colonial Company and Burnley
and Company, Greig and Company, Messrs. Turnhull and Com¬
pany, Sir Chas. Tennant, and the Lamont family, were the
19
other principal owners.
Amalgamation and reduction in a number of sugar estates
in Trinidad was largely a process of natural selection. Most
of the estates, which went out of sugar cultivation, had pro¬
duced only muscovado sugar and were too small to warrant the
cost of erecting modern machinery and appliances, or there
was a lack of funds to carry them on.
The Lamont family's acquisition of property in the second
half of the century, is a good example of what took place in
the island. This family concentrated on choice sugar areas
in /
in the Naporima district "by purchasing old muscovado estates,
scrapping machinery, cultivating only the "best land and
p o
tagging them on to adjacent actively cultivated estates.
In Trinidad central factories were first established in the
West Indies, and this development tended to concentrate cane
cultivation into more compact areas. The great Usine St.
Madeline estate owned "by the Colonial Company, and comprising
an area of 4,000 acres, formerly consisted of a number of
91
small muscovado estates.
Trinidad, British Guiana reflected a business like air
in its sugar industry and the historian Frolide visiting
Trinidad in 1887 had remarksd that there was "a set of people
here on a better level with the times than the old-fashioned
22
aristocracy in the other islands." Reduction in number
of sugar estates in Trinidad was from 110 in 1865 to 56 by
23
the end of the century.
Jamaica next to British Guiana exemplified most this
reduction in number of sugar estates. By 1865, one-half of
the 600 sugar estates in cultivation at the time of Emancip¬
ation were "either abandoned or converted into grazing pens".^'
The process of natural selection had been the cause of the
abandonment /
abandonment of most estates, up to 1865 This process of
natural selection continued throughout the remainder of the
century. By 1875, the number of sugar estates were 244 and
by 1896, there were but 140 remaining of the 600 at Emancip-
25
ation. In some parishes extinction of sugar was complete
or nearly so. For example in St. Mary's parish, in 1875,
there were thirty sugar estates cultivated, by 1897, there
2 6
were but two.
As already stated, the shift of sugar cultivation in
Jamaica was towards the western and more dry parishes of the
island and even in these districts the number of estates was
much reduced. In Westmore land, of the sugar estates at the
beginning of the century, there were but 15 remaining in
1897.27
Although reduction in the number of estates in Jamaica
throughout the 19th century had taken place largely as a
result of abandonment of the poorer unprofitable estates,
reduction of numbers also took place as a result of the
amalgamation of estates sold through the Encumbered Estates
Court, and which were concentrated in fewer hands - (chiefly
28
consignee merchants) than previously.
The /
The speculative commercial attitude remarked on in
the case of British Guiana and Trinidad, was also present
in Jamaica, hut labour difficulties chiefly, prevented
successful enterprise in this colony. However, the im¬
provements that were made in Jamaica, in the matter of in¬
stalling centrifugals and open steam pans, were chiefly
effected by the merchant firms who had acquired holdings
through the Encumbered Estates Court. Many of the old
family estates as Worthy Park, Spring Garden, Harmony Hall
and Bushey Park estates had passed out of the hands of
families long associated with Jamaica into the ownership
of firms who converted them into grazing pens, logwood and
pimento estates, or, if remaining in sugar cultivation, in-
oq
stalled centrifugals and open steam pans.
Abandonment of sugar estates in Jamaica did not signify
a great decrease in cultivated adreage, nor did decreased
cane acreage mean a commensurate drop in sugar production.
The abandonment of Holland estate (formerly Gladstone's)
containing 10,000 acres, meant a loss of but 300 acres of
30
cane cultivation. The abandonment of four sugar estates
31
in 1879 meant a loss of only 323 hogsheads of sugar.' Many
such /
such, sugar estates were in only a partially cultivated es¬
tate when abandoned. From 1875 - 95, cane cultivation in
Jamaica decreased from 48,246 acres to 30,971 acres, but
32
sugar production practically remained the same.
During the second half of the century, the resumption
of land by the Crown, for non-payment of quit rent, also
extincted many former sugar estates. Patents of land
granted by the Crcwn, in the early years of the colony, were
made, subject to the payment of annual quitrent by the
grantees. Payment of quitrent had never been punctual, and
when depression hit the colony after Emancipation, it vir¬
tually ceased. The loss of revenue in unpaid quitrent and
the anomaly of vast acreages lying uncultivated was first
dealt with by Sir John Grant, Governor of Jamaica (j w, .)
On his initiative the forfeiture of this land was begun and
continued throughout the century. By the end of the cen¬
tury, although thousands of acres had been resumed by the
Crown, there were still over 200,000 acres liable to forfeit¬
ure. The resumption of such land, as has been mentioned,
increased available acreage on which labourers could settle
33
and aggravated the labour shortage.
Reduction /
Reduction in the number of sugar estates in the smaller
colonies of the Leewards and Windward groups, was also mar¬
ked. The colony of Grenada, by 1900, had experienced the
total extinction of 119 sugar estates that existed at the
34
time of Emancipation." In Tobago, Dominica and Montserrat,
the small muscovado sugar estates were severely hit in 1884
and as no attempt to improve had been made, they were in a
35
hopeless position and quickly collapsed."^ Grenada, by
36
1897, was importing instead of exporting sugar. Decline
of sugar production in St. Vincent had been brought about
by the definite policy of the principal proprietors, Messrs.
Porter (see chapter who refused to invest further capital
and improve in the face of falling prices, preferring to
37
wait on event a.
Antigua, ideally suited to sugar cultivation from the
viewpoint of fertile soil and flatness of fields, tended to
the modern commercial attitude, and sugar production here,
by 1887, was.stated to be more and more a "manufacturing
industry" as the result of "commercial men exercising close
■ZO
control over estates""'" they had purchased ~ many through
the Encumbered Estates Court. By 1900, there were stated to
be /
"be .78 sugar estates in the colony but some of these were
grouped together and worked as one, and if this is taken
into account, the number of sugar estates was actually 53 -
39
compared to a total of 107 in 1865.
Is in the other sugar colonies, the sugar industry in
Antigua was largely in the hands of a few firms, Lee Crerar
and Company, Messrs. Boddington and Fryer and Company being
the largest proprietors. The acquisitions of these firms
40
were principally made through the Encumbered Estates Court.
In St. Kitts and Nevis, abandonment and amalgamation
of estates was not marked. Messrs. Swings, with large in¬
terests in St. Kitts, stated they would gladly have joined
their estates, but these were too scattered to do so, and
costly management resulted because of separate and duplicated
41
services.
In Barbados reduction in the number of sugar estates
was less than in any of the colonies. Of the 500 sugar es¬
tates in active cultivation at the time of Emancipation there
were 440 remaining in the 1890's. This small reduction,
which was gradual to 1884, was accentuated after that date,
chiefly by a number of estates in Chancery being broken up
and /
and sold in small lots.^2
The trend towards ""big business" was never common in
Barbados, and in 1897, there were but 19 estates of the
4-3
440 in the island, owned by public companies. The re¬
maining 421 estates were owned by private persons.^ There
had been no concentration of a number of estates in the
hands of one mercantile firm, apart from the case of Messrs.
Daniels and Company, who owned nine (in liquidation in 1897)
There were however many cases of private ownership of more
than one estate, although little erpohoG of amalgamation of
46these estates into one."1"" The accepted method in Barbados
appears to have been to scatter one's property ~ contrary
to the usual English method of concentrating it. This
feature of Barbadian land tenure may have arisen from an
attempt to catch the advantages of rainfall, at least on
some estates if not on others, the rainfall in Barbados bein
curiously variable.^ There was also for the greater part
of the century keen competition to acquire land in Barbados
and acquisition was made, whenever the opportunity arose,
with disregard to whether areas weie always contiguous to
property already owned. The high cost of property in
Barbados /
Barbados, .approximately £100 per acre for most of the
century, made large areas very costly to purchase. One
of the many examples of this dispersal of property is that
of the eight Alleyne estates, scattered throughout six of
the eleven parishes in the island.^8
This scattered holding of land in Barbados, in addition
to discouraging amalgamation of estates, also deterred the
development of central factories when their establishment was
urged in the 90's. It was not always possible to obtain
a consensus of opinion favourable to supporting central
factories in any one block of estates of sufficient area
4-9
to maintain a central factory.
The traditional patriarchal air, if it ever existed to
any degree in the British West Indies, was still to be
found in Barbados. Barbadians looked upon the island as a
home as well as a place from which to obtain an income.
Two-thirds of-the Barbadian proprietors were resident, and
their pride in the colony seems to have been transmitted to
50
the labouring population."" Whatever the many reasons were
for its existence, there was a definite ethos in Barbados
different from the purely commercial speculative attitude
as existed in British Guiana.
P1
The over-all effect of abandonment and amalgamation
of sugar estates in the British West Indies was a reduction
in the number of sugar estates from approximately 2,200 at
51
the time of Emancipation to between 750 - 800 by 1900.
A noticeable effect of amalgamation of sugar estates in
the hands of mercantile firms was a waning of the old con¬
signee system, which had been a marked feature of the sugar
industry in the British West Indies, almost from its begin¬
ning. Merchant firms taking over sugar estates became their
own consignee with no longer a need for the old system of
advances, mortgages and commissions. By 1870, thirty per
cent of British Guiana sugar was coming home to its owner,
and by the end of the century, the consignee system in the
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old-fashioned sense, had disappeared in British Guiana.
Similarly, in Trinidad and Jamaica, sugar was coming
home to the large firms who owned the sugar estates, often
in their own ships, as in the case of Prentice, Service and
Henderson Cavan Bros,, Bosanquet Curtes and Company and
Messrs, Daniels. Some of these firms were carrying home
the sugar of adjacent estates in addition to their own.-''5
A number of the large West Indda houses as Sandbach
Parker /
Parker and. Company and the Colonial Company sold their sugar
5A
directly to the refiner, as, for example, Tate's of London.
But "by the end of the century, practically all these houses,
whether their sugar went to the United Kingdom or the United
States, sold through the medium of the large produce brokers
who, in London, were centred in Mincing Lane and Tower Street
and, if in Glasgow, in Queen Street and dealt through the
55
Greenock Sugar Exchange.
By the end of the century, the entire sugar production
of British Guiana - 110,000 tons out of total British West
Indies production of 235,000 tons, was in the hands of six
mercantile firms, who, in turn, sold through Czarnikow and
Company, and Booker Bros, of Mincing Lane,^ Czarikow and
Company, sugar brokers throughout the 19th century, were, by
far the largest firm, and by 1900, had agencies in New York
end Montreal. lost West India houses found it to their
advantage to sell sugar through these large sugar brokers
who had cosmopolitan connections and wide experience. Even
the Colonial Company, owner of large estates and central
factories which had long ^old thol.r sugar directly to re¬
finers both ill the United States and in the United Kingdom,
ceased /
ceased handling their own sugar and went over to Cznarikow
57
and Company in 1897.
The consignee connection still existed in many instances
between sugar proprietors and the United Kingdom merchant,
hut only a small proportion of total sugar produced in the
British West Indies, by the end of the century, was sold
under this system. Where the consignee system was still
in effect, chiefly in the smaller colonies and to some ex¬
tent in Jamaica, evidence given in 1897, showed that the
old charges were still paid by the sugar planter connected
with the consignee merchant - viz. 6 per cent on advances,
plus 21/2 per cent on sugar sold, and Vz per cent for brokerage.
The usual 5 per cent on estates supplies scarcely entered
into the picture by the 1890*s the local merchant supplying
58
these requirements to the estates in most cases.
A more noticeable weakening of the consignee system and
business connection of the British West Indies sugar industry
with the United Kingdom, was brought about by the growth of
the' United States market, and developments in more speedy
communication and ocean transport.
Exports of British West Indies sugar to the United
States /
States increased from a yearly average of 14,523 tons in
the period 1865 - 8 to 38,119 tons in the period 1872 - 4.
By 1887, 194,920 tons of sugar out of a total production
of 336,016 tons were exported to the United States, and "by
1900 over two thirds of British West Indies sugar exports
59
were to the United States.*'
Various influences "brought about this increased export
of sugar to the United States. The alteration of duties
in that country in 1872 was such as to favour the American
refining industry and thus British West Indies unrefined
sugar, most of which was muscovado, came in under the lower
scale of duties. British Guiana vacuum pan proprietors, by
making a dark grey refining crystal, also had an advantage
in the United States market, but sold their yellow crystals
to the specialized market in the United Kingdom because this
lighter coloured sugar,fit for immediate consumption,was
fin
liable to prohibitive dnities in the United States.
The removal of sugar duties in the United Kingdom in
1874, and the increasing but sugar competition in the home
market caused West Indies sugar producers to prefer the
United States market. Hereicontinental beet sugar was at
a /
a disadvantagej being subject to a higher duty than mus¬
covado and, in addition, freight charges from the West Indies
to the United States were approximately one fifth to one-
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quarter of what they were to the United Kingdom. With
the great drop in the price of sugar after 1884, the sugar
producers in the British West Indies found it more profitable
to the extent of usually £2 per ton, to send sugar to the
United States market, despite the 40 per cent duty it was
subject to in that country.
Finally, the factors of geographical nearness to the
United States, and the large amount of trade done with that
country, especially in foodstuffs brought close association.
Ships returning to the United States from South America and
the West Indies were desirous of return cargoes and allowed
favourable freight changes to obtain them.
By 1866 American importers of sugar were sending down
agents to the British West Indies to buy sugar on the spot.
By 1879, it was stated that, as regards St. Kitts-Nevis,-
"those sugar proprietors who are not tied to English
merchants dispose of their crops to purchasers for the
United States market and realize £2 or £3 per hogshead on
the /
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the price obtained in the United Kingdom."
The annual report for Antigua (1882) shows that ap¬
proximately half the sugar exports from that colony went to
the United States and stated that -
"it is significant evidence of the extent to which the
growers of sugar have "become free from the control of
English consignees".^
(This observation is not necessarily accurate because sugar
consigned to the consignee merchant could still be sold and
controlled by him even if it went to America).
The Royal Commission on Finance, 1883 - 4, in evidence
taken, reports that -
"everywhere one goes one sees American buyers" and that
"the American market is a great boon even with the heavy
duty". ^:>
Resentment was expressed to this Commission by planters in
the various colonies, who were tied to the English merchant
and who had to forego the higher prices offered by American
buyers /
i 66buyers.
Sugar exported to the United States appears to have
been sold to that market by any of three methods.
There were the large West India houses, as in British
Guiana and Trinidad, who had their sugar conveyed direct to
the hew York market, sometimes in their own ships, but in¬
creasingly by means of the regular steamship lines that were
established after 1870. These firms, some of whom were
acting as consignee merchants, usually sold through the
American agencies of the large brokers as Cznarikow and
Booker Bros, and their sugar was usually unloaded directly
into refineries on the water front in hew York.^'
In addition to this more direct method, local merchants
in the colonies wexe acting as agents for American commission
merchants and obtaining for them shipments of sugar purchased
from the smaller sugar proprietor and also from consignee
merchants who were selling to the American market. The
American Commission merchant charged a round commission,
usually per cent for selling the sugar1, and gave his West
Indian agent - the local merchant, a portion of it, in some
instances /
68
instances, as low as Vz per cent. JlJ The local merchant
did little more than contact those sugar proprietors desir¬
ous of selling their produce and made certain that the sugar
was available for shipping to the United States when wanted.
Advances to sugar proprietors were not usually made by these
local merchants. With the establishment of the telegraph
in 1871, and daily price quotations received, and the speedy
transport to the United States market, account sales were
usually had within a matter of, at the most, a few weeks
and there was thus less need for advances. In many
respects the position of the local merchant, acting as agent
for the American commission merchant, was similar to that of
the "commissioner" or factor, in the French West Indies, xvho
had long handled the sale of sugar from those colonies with¬
out any financial responsibility - merely acting as a local
broker.
The third method of purchase of sugar for the American
market, which seems to have been widespread during the late
1860*s and 70fs, was that of American agents who came to the
colonies in person and bid for the proprietors' sugar on the
71
spot. For the small planter who was put in possession of
funds /
funds immediately this must have been a refreshing experience
in comparison to long tedious delay under the consignee sys¬
tem, The forwarding of sugar to the English merchant "by
the sugar planter and the drawing of hills on him for what
he thought the sugar was worth and the arrival, perhaps
months later, of account sales, itemizing proceeds and various
charges were now needless. Charges, as commission for sales,
brokerage, insurance and dock charges all part of the
"phlebotomizing" process were avoided, or seemingly so, by
72
the sugar planter who sold to the American agent.
This practice of selling sugar to American agents on the
spot appears to have given way to the method of having a
local merchant acting as agent although there is still re¬
ference to these American buyers up to the end of the century.
During the season 1881 - 2, the bulk of the crop of St. Kitts-
Nevis went to the United States and was sold through these
"American speculators in the local market". In the 1890's,
when American sugar cartels were being established, planters
comrjlaincd of the lack of competition among the American
buyers and stated that "they bought as a man".
Coinciding with the growth of the American market, the
development /
development of steamships and the establishment of telegraphic
75
service in 1871 tended also to effect the merchandising of
sugar and to lower cost of transport of sugar.
The increase of steamship traffic in the West Indies was
raped. For example, in Jamaica in 1876, 216 steamships
entered ports of that colony, in comparison to 641 sailing
ships; by 1881 the figures were respectively 382 and 333.'^
By 1879, regular steamship connection was established between
77
Jamaica and New York, and in evidence given in 1884, by
Messrs. Ker, pioneers of the steam carrying trade in Jamaica
shows that most of the sugar carrying trade from Montego Bay
no
(the chief export area for sugar) was being done by steamers."'
This sugar was transported in steamships to the United King¬
dom at a rate of 50 - 55s. per ton compared to 60 - 65s. per
79
ton by sailing ships.
Much of this growing steamship traffic was to the United
States where after 1884, the greater quantity of sugar went.
American steamships and sailing vessels returning from
bringing down cargoes of food and timber products were call¬
ing at the various islands seeking cargo and, as was stated,
80
"competition among the Yankees" tended to keep freights down.
The /
The Pickford and Black line of steamers "between Georgetown
and New York, the agency for which was held hy Sandhach.
Barter and Company, complained of these American vessels
seeking cargo and remarked, "they will hold over if there
81
is a chance of getting one".
With increasing steamship traffic, it was found that
existing harbour and navigational facilities were inadequate.
All the ports were in the Windward and protected side of the
QO
islands and were not necessarily the best harbours. 1 Most
of these ports had insufficient depth of water even for
sailing ships, to load at the wharf, and lighterage was
usually necessary. For many years the bulk of sugar from
the sugar colonies had gone to Bttstol and as the Avonmouth
did not permit of passage of vessels over 500 tons' , West
India ships were usually never more than this tonnage and
harbour facilities in the 'West India ports were fairly ade¬
quate to the needs of such sailing vessels. By the 1880's
steamships of tonnage of up to 3,000 were entering the har¬
bours to take on sugar cargo. In all the ports of the
British West Indies, there were only, at the most, three
ports where steamships could dock at the pier - Castries in
St. /
St. Lucia, Kingston, Jamaica and Georgetown, British Guiana.
Most of the sugar exported from Jamaica was loaded in the
Bay of Lucy and Montego Bay on the northwest coast and here
85
lighterage v/as necessary. At Georgetown, docking facili¬
ties were handicapped in that a bar across the Demerara
river made crossing dangerous for ships of anything but the
8 6
smallest tonnage,"'1" and Castries in St. Lucia was but a
P *7
minor port for the shipment of suga.r. '' At all other ports
in the British West Indies steamships had to dock in the
88
open roadstead,""0 At the harbour of St. Johns, Antigua,
steamers anchored two miles out, and similarly at Bridgetown
Barbados (prior to harbour improvements in the 1880's) and
89
at Kingstown in St. Vincent.
Due to the short distances between the islands, steam¬
ships endeavoured to journey between the island at night in
90
order to make use of the daylight hours for loading.'
However, customs hours did not permit of this being done to
the best advantage, especially in the Leewards and Windward
91
group. Customs hours were usually from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m.
If a steamier arrived at 3 p.m. or later it meant remaining
over until next day. Vexatious customs hours and the dif¬
ferent /
ferent rates of harbour dues and export duties of the
various British West Indies colonies, did not cause so much
difficulty when only sailing vessels were used and were sent
out to some port and returned home without calling at other
92
ports. But, by the 1880's, steamers with greater cargo
capacity were calling, loading and discharging at various
ports. The factor of wind that had determined sailings
between the islands was of less importance and steamships
with their heavier working expenses did not wish to hold
93
over if it could be avoided. Pickford and Black claimed
that their steamship captains were afraid to approach the
91
islands at night.
There was much loading and unloading in shipping sugar
from the colonies. Most estates had their own small shipp¬
ing bays and wharves fitted with hand-operated winches, and
from these sugar was loaded on to the droghers and taken to
°5
the main port of the colony.'' Much of Jamaican sugar ex¬
ports were loaded directly from the drogher to the steamer
waiting off shore, from the estates chiefly along the. Bay
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of Lucea and Montego Bay,' In most of the smaller colonies
this sugar was warehoused at the port and from there loaded
on /
on to a lighter and. transferred to the ship when it arrived.
If times of loading were well arranged, the sugar could he
loaded on/^he ship directly from the dragher bringing it
from the estate to the port. However, most sugar was ware¬
housed at the port of the colony in the process of export.
Georgetown, British Guiana, had thirty such private warehouse
Inland estates, such as Worthy Park, which were suffic¬
iently profitable in the prosperous period of the sugar in¬
dustry to justify hauling sugar over miles of rough road
(at a terrible cost to draft animals) had, by the later
years of the 19th century, nearly all gone out of sugar cul-
.. 98tivati on.
With the development of the railroad, in British Guiana,
Trinidad and Jamaica, some plantations shipped sugar to the
ports via this medium, on which they usually enjoyed favour-
99
able freight rates. But as these railways usually skirted
the coastline on v/hich sugar estates bordered, as in Trinidad
and British Guiana, sugar planters preferred the cheaper
dr&gher which, with its one large square sail, was still a
familiar sight at the end of the century.
As the result of ample cheap labour, expense in handling
sugar /
sugar at the colonial ports was not excessive. The usual
loading charge for a hogshead of sugar was 4d.-5d. and for
A fH
a bag of 250 pounds, 21/2d,
With the increasing number of steamships calling at the
various ports of the sugar colonies, it was found necessary
to improve harbour facilities and navigational aids. In
1869, the careenage s.t Bridgetown was being altered to ac¬
commodate steamships "up to 72 feet across at the paddle
102
boxes", In 1886, £70,000 was spent on improving the
103
harbour of Castries, St, Lucia, and by 1887, this harbour
and Kingston, Jamaica, were the only ports at which ships
drawing 27 feet could dock.^^ In Trinidad, the Caroni
river was deepened gradually after 1886 to permit steamships
105
to come up to Port of Spain. In British Guiana, the
Committee of Pilotage was empowered to purchase certain tall
chimneys situated on sugar plantations and which for many
years had served as landmarks for ships approaching the low-
106
lying shore, but which the sugar planters proposed to move.
By 1890, regular steamship service was established bet¬
ween all the British West Indies, the United Kingdom and the
United States. In 1889, a steamship service was established
around /
around the island ox Trinidad and direct to New York, giving
sugar planters the opportunity of loading sugar offshore to
107
steamers, instead of droghering to Port of Spain.
The manager of Estridge's estate, in St. Kitts,in 1881,
stated that -
"English sailing ships began to cease calling at the
108island as the chance of obtaining produce decreased".
By this date most of the sugar from St. Kitts was going via
American steamers to the United States. Being almost the
last colony on the northern journey of ships returning from
South America and the West Indies, St. Kitts planters often
experienced difficulty in that space on ships was occupied
109
by sugar from the more southern colonies. Despite there
being less competition for freight in St. Kitts, the manager
of Canada estate, maintained that he realized £1 more per ton
of sugar in shipping to the United States rather than to
the United Kingdom.110 Montserrat planters being slightly
off the recognized sailing route and also at the end of the
northern journey through the islands, stated that charges




By 1890j freight on sugar carried to New York from
Barbados was 16s. per ton, compared to £2 ~ £2: 10s. per
112ton to London. In addition to the lesser freight charge
there was less drainage of molasses in going to the United
States, Despite the quicker transport by steamers, molasses
drainage on theocean trip to the United Kingdom was still
110
anywhere from 10-12 per cent when hogsheads were used.
On the trip to New York from Barbados, muscovado sugar lost
114-
an estimated per cent in weight by drainage. Various
port charges in New York and London harbours were equal except
that barging as necessary in London, and which cost 1s. per
115
ton, was unnecessary in New York, " and in addition the charge
of draft, peculiar to London, was not deducted by the New
York buyer (draft was an allowance made to the refiner or
wholesale grocer in London for sugar whcih adhered to the
cask and was usually estimated at 2 pounds per hogshead.
By 1895, sailing ships handled very little West Indies
sugarj Sandbach, Parker and Company speak of selling their
small sailing ships at the end of the century and shipping
by steamers of the regular lines, especially those of the
Trinidad /
Trinidad Trading Corporation, carrying up to 3,000 tons of
117
sugar per ship.
The rediiction in shipping oosts and speedier transport
contributed towards the reduction in price of sugar during
the second half of the century. Freight on sugar carried
to the United Kingdom, was reduced approximately £1 per ton
during the period 1865 ~ 1900. Sugar exported to the
United States from British Guiana, in 1897 was carried for
as low as 9/4d. per ton, representing a drop of approximately
119
one-half from the charge of 18s. - £1 per ton in 1865.
Even sugar carried from British Guiana to Few York at 9/4d.
per ton, found it difficult to compete with beet sugar
carried by subsidized German lines from Hamburg to Hew
1 on
York at 7/6d, per ton in the 1890*s.
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BEET SUGAR COMPETITION 1884 - 1896.
ROYAL COMMISSION 1897,
ABOLISHMENT OF BOUNTIES 1903.
Following the great drop in the price of sugar in
1884, there was no cessation of beet sugar competition in
the United Kingdom, market.
The following figures (in thousands of tons) indicate
the total imports of sugar into the United Kingdom during
the period 1884 - 1900, and show the decreasing amount of
British West Indies sugar going to the United Kingdom market
The balance of sugar exports from the British West Indies
were almost entirely to the United States.
Tots.l B.W. Indies Imports of Sugar into United Kingdom




1884 329 168 414
1885 283 138 423
1886 256 99 367
1887 336 108 331
1888 299 106 468
1889 289 94 376
1890 298 67 216
1891 264 54 298
1892 279 75 311
1893 273 61 307
1894 260 85 239
1895 236 85 243
1896 206 72 226
1897 254 47 228
1898 289 41 235
1899 244 39 106















1,117 1, 41 9
1,258 1 406
1,362 1,476
Note to Table .
x-
(By far the greatest- proportion of beet sugar came from
Germany, e.g. 1896 (in thousands of tons) Germany 755,
France 143, Holland 106, and the balance made up by
various other European countries)2
Bounties on German and French sugar during the period
1884 - 94, averaged approximately £1 per ton and £5 per ton
respectively, but by 1894 were down to 12/6d, per ton in
the case of Germany and £2: 8s. per ton in the case c£
-v 3France.
On August 1st 1896, the bounties in both countries
were approximately doubled, so that by the end of 1896,
3
they stood at £1: 5s, and £4:-iOs.
Cost of producing beet and cane sugar by 1890 was ap¬
proximately equal and in some instances vacuum pan sugar
a h1'*
made in British Guiana and Trinidad, was produced at a below
£> ^
that for whioh German beet sugar with the advantage of the
bounty. Comparative cost of beet and cane sugar per ton in
1895 - 6 was
Beet sugar (Germany) £9: 12: 0d,^"
Cane sugar (Demerara) £9: 5: 0d.
On some estates in British Giiiana, as those of the Colonial
Company /
Company? sugar was produced, at as low as £8: 19: 4d. and
5at the Usine St. Madeline in Trinidad, for slightly less."
The advantage that beet sugar had in the price for which
it could be sold in the United Kingdom market, arose not so
much from the bounty (which, in the case of Germany, the
greatest exporter to the United Kingdom, was never more than
a £1 per ton until 1896) but, rather from the lower freight
charge on sugar from German ports to the United Kingdom,
approximately 6s. per ton compared to about £2 per ton from
the West Indies.
The price of raw sugar in London by 1895 - 6 was £11: 6s.
6
per ton, Thus German raw beet sugar, with the advantage of
the bounty of £1 per ton (1896) less the cost of freight
6s. per ton, was realising a profit of £2: 8s. per ton.
Vacuum pan sugar from the' British West Indies however, did
no more than break even if sold in the United Kingdom.
Demerara yellow crystals (also produced in Trinidad) were
in a'better position. This special form of sugar, made by
adding a small amount of sulphuric acid to the clarified
juice, oost only a few shillings more per ton to produce
than ordinary vacuum pan sugar, but brought, on an average,
£1 /
7
2 per ton more than beet sugar in the London market.
Yellow Dernerara crystals had a limited and prized market,
and, by the late 1890's, this too was being invaded by beet
crystals 'doctored' to resemble Deraerara crystals.
Muscovado sugar, which in 1890 formed by far the
greatest quantity of sugar produced in the sugar colonies,
apart from British Guiana, was in the worst position of all
classes of sugar sold in the United Kingdom market. By
1895 Muscovado sugar, which cost approximately £9 per ton to
produce in the colonies, was quoted at from £7: 14s. to
£10: Os. per ton and could not he sold at this price on
8
the London market.
It was evident in the.United Kingdom by 1890 that
public taste in the matter of sugar had changed. The
British public quickly appreciated the dry white semi, or
fully refined beet sugar that came in a granulated state
from the continent. The British refiner "who produced the
9
filthy pieces that turned black in the cup" 'was doomed.
Muscovado sugar was poor refining sugar, as the loaf sugar
refiners had remarked as early as 1862 (see p./0°). The
loss hy shrinkage, so common in muscovado sugar, continued
after /
after it was refined in the United Kingdom. Beet sugar
lost no weight in transit, and wholesalers.were quick to
appreciate this saving. Loss of weight in storage and
transit had been an endless source of complaint between the
grocer and the wholesale dealer. On the top of invoices
for British pieces it was stated -
"All English and Scotch sugars sold by filled out
10
weight and no responsibility taken for shrinkage".
Grocers claimed that the 'pieces' were filled out hot and
that "the art of the sugar refiner was to make them carry
11
moisture".
As regards raw sugar for direct consumption in the con¬
fectionary trades, some refined beet sugar, almost white in
colour and in a dry state, -was infinitely preferred to muc-
uovado and was extensively used in jam making. In 1899, a
prominent confectioner stated -
"ho self-respecting confectioner will be bothered with
the huge dirty casks and syrupy bags in which cane sugar is
mainly imported now, he may buy some of it for special work




Tate, ancl Messrs. lyle, in the late 1880's were im¬
porting thousands of tons of Java sugar in their own sailing
ships, and Mr. Crosfield in 1896, estimated that nine-tenths
of the cane sugar used in the refining industry came from
13
Java, Manilla and Brazil. Java vacuum sugar was pro¬
duced at a very low price, chiefly Because of the low price
of labour (3d. per day) in that colony. In addition, in the
1890's, the depreciation of their standards of value - silver
and the rupee, relative to the gold standard of the West
Indies, gave the East Indies an advantage in selling sugar
in the United Kingdom.^
Even this foreign cane sugar gradually lost out to
beet sugar, as figures given on .show. Those refiners
who were using both this foreign cane sugar and semi-refined
whthf Mijak'f to with beef
beet sugarAwhich came into the United Kingdom from Germany
in the 1890's in enormous quantities.
Reduction in the cost of producing beet sugar continued
throughout the 1890fs. Some of the West Indian planters,
especially those of British Guiana, appreciated the technical
improvements /
improvements made in the German sugar industry, and admitted
that it was not alone bounties and lower freight charges
which enabled German beet sugar to come into the United
"1 5
Kingdom at a low price. But sugar had certain advantages
not enjoyed "by sugar cane. Beet root p^^lp from factories
was in great demand for cattle food, and a prosperous cattle
(t>
1 0
industry had been built up in sugar beet areas in Germany.
The beet root also played an imj^otant part in the crop
rotation system. The sugar1 beet industry employed a large
working population the year round.Harvest of the beet took
place in the Autumn and the beet could be stored; manu-
1 7
facturing of sugar took place during the winter months.
The by-product beet molasses, much inferior to sugar cane
molasses produced a great quantity of cheap spirit, which
was shipped abroad disguised as Scotch whisky, gin and Jamaica
18
rum.
Witnesses who visited German villages in the beet sugar
industry area before and after its great development re¬
marked on the change from former destitution to present
prosperity.1^
Bounties /
Bounties were, no doubt, a drain on tlie exchequers of
Europe, but benefits derived were diffused so as to have a
wide and appreciable influence on the country's economy.
Bounty on export of beet sugar was only one aspect of German
policy to develop industry by state assistance. But sugar
by the late 1890's was carried 011 subsidized steamship
lines, and the whole German system of light railways re¬
ceived a boost from the enormous expansion of the beet
20
sugar industry.
But sugar was also exported to the United States and
lowered the price of sugar in that- country (beet sugar ex¬
ports from Germany to the United States rose from 200,000
tons in 1887 to 717,170 tons in 1897)/"''
Fortunately a reciprocal trade agreement between the
major British West Indies sugar colonies and the United
Stales in 1892, further enhanced the value of thai market
22
to the sugar colonies. A price had. to be paid for this
reciprocity chiefly in the form of removal of duties on food¬
stuffs which came principally from the United States and,
which duties formed the. chief revenue of the sugar colonies.
Compensating measures were necessary in all colonies excei3t
Jamaica /
Jamaica which was suificiently prosperous to require no
2*5alternative revenue to make up the loss., The compen¬
satory measures in the other colonies took the form chiefly
of increased export duties on sugar products.
This reciprocity was short-lived. A new president in
the United States in 1894, resulted in duty changes. There
had been, in addition, complaints on the part of the United
States Government that the British West Indies had not re¬
ciprocated sufficiently and that imports from the United
OA
Kingdom were unduly favoured in the colonies. Recip¬
rocity at the end of 1894 was terminated.
With the termination of the commercial agreement with
the United States, in 1894, the sugar colonies were in a
CC
difficult position. But competition was severe in both
the United States end United Kingdom market. United States
refiners were less inclined to use muscovado unless it were
centrifugalled, i.e. dried, and, in addition, there was the
threat of Cuba's coming into the United States market as a
great sugar cane producer. To round off their difficulties
in 1896, both Germany and France doubled their bounties and
it appeared likely that a race of bounties between those two
countries /
9 5
countries had begun. As in 1884 - 6, 1894 - 6 marked the
depth of depression in the British West Indies, and, as in
1884, a number of commercial houses collapsed. Hawthorn
and Watson in Jamaica; Swendell and Mathews, St. Kitts-
Mevis; P. 3: G. Garroway, Antigua; Gregor Turnbull and
Company, Messrs. Burnley, both of Trinidad all went under.
Messrs. Daniels, one of the oldest and most widely connected
96
of West Indies houses also went down. These firms were
connected with both vacuum pan and muscovado estates.
Daniels and Company were purported to have lost over one
2fl
million pounds in the trade. *
Gloomy conditions were reported in all the colonies.
In Barbados, plantations appraised at £15,000 in 1883, by
1896'were worth £5,500. The Receiver in Chancery for
Barbados applied to have those estates in his hands aban¬
doned, Barbados plantations long the best in the West
9g
Indies, by 1895 were experiencing !,a universal loss"." In
the Leewards sugar exports went down in value by £91,000 at
29 -
the end of 1894. in British Guiana, the Colonial Govern¬
ment appointed a Commission to report on how relief could be
30extended to the sugar estates."" The British Guiana. Bank
which /
3i
wiiioh had loaned money to estates also collapsed."'
Jamaica, alone of the sugar colonies, with little dependence
011 sugar, evinced prosperity, "Jamaican 4v' stock in the
London money market "being inferior only to Canada and the
Cape".52
The doubling of bounties on August 1st, 1896 by Germany
and France resulted in a further drop in the price of sugar
which, by 1897, was down to £10 per ton for raw sugar in the
London market. Muscovado sugar was down to £8: 2s. which
on the best estates left but a profit of 6s, per ton insuf¬
ficient to continue on, "iul; caused others a Ices."1"'
British West Indian sugar producers were claiming ,by
mid 1896,that their sugar industry was faced with extinction
3 Aunless the United Kingdom Government intervened. r
Ever since the early 1880's there had been complaints
and resolutions coming to the Colonial Office from the
sugar colonies in the West Indies in connection with depres¬
sion, and the need for action by the United Kingdom to bring
about the abolition of bounties. Colonial Office indif¬
ference to these complaints appears to have arisen from a
conviction that the immense boon to the British public in
having /
having cheap sugar from the continent far outweighed the
attempts of the West India Committee to awaken honest Im¬
perial enthusiasm through the columns of the "limes" and by
35
organizing anti-bounty organizations.
In addition, there was the definite feeling in the
Colonial Office that beet competition had a healthy effect
on the British lest Indies in forcing them to abandon
obsolete methods of sugar production. Lord Derby, Secre¬
tary of State for Colonies had remarked in 1884 -
"It will be a great step if the present crisis turns
those who survive it to the best methods of manufacturing
36
sugar as their only hope of prosperity".''
By the end of 1884, when depression had shown no signs of
lessening, Derby also stated -
"No doubt there must be a revolution in lest Indian
methods, but I am not sure that it would be wise or right
37
to leave them to their own devices at the present juncture".
Apparently it was "wise or right", to leave the British
West /
having cheap sugar from the continent far outweighed the
attempts of the West India Committee to awaken honest Im¬
perial enthusiasm through the columns of the "limes5' and by
35
organizing anti-bounty organizations.
In addition, there was the definite feeling in the
Colonial Office that beet competition had a healthy effect
on the British West Indies in forcing them to abandon
obsolete methods of sugar production. Lord Derby, Secre¬
tary of State for Colonies had remarked in 1884 -
"It vdll.be a great step if the present crisis turns
those who survive it to the best methods of manufacturing
36
sugar as their only hope of prosperity".""
By the end of 1884, when depression had 3hown no signs of
lessening, Derby also stated -
"ho doubt there must be a revolution in West Indian
methods, but 1 am not sure that it would be wise or right
37
to leave them to their own devices at the present Juncture".
Apparently It was "wise or right", to leave the British
West /
pi
West Indies sugar producers to their own devices, for there
is no evidence of sympathy in the Colonial Office towards
their continual complaints of depression throughout the
period 1884 - 94. The bulk of West Indies sugar was also
going to the United States and their claim for Imperial action
was not held to be justified considering the anall propor¬
tion of their sugar consumed in the United Kingdom.
By 1895j it was evident from the collapse of West
Indian houses-, and the drop in the price of sugar, apart
from the increased agitation of the West India Committee,
that distress in the West Indies was genuine, but even at
this.date the Colonial Office's view is expressed in a
minute to the effect that -
"Our policy ought, I think, to he to let mortgagees
and encumbrancers foreclose and if they cannot make the
38
estates pay, let them sell them to those who can".
The Under Secretary of State's added note to this minute
states -
"I am afraid no one would buy, there are hundreds of
mortgagees in England, who would thankfully sell".
In /
In 1895, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain became Secretary of
State for Colonies. By this year, Free Trade Doctrine in
the United Kingdom was less strong. Germany and the United
States were encroachirg on Britain's overseas markets, and
there was increased Imperial enthusiasm in the United King¬
dom. Mr. Chamberlain showed more solicitude towards the
sugar proprietors than his predecessors although his public
utterances of sympathy with their plight are at variance
with opinions expressed in official correspondence at the
Colonial Office.
In 1895, remarking on a letter from a sugar proprietor,
Mr. Ewart, who complained of depression, Mr. Chamberlain
stated -
"Americans say that hereditary West Indians like Mr.
Ewart appear to have been born tired, in which opinion there
is a good deal of truth".^
In 1896, Chamberlain remarked -
"I have felt more than once or twice, that the British
West Indies sugar colonies show very little energy. If
they /
they had devoted to cultivation of the cane as much in¬
dustry and science as other countries have given to "beet
4-1
they would have been in a much better position,"
Mr. Chamberlain qualified these remarks to the effect that
they did not apply to sugar planters in British Guiana.
As the result the doubling of bounties on August 1st,
1896 by Germany and France, and active agitation by the
West India Committee for action to end bounties, Mr. Cham¬
berlain was apparently convinced of the need for action.
In the autumn of 1896, Mr. Cznarikow began a rumour that
German Consuls in the British West Indies had been requested
to inform the Home government as to how long the sugar-cane
industry in the colonies could withstand bounties and what
extra bounty was suggested. Hie truth of this report,
according to ColoniaL Office comment on the incident, is
difficult to ascertain but it does appear to have had a
stimulating effect in bringing action for a removal of
bounties.42
In a speech of November 9th, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain




non-intervention as hitherto pursued in regard to bounties".
In the same month Chamberlain proposed to the Treasury that
a Royal Commission be sent to ;the West Indies to enquire
into the effect of foreign sugar bounties on their prin¬
cipal industry. Mr. Chamberlain "desired not so much an
academic inquiry into the bounty legislation as a reliable
presentation of evidence",^"4 and stated on December 16th,
1896 -
"The appointment of the Royal Commission may indirectly
assist matters by suggesting to' Foreign Governments the
possibility of our taking some action if bounties are con-
4-5
tinned1'. '
1 Royal Commission, consisting of Sir Edward Grey, Sir
Henry Horman (a former financial secretary to the Governor
General of India) and with Doctor Morris (Assistant Directoi*
of Kew Gardens and with years of experience in the West
Indies) as expert adviser*, proceeded to the West Indies in
* The West India Committee opposed the appointment of Dr.
Morris on the ground that he had often minimized the
importance of the sugar industry to the British West
Indies.Colonial Office comment on West India opposition
to Dr. Morris appointment'was that "it shows the worst
side of the sugar planters - their intense jealousy of
any other industry in the West Indies - it will do them
more harm than good". (C.O. 318/289 Mar. 17, 1897).
a6
December, 1896 returning at the end of April. 1897/'' In
addition to evidence taken in the West Indies, further wit¬
nesses were examined in London (such as, Mr. Cznarikow, sugar
broker, Mr. late, sugar refiner, and Sir Ti. Lubbock, Chairman
of the West India Committee).
Ihe Report of the Commission, general in its nature,
stated that the depression in the West Indies sugar in¬
dustry was due to the competition of other sugar producing
countries and in a special degree to the competition of beet
sugar produced under a system of bounties. The Commissioners
stated -
"The special causes of the present depression have only
begun seriously to affect the sugar producing colonies within
4-7
the last fifteen years'1.
>
Imperfect manufacture, extravagant management or ab¬
senteeism were not in any considerable degree the cause of
the depression, although there were many places where sugar
was not produced by the latest and best methods diie chiefly
to a conviction that in the face of bounty competition it
would be of no avail.
Apart /
Apart from the recommendation of central factories
in these colonies suited to their establishment, the Royal
Commission was more interested in alternatives to, rather
than the rehabilitation of the sugar industry.
The special remedies or measures of relief unanimously
recommended were, settlement of labourers on plots of land;
establishment of minor agricultural industries; improved
communication; encouragement of the fruit trade; and the
grant of an Imperial loan for the establishment of central
A 9
factories in Barbados.
All Commissioners agreed that the best immediate remedy
for the depression in the sugar industry "would be the
50
abandonment of the bounty system by continental nations" ,
but looking to the future, the uncertain tariff policy of
the United States, to the great cheapening of the cost of
production of beet sugar and the artificial stimulation of
the sugar industry in many countries "it is not clear that,
even if bounties were abolished, another crisis of a similar
character might not arise in the West Indies at a future
day".^
The Royal Commissioners' Report was submitted in the
Autumn /
?p/
Autumn of 1397. No action followed immediately.- The
only recommendation that would have had an immediate effect
would have been the abolition of bounties, and West Indian
agitation for this action to be taken was lessened in the
autumn of 1897, ?/hen the United States placed a counter¬
vailing duty 011 bounty subsidized sugar imports to the full
extent of the bounty. By February, 1898, German exports
of beet sugar to the United States dropped from 717,170 tons
52
in 1897 to 17,000 tons. This shutting out of beet sugar
from the United States was worth 09s. per ton to the West
53
Indian producer, and lessened their drive for the removal
of bounties and the implementation of the recommendations
of the Royal Commission . At this stage, oddly, the Leewards
petitioned the home Government for compensation in case the
United States removed countervailing duties. Some muscovado
producers now maintained that as their was a definite market
for muscovado and few countries were engaged in producing
it, "Barbados and the Leewards would err if they sought to
54
replace it by more highly refined sugar".
Despite the countervailing duty imposed in the United
States, German beet sugar exports to that country, were by
1900 /
1900 "back to their original level, without having had any
increase in bounty, hut did have subsidized steamship trans-
port at 7/(, per ton to New York.'' The British West Indies
sugar produced however still had an advantage on beet sugar
in the United States market to the extent of the counter¬
vailing duty against bounties and, by 1900, three-quarters
of British West Indies sugar was going to the United States.
Despite this greater proportion of British West Indies
sugar going to the United States market, the West India Com¬
mittee continued to petition the home Government for the re¬
moval of bounties. Uncertainty of the United States market
and the fiscal policy of that country which was being adjusted
to favour the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines and finally
Cuba, was the cause of much of this agitation for removal
56
of the bounties.
Behind much of the uncertainty of the United States
market was the fear of potentiality of Cuba as the great
supplier of cane sugar to the United States. Prior to
1880, British West Indian planters had remarked that the
freeing of the slaves in Cuba would hinder that colony's
57
sugar industry, A view commonly held was that Emancipation
of /
of the slaves in Cuba would result in a relapse into a state
of affairs as existed in the Jamaican sugar industry.^
Cuba had far more available land and other products to at¬
tract the freed slaves than ever existed in Jamaica. Events
in Cuba had not fulfilled such expectation, American capi¬
tal had been increasingly invested in Cuba and the growth
of the colono (cane farming) system with the exploiting of
great tracts of virgin soil in the eastern portion of the
59island , plus the establishment of central factories of
large capacity; resulted in an enormous increase in sugar
production. By 1894, Cuba was the largest cane sugar pro¬
ducer in the world manufacturing one million tons in that
year. The Cuban rebellion which broke out in 1895 reduced
60
exports of sugar to77,000 tons in that year, ' and but for
the great increase in bounty fed sugar in 1896, would have
temporarily raised the price of sugar. The cessation of
the Spanish-American War in December 1898, and Cuba's becomin
a protectorate of the United States, diverted the hulk of
Cuban sugar to that market ana in 1903, the United States
granted preferential rates to Cuban sugar to the extent of
a 20fo advantage over British West Indies sugar, ^
The /
The other factor which .induced the West India Committee
to persist in its agitation for removal of bounties was,-this
body itsoIf which hud long boon representative, more or less,
of all the sugar colonies, was, in the last decade of the nine¬
teenth century, more nearly representative of British Guiana
62
and Trinidad. " The Colonial Office by 1894, was equating
the West India Committee with the "large sugar growers of
63British Guiana' "who were nearly all large mercantile houses
in the United Kingdom. The decline of Jamaica's sugar in¬
dustry and its practical extinction in a number of the smaller
islands, followed by the liquidation of Messrs. Daniels who
largely represented Barbadian interests, left British Guiana
and, to a lesser extent, Trinidad, the two colonies most
A
influentially represented in the West India Committee.
These two colonies had continued to send yellow crystals
to the United Kingdom long after muscovado sugar ceased to
go there. By the late 1890's, these yellow crystals formed
the greater part of the value of British West Indies sugar
exports to the United Kingdom, where a definite specialised
market existed for this class of sugar. British Guiana and
Trinidad vacuum s-«4a3? sugar producers valued this market
highly /
highly "both "because of the £1 - £2 advantage it had over
"beet crystals and becaoise of the increasing difficulty of
obtaining good prices for their grey refined crystals in
65
the United States.
Throughout the 1890's the introduction of doctored
yellow beet crystals hit this exclusive London market, and
the West India Committee was busy during the last decade
of the century bringing legal action against purveyors of
66
yellow beet crystals under the name of Demerara crystals.
By the end of 1897, it was estimated that 1,500 tons of beet
crystals were dyed in the London market and sold a-t below
the price of Lemerara crystals.^ These yellow beet crys¬
tals had a strong chemical odour but with their attractive
appearance sold well. By 1897, it was stated, as regards
Demerara crystals that, "a very few thrifty middle classes
63
still show discriminating preference".
This new form of competition from beet sugar explains
much of the continued agitation against bounties by the
West India Committee.
British refiners were also strenuously opposing bounties
having been submitted to increasing pressure from the great
amount /
amount of German refined sugar that came into the United
Kingdom in the 1890's. Of the ten refineries in Liver¬
pool in 1890, there were hut five left in 1896, and the state
69of Greenock was spoken of as disastrous.
By 1898, Mr. Chamberlain was again urging steps for
the removal of bounties, There was less Free Trade op¬
position to their removal and it was evident by this year
that feeling on the continent was more amenable to a dis¬
cussion of a means of abolition of the bounty system. The
action of the United States in imposing countervailing duties
70
in 1897 was followed by India in 1899.'' A fresh confer¬
ence of the Powers which had assembled at Brussels in June
71
1898 adjourned indefinitely with no concrete result, but
following the action of the Indian Government in 1899, in
levying a countervailing duty, and investigation in Germany
into the sugar cartel system in that country hastened action.
When the cartel got to work in Germany, the price of refined
sugar in that country (already very high because of a pro¬
hibitive duty of £10 per ton) rose by £7 per ton. The
disclosure of t'he enormous profits made by the cartel de~
72
cided public opinion in Germany against bounties. When
the /
the Sugar Bounties Conference re-adjourned in 1900, and.
France was also now more agreeable to the idea of the re¬
moval of bounties,in view of Germany's attitude. Following
negotiations and conferences in 1900 and 1901, a Convention
was signed on March 2nd, 1902, ratified on February 1st,
73
1903, and came into force on September 1st, 1903.
West Indian difficulties were not ameliorated during this
period of protracted negotiations, despite their sending
most of their sugar to the United States market. The great
quantity of cane and beet sugar going into that country
had forced down the price of sugar so that Muscovado sugar
from Barbados had fallen, from £8; 10s. per ton in 1901 to
74-
£5: 15s. in 1902. The indefinite adjournment of the
Bounty Conference of 1898 had caused a feeling of little
hope of bounties being abolished. As in 1884, there was
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talk in the colonies of joining the United States.' y The
question of central factories also came up again and as the
Royal Commission of 1897 had recommended their establishment,
and specifically so in the case of Barbados, the Imperial
Government was willing to grant a loan for this purpose to
Barbados. In 1899 Mr. Chamberlain commissioned Sir C.
Quilter /
37''
Quilter and Sir N. Lubbock, Chairman of the West India
Committee, to report on the prospect of the establishment
of central factories in the West Indies.These two
gentlemen did a yachting tour of the West Indies. Nothing
constructive resulted from their visit. Private capita]., for
such a venture could not be had. An attempt to interest
Sir Thomas Upton in the idea of central factories fell
through, he having no intention of investing capital -unless
77
assurance of the removal of bounties was given. The same
former difficulties, as regards attorneys and mortgagees
opposition, v/as also revealed, A feeling was also still
said to exist that bounties might be abolished and thus
existing appliances would still make sugar production
no
profitable,
By 1902, the project of central factories was still
only contemplative. There did not seem to be any like¬
lihood of private capital ooming in until the convention
for the removal of bounties was ratified. On the other
hand, the Imperial Government was unwilling to advance a
loan unless they were absolutely certain that no private
capital would come in. Finally, the possibility of bounties
being /
being abolished, lessened the urgency for the establish¬
ment of central factories. With the signing of the Con¬
vention on March 1st, 1902, West Indian hopes soared.
Sugar proprietors' optimism and their feeling that the
golden era was about to return was reflected in March 1902,
when Dr. Morris stated,, in regard to Barbados -
"People here already regard the removal of bounties
as likely to increase the value of sugar properties to
about 100$ - but as they were worth practically nothing
79
before, this may not mean much".
CONCLUSION
The cessation of "bounties on "beet sugar on September
1stj 1903, had no miraculous effect on the British West
Indies sugar industry. The beet sugar industry was too
well established to be seriously affected by the removal of
bounties. There was only a limited market for West Indies
sugar in the United Kingdom (in 1909, out of total United
Kingdom consumption of 1,600,000 tons, only 129,000 tons wa.s
■j
cane sugar), and beet sugar producers knew how to retain
that market by prohibitive duties at home to keep down con¬
sumption and by cheap steamship freight charges and by in¬
creasing technical efficiency.
With the abolition of bounties in 1901, United States
countervailing duties also ended and British West Indies
cane and beet sugar competed on equal terms in this market
where Cuba enjoyed a preference of 20£,
The first year following the cessation of bounties there
was only a slight increase in the price of sugar ~ confoundin
both the Cobden Club and the West India Committee who had pre
2
dieted price rises of £8 and £2 per ton respectively, A
failure /
CONCLUSION
The cessation of bounties on beet sugar on September
1stj 1900, had no miraculous effect on the British West
Indies sugar industry. The beet sugar industry was too
well established to be seriously affected by the removal of
bounties. There was only a limited market for West Indies
sugar in the United Kingdom (in 1909, out of total United
Kingdom consumption of 1,600,000 tons, only 129,000 tons was
cane sugar), and beet sugar producers knew how to retain
that market by prohibitive duties at home to keep down con¬
sumption and by cheap steamship freight charges and by in¬
creasing technical efficiency.
With the abolition of bounties in 1903, United States
countervailing duties also ended and British West Indies
cane and beet sugar competed on equal terms in this market
where Cuba enjoyed a preference of 20#.
The first year following the cessation of bounties there
was only a slight increase in the price of sugar - confounding
both the Cobden Club and the West India Committee who had pre-
2
dieted price rises of £8 and £2 per ton respectively. A
failure /
failure of the "beet crop in 1905 brought a price rise from
£8 to £16 per ton but by 1906, beet sugar exports into the
United Kingdom were greater than ever and the price of sugar
3in London was back to £8 per ton.
The United Kingdom cane sugar refining industry was
practically extinct at the end of 1902; of the fifteen
surviving refineries only one refined cane sugar. When in
World War I beet sugar supplies were cut off, Britain had
to go to New York for her refined sugar.^
The saving feature in the decade following the removal
of bounties was the growth of the Canadian market. In
1898, as regards British West Indies difficulties, Mr,
Fielding, Minister of Finance for Canada, stated that Canada
had some Imperial responsibilities in the matter. In
1898 Canada admitted British West Indies sugar under a pre¬
ferential rate of 25# below existing duties and this was
raised to 53in 1900.^ In 1903, when the United States
imposed countervailing duties against bounty sugar, Canada
placed a surtax on German sugar imports into Canada to the
extent of 33IS#- The steady expansion of the Canadian market-
is shown in imports of British West Indian sugar which rose
from /
from 11,000 tons in 1897 to 133,000 tons by 1909.'
The muscovado industry in the smaller colonies, es¬
pecially Barbados,was undoubtedly permitted to survive as
a result of the demand for this type of product in Canada.
A large amount of molasses was absorbed in the lumbering
industry and the fishing industry, where it was used as a
staple food. As was the ca.se with the United States trade,
Canadian commission merchants, chiefly those located in
Halifax and St. John's New Brunswick,established connections
with West Indian agents through whom they purchased sugar
. 8
supplies.
This thesis, covering the period, 1863 - 1900, has been
/
carried up to the date of abolition of bounties to show that
conditions after their removal did not restore solid pros¬
perity in the British West Indies. Sugar production was
never again so lucrative as in the day's prior to Emancipation,
although sugar proprietors never really looked upon the
palmy days as beyond recall. Bounty competition had greatly
helped to force down sugar production costs which were re¬
duced approximately one-half in the period 1884 ~ 1903.
The /
She price of sugar never rose to expected heights of £12 ~
£20 per ton except in two World 'Jars which did revive a
taste of the halcyon days.
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APPENDIX I.
ougar Machinery.
Most of the sugar machinery imported into the British
West Indies (1865 - 1900), came from England. There were
some instances of installation of German and Austrian mac¬
hinery. German technology had made a great advance in
connection with the "beet sugar industry, and a number of
the developments could be used in the cane sugar industry.
Quinton Hogg, the British Guiana planter, speaks of making
personal visits to Austria in the 1880's to purchase a triple
and multiple evaporator, and obtained his diffusion batteries
-l
at Sangerhaasen in Germany. Vacuum pans, clarifiers and
gadgets for testing and controlling sugar manufacture were
imported from Germany, chiefly for British Guiana sugar
estates, improvements being made.
Along with the purchase of German machinery, contacts
were made with German technologists - a number of whom came
out to British Guiana and Trinidad. Shortly after the mid
century, there was a German sugar boiler on plantation
2
Friends in British Guiana. By the 1890's German chemists
were /
were employed on most of the large estates as, Diamond,
3
Don Pareil and Reliance, The Planters Association of
British Guiana corresponded with a sugar expert, Professor
Horaberg, on the chemistry of sugar, and this Association
giving evidence in "1897, stated that the German chemists
and engineer employed had a familiarity with German beet
sugar factories,^" Eves, going out to the West Indies in
1896, speaks of E,a sprinkling of Germans on board, generally
chemists or engineers goint to large usines in Trinidad or
5
to set up diffusion sugar processes in Demerara".
Quinton Hogg also purchased French sugar equipment and
brought out a French chemist but stated that he shortly re-
r
verted to English machinery, it being the best.D
Apart from the few instances of import of German sugar
machinery and from France or Austria, the bulk of heavy
sugar machinery continued to come from the United Kingdom.
For example, in British Guiana, in 1890, (the year of greatest
foreign sugar machinery imports in the period 1872 - 1896),
figures for sugar machinery imported are: -
From U.K. From U.S.A. From other countries
£120,292: 11: 31/2d. £5,261: 1: 7d. £6,115: 3: 10d.
There /
There were a large number of light sugar mills imported
from the United States into Jamaica during the second half
of the century, for use by the peasant cultivator. By
the end of the century there were some 6,000 of these mills
in use in Jamaica. Chamberlain's circular to the governors
of British colonies in 1897, enquiring as to the extent of
foreign encroachment on British overseas markets, revealed
that only the lighter machinery came from the United States.
The chief engineering firms manufacturing sugar mac¬
hinery in the United Kingdom tended to concentrate in the
Glasgow area although there were three prominent exceptions -
Manlove, Alliott and Company of Nottingham, Fawcett, Preston
and Company of Liverpool and Fletcher of Derby, the latter
supplying the heaviest mills in use as,for example, those
of the Ua ne St. Madeline in Trinidad. Castings for mills
supplied by Fletcher of Derby in the mid nineteenth centuryy
were still in use in the mid twentieth century. The chief
Glasgow sugar engineering firms were McOnce and Harvey;
Mirlees, Watson; Craig and Company; Smith and Company;
Blair, Campbell and. McLean. These sugar firms did a world
wide /
wide business, and the British West Indies market was a
comparatively small one for sugar machinery (apart from
British Guiana and Trinidad).
Cuba was the chief buyer in the West Indies. For
example the mill book sales of Mirlees, Watson, Glasgow,
shows - 58 sugar mills sold in this island during the
period 1860 - 70, compared to 44 in Demerara and 27 in
Jamaica.10
There was a tendency in Jamaica, whenever depression in
the sugar industry was felt more than usual, to sell, sugar
machinery to Cuban planters. In 1866, it was stated that
sugar machinery costing thousands of pounds, was going to
11
Cuba at the price of old metal and some also went to Haiti.
In 1878 - 9, Y/hen beet competition was accelerating abandon-
12
ment of poorer estates, machinery was again sold to Cubans.
A number of estates sold by the Encumbered Estates Court
had been stripped of their machinery which was sold to Cuba.
English engineers v/ere employed oa ©any Cuban estates to set
up and to supervise machinery imported from England. This
factor may have been an incentive to purchase disused English
sugar machinery from not too-distant Jamaica.
•53?
1. P.P. 1898. Y. 50. Appendix C. Pt. I. p. 33.
2. Report on the Agricultural Wants of British Guiana by
Wm. Russell. Georgetown. 1876. p. 28.'
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